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The Bhagavad Gītā, a classical Sanskrit text, describes a spiritual practice 
called karma yoga.  Central to this practice is niṣkāma karman or action without 
desire. A number of philosophical issues present themselves in connection with this 
teaching.  First, while the Gītā enjoins action, action seems prima facie problematic in 
the Gītā in light of metaphysical claims that seem to deny human freedom.  Second, 
Western scholars who hold that desire is necessary for action find the Gītā’s 
desirelessness requirement problematic.  Finally, while the sense of karma yoga seems 
clear enough, the teaching is connected with two notions that are obscure: 
transcendence of the guṇa-s and surrender of action to Krishna.  This dissertation 
explores and seeks solutions to these problems. 
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the Gītā’s philosophy and selected 
classical Indian commentaries.  Chapter 2 tackles the assumption by some scholars 
that the Gītā shares tenets of the determinist metaphysics of classical Sāṃkhya.  This 
assumption is shown false and the argument made that the Gītā, as a yogic text, 
implies voluntarism.  Chapter 2 offers an analysis of the Gītā’s concept of guṇa 
(literally ‘strand’), and argues that the puruṣa, or self, which is called a ‘consenter’ 
exercises agency in consenting.  Chapter 3 addresses the worry that niṣkāma karman, 
or desireless action, is a contradictory notion because desire is necessary for action.  
 
 v 
Based on examination of the Gītā’s theory of action, it is shown that the Gītā does not 
hold desire necessary for action and that in fact the text articulates four distinct types 
of niṣkāma karman.  Chapter 4 explores the concepts of transcendence of the guṇa-s 
and surrender of action to Krishna and develops a definition of karma yoga involving 
these concepts.  The chapter concludes with an argument that karma yoga requires 
creativity.  The dissertation closes with the suggestion that through karma yoga a 
practitioner might come to enjoy an extraordinary sort of freedom that surpasses the 
























The Bhagavad Gītā (BG), or Song of the Lord,  is probably India’s most 
widely-read religious text.  Composed between the 6th and 2nd centuries BCE, it is a 
small section of the much longer Mahābhārata (MBh), or Great Indian Epic.  The 
MBh tells the story of a great war between two clans, the Pandhavas and the Kauravas.  
The Gītā is a dialogue between the charioteer Krishna and the warrior Arjuna which 
takes place on the battlefield just before the battle begins.  In that dialogue, Krishna 
reveals himself as God incarnate and teaches Arjuna yoga, or spiritual practice.  
Specifically, he teaches karma yoga, a practice of good works. Important to karma 
yoga is what has come to be called niṣkāma karman or “action without desire.”   
Indian tradition considers Krishna a historical figure and the dialogue 
represented in the Gītā a historical event.  Out of respect for this tradition, I treat 
Krishna as the author of the teachings presented in the Gītā.   
The notion of niṣkāma karman seems, prima facie, to be at odds with “a 
dogma in [Western] philosophical psychology:”1 the Humean theory of motivation.  
Fundamental to this theory is the tenet that desire is necessary for action.   
In keeping with Humeanism, Western scholars of Indian philosophy have seen 
niṣkāma karman as deeply problematic.  They have argued that Indian tradition 
uniformly holds that desire is necessary for action and that so must the Gītā.  On this 
basis they put forward what Christopher Framarin calls “subset interpretations” of 
                         




niṣkāma karman.  Such interpretations assert that not all desires are to be abandoned in 
niṣkāma karman, only a certain subset of them.2 
However, according to J. N. Mohanty, Indian theories do not exhibit a 
uniformity of views about action.  While several do hold that desire is required for 
action, Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, for example, does not.3  As I will show, neither does the 
Gītā.  The subset interpreters of niṣkāma karman beg the question when they argue 
that all Indian philosophies hold desire necessary for action and so must the Gītā.  
Blinded, perhaps, by Humean dogmatism, these scholars have failed to 
recognize niṣkāma karman as a potential threat to the Humean theory of motivation.     
 Niṣkāma karman does constitute such a threat, all the more because the Gītā 
explicitly contrasts niṣkāma karman with action done from desire and understands the 
latter much like Hume does.  Hume explains that sensory perception induces desire 
and desire causes action.  This proceeds, he thinks, in a mechanistic fashion with no 
role for will.  The Gītā explains that perception of sense objects induces desire, and, in 
the ordinary person, desire seems to override will and force one to act (BG 3.36-37).   
 Niṣkāma karman, on the other hand, involves restraint of desire and the pursuit 
of ends determined in some other way.  But subset interpreters argue that while most 
desire is to be restrained, certain kinds of desire are allowable under niṣkāma karman, 
such as desire for liberation or non-selfish desires, and serve as sources of motivation.  
 I will argue that desire is not necessary for action according to the Gītā and 
that the karma yoga practitioner should not allow desire any role in his actions.  
                         
2 Christopher G. Framarin, “The Desires You Are Required to Get Rid of: A 
Functionalist Analysis of Desire in the Bhagavadgītā,” Philosophy East and West 56 
(2006): 605. 
 
3 J. N. Mohanty, Classical Indian Philosophy (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield 




Though it may be present, the practitioner should exercise restraint and not allow 
desire to motivate him. 
 In Chapter 1, I provide a brief philosophical introduction to the Gītā.  The 
purpose of the chapter is to elucidate the Gītā’s metaphysics, psychology, and ethics 
as relevant to my project.  
My account of niṣkāma karman depends on the agent possessing genuine 
freedom. This is problematic, for the text includes several verses that prima facie seem 
to deny freedom, such as the following. 
Actions are performed, in all cases,  
by the guṇa-s of prakṛti; 
one who is deceived by self-conceit  
thinks ‘I am the doer’.4 (BG 3.27) 
A longstanding trend in Gītā scholarship is to assume that the guṇa-s of the Gītā are 
to be understood in line with the school of classical Sāṃkhya.  Sāṃkhya takes the 
guṇa-s to be the fundamental constituents of material nature which produce all 
phenomena according to strict causal laws.  Commentators and scholars attribute this 
view to Krishna and, based on verses like BG 3.27, argue that Krishna is a determinist.   
 I begin Chapter 2 by arguing that the Gītā, as a yogic text, implies 
voluntarism.  I go on to review arguments that Krishna is a determinist, and then 
engage in a careful analysis of Krishna’s use of the concept of guṇa.  It is not difficult 
to show that the guṇa-s are not material constituents according to the Gītā.  They are 
discussed at length in Chapters 14, 17, and 18 of the Gītā in connection with 
cognitive, affective, desiderative, and experiential states, behavior, virtues, and vices.  
No verse in the Gītā positively ties the guṇa-s to a determinist metaphysics.  I argue 
that guṇa theory is a theory of psychology which is compatible with voluntarism. 
                         
4 All translations of verses of the Gītā are my own, unless otherwise noted. 
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Krishna is explicit in stating that an agent is necessary for action, but he 
provides no theoretical account of agency.  In Chapter 2, I develop a theory of agency 
and motivation that is consistent with, and indeed suggested by, the broader 
metaphysics of the Gītā. 
In Chapter 3, I entertain the views of subset interpreters and argue that they are 
incompatible with important elements of the text.  I show that Krishna explicitly 
differentiates three types of action according to the reasons for which they are 
performed.   One is action performed from a sense of duty, the second is action 
performed from desire, and the third is action performed from delusion.  The first and 
third are not motivated by desire.  This is made very clear in the text.  Therefore, they 
count as niṣkāma karman, and niṣkāma karman is to be understood as action in which 
desire plays no role.  Krishna states that he acts too, and that he is motivated by neither 
duty, desire, nor delusion.  His action counts as a third type of niṣkāma karman, which 
will be explained.   
In Chapter 3, I also address the question of what motivates a practitioner to 
take up and maintain karma yoga practice.  Throughout the text Krishna promises 
Arjuna that successful yoga practice culminates in liberation, or freedom from rebirth, 
a state characterized by bliss.  It seems, on the one hand, that this promise is supposed 
to motivate Arjuna to practice.  On the other hand, it seems that desire for liberation is 
not an allowable motivation under the karma yoga instructions.  (This is a puzzle 
occurring in all enlightenment traditions, Buddhist as well as Hindu.)  I show that as 
Krishna seems to understand it, desire is intentional and only takes as its objects 
external and internal phenomena expected to cause pleasure.  I argue that liberation is 
not a phenomenon, and therefore cannot be an object of desire.  The notion of desire 
for liberation is therefore incoherent.  I suggest that the motivation for yoga practice 




Finally, in Chapter 4 I argue that the action constitutive of karma yoga is 
nirguṇa karman, or action without involvement of the guṇa-s.   I define nirguṇa 
karman negatively as action by one who has transcended the guṇa-s, and positively as 
surrendering all action to God.   
Note that I translate the Sanskrit words īśvara and brahman as ‘God’.  I have 
chosen to use ‘God’ because the concept of the divine being developed in the Gītā is 
close enough to a Christian notion of God that comparison by the reader is probably 
inevitable.  The risk in using ‘God’, of course, is that it carries Christian connotations 
which may unduly color our reading of the text.  On the other hand, it may force the 
reader new to the Gītā to countenance cross-traditional differences as he finds a 
familiar term employed in unfamiliar ways.  I hope for the latter. 
Krishna identifies himself as God, describes his nature as God, and instructs 
the practitioner to worship him as God.  Yet, Krishna, as an incarnation of God, will 
someday die.  For clarity,  I use ‘God’ to refer to the creator and sustainer of the 
universe (īśvara) who is at the same time the absolute being (brahman).  I let 
‘Krishna’ refer to the incarnation of God who is the teacher in the Gītā. 
The notions of transcendence of the guṇa-s and surrendering action to God 
occur in critical places but nonetheless infrequently in Krishna’s teachings.  They have 
received scant attention from classical Indian commentators and almost no attention 
from Western Gītā scholars.  The classical commentators, for the most part, interpret 
these notions to accord with the determinism they think is implicit in the Gītā’s 
philosophy.  They take both the ideas of transcendence of the guṇa-s and surrendering 
action to God to be disidentification with one’s actions or the recognition that one’s 
actions are not one’s own doing.  I disagree and give a libertarian interpretation.  I 
argue that to transcend the guṇa-s is to refrain from acting for any of one’s own 
reasons such as duty, desire, or delusion, and to instead adopt God’s ends as one’s 
own.  I show that transcending the guṇa-s and surrendering action to God require 
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constant devotion to God.  Finally, I argue that the nirguṇa karman practitioner does 
not submit his will to God.  Rather, he chooses to take up God’s ends.  These ends are 
construed broadly.  I argue that there is room for choice and creativity in achieving 
these ends, and that in some cases choice and creativity are required.   
 The four main questions of this dissertation on the Gītā are:   
1. Is effort considered in principle possible?  
2. Is action in karma yoga to be free of all desire?  If so, how can action be 
performed without desire?  
3. How is action in karma yoga to be specifically characterized? 
4. What does it mean to transcend the guṇa-s and surrender action to God?  
For each issue I address I consider the positions taken by classical Indian 
commentators as available.  Hundreds of commentaries exist and I cannot consider 
them all.  I include what are perhaps the two most prominent: that of the non-dualist 
Śaṅkara (8th century CE), whose commentary is the oldest extant, and that of the 
qualified non-dualist Rāmānuja (12th century CE).  I also include the tantric 
Abhinavagupta (11th century CE), a voluntarist and sophisticated thinker, and 
Aurobindo (early 20th century CE), whose work is one of the more sensitive 
commentaries of the modern era. 
There are limits, it must be noted, to the use of the commentators’ work in 
understanding the Gītā.  Svāmī Ādidevānanda, in the preface to his translation of 
Rāmānuja’s Gītā commentary, writes: 
Every Vedāntic ācārya [teacher] has to justify his claim 
to that position by writing commentaries or bhāṣya-s on 
the three foundational texts of the Vedānta: the 
Upanishads, the Vedāntasūtra, and the Bhagavad Gītā.  
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Ever since the time of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya this convention 
has been in vogue.5 
In these commentaries a proponent of a school of thought interprets the Gītā according 
to his own system, often explaining away verses he cannot handle as meant for those 
not capable of grasping higher truths.  A commentator may also simply neglect to 
comment on a verse that directly challenges his view.  For example, Śaṅkara does this 
with BG 3.22 where Krishna says he engages in action.  That Krishna is inactive is 
fundamental to Śaṅkara’s view.6   
In Chapters 2 through 4, I consider the views of other modern Western 
scholars, namely George Teschner, Simon Brodbeck, Matthew McKenzie, Roy 
Perrett, Tara Chatterjea, Purushottama Bilimoria, and Christopher Framarin.  Their 
work constitutes the current research on free will and niṣkāma karman in the Gītā.   
I make use of terms, concepts, and distinctions developed by contemporary 
Western action theorists to help clarify my reading.  This places the Gītā’s action 
theory in a context familiar to the Western philosophic reader and thereby makes it 
more accessible.  There is only a limited extent to which the Gītā’s theories can be 
brought into dialogue with Western theories, however.  There are a great many issues 
of interest to Western action theorists about which Krishna simply does not worry.  
 
                         
5 Śrī Rāmānuja, Gītā Bhāṣya, trans. Svāmī Adidevānanda (Mylapore: Sri 
Ramakrishna Math, 1991) 9. 
 
6 Modern Western Gītā scholars such as Franklin Edgerton, J. A. B. van Buitenen, 
Eliot Deutsch, and others examine the Gītā’s metaphysics, soteriology, and so on.  
Their work is helpful because they set their own theoretical commitments aside, for 
the most part, and let the text speak for itself.  However, their treatments tend to be 
summary, capturing only general features of the text.  Their work informs the 
overview of the Gītā I provide in Chapter 1 but it less helpful later in the dissertation 





Reading the Gītā as a yogic text 
 
Krishna’s main concern in the Gītā is to teach yoga.  The theories he offers are 
meant to support his practical teachings.  Yoga works on the whole person but 
involves, importantly, conscious intervention in psychological processes and 
transformation of the inner landscape.  It is therefore necessary that Krishna provide 
not only a theoretical account of how things are but that he also describe how things 
seem to the practitioner at different stages of the yogic path.     
As Radhakrishnan puts it, Krishna employs two modes of speech, the 
subjective and objective.7  In the subjective mode he gives a phenomenological 
account of a state or practice.  In the objective mode he gives psychological and/or 
metaphysical accounts.  
Sometimes it is not clear which mode is being employed.  For example, 
liberation is described as blissful (BG 5.21, 5.24, 6.21, 6.27) and this is clearly 
phenomenological.  It is described as a state of release from the bondage of karman 
that leads to rebirth (BG 3.31, 9.28) and this is metaphysical/psychological.  It is also 
frequently described as “going to Krishna” or some equivalent thereof (BG 4.9, 7.23, 
8.5-8, 9.25, 10.10, 11.55).  It is not clear what mode is employed in such descriptions.  
It is not clear what “going to Krishna” might mean and the text does not elaborate on 
this notion.   
Rāmānuja takes the phrase to refer figuratively to escaping from the process of 
rebirth.8  Thus, he takes it as a stand-in for the metaphysical account of liberation 
                         
7 S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol. 2, 2nd ed. (London: George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd., 1931) 533. 
 
8 Rāmānuja, Gītā Bhāṣya 263. 
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given elsewhere.  In doing so, he ignores any content that it might add to his 
understanding of liberation.  An interpreter sensitive to the subjective mode will 
consider that “going to Krishna” might just mean feeling close to God.  Taken as 
phenomenological, the description adds something to our understanding of liberation.  
It provides an important indicator for the practitioner.  He will know he is liberated 
when, among other things, he has an abiding feeling of being close to God. 
A third mode of speech Krishna employs is the practical.  This is exemplified 
by many statements to Arjuna in the imperative tense.  Krishna commands Arjuna not 
to grieve, to fight, to give up desire, and so on.   But the practical mode is also used 
more subtly.  For example, consider the following verse. 
‘I do nothing whatsoever,’ 
the disciplined one who thinks this, 
though seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, 
eating, walking, sleeping, or breathing, knows the truth.  
(BG 5.8) 
While many interpreters have taken this verse as evidence of the view that the self is 
inherently passive,9 I read it as telling the practitioner to think ‘I do nothing’ not 
because that is true but because adopting this thought will have some effect on his 
mental state.  The instruction may be purely pragmatic. 
Each of these three modes of speech is indispensable to Krishna as a yoga 
teacher.  In interpreting the Gītā it is necessary to consider which mode is being 
employed.   
                         
9 Robert Minor, Bhagavad-Gītā: An Exegetical Commentary (New Delhi: Heritage 
Publishers, 1982) 191; Rāmājuna, Gītā Bhāṣya 195-96;  Śrī Śaṅkarācarya, The 








In this chapter I lay the groundwork for my project.  I provide a brief 
discussion of the Gītā’s storyline, define ‘yoga’, and address the traditional view that 
the Gītā teaches three distinct yogic paths. I argue that Arjuna is to be viewed as a 
new practitioner.  I provide a concise overview of the Gītā’s metaphysics, psychology, 
and ethics.  Finally, I summarize the views of the Indian commentators Śaṅkara, 
Rāmānuja, Abhinavagupta, and Aurobindo as relevant to their work on the Gītā. 
  
 
The Gītā’s storyline 
  
 Conflict over control of a kingdom sets the stage for the Gītā.  A group of 
brothers, the Pandhavas, have lost their portion of a kingdom to their cousins the 
Kauravas in a crooked game of dice.  The Pandhavas, abiding by the terms of the bet, 
have been exiled for thirteen years.  At the end of this time their rule was to be 
restored.  However, when they return the Kauravas deny them their due and both sides 
prepare for battle.   
 The Gītā opens with vivid descriptions of the two armies arrayed against each 
other on opposite sides of the battlefield of Kurukṣetra.  Arjuna, one of the Pandhava 
brothers, instructs his charioteer Krishna to draw their chariot between the two armies 
so he can survey the scene.  Arjuna is overwhelmed at the sight and though he is a 
great warrior, he loses his resolve.   




teachers, uncles, brothers,  
sons, grandsons, friends, (BG 1.26) 
and beloved father-in-laws,  
but members of two armies. 
Arjuna, seeing 
all his kinsmen lined up, (BG 1.27) 
was filled with great tenderness 
and came to grief.  He said: 
‘Seeing this, O Krishna, 
my kin approaching, wishing to fight, (BG 1.28) 
my limbs sink 
and my mouth dries up. 
My body trembles 
and my hair bristles.  (BG 1.29) 
The Gāṇdiva bow slips from my hand 
and my skin burns. 
I cannot stand 
and my mind seems to reel’.  (BG 1.30) 
Arjuna slumps down in his chariot and refuses to fight. 
 Arjuna explains that he does not want to kill his kin (BG 1.35).  The Pandhava 
brothers were raised alongside their Kaurava cousins.  Arjuna loves them like brothers 
despite their infidelity.     
 Furthermore, Arjuna argues, it is wrong to destroy one’s family.  Though his 
cousins are blinded by greed and do not recognize this, Arjuna claims he knows what 
is morally required in the situation.   
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 While Arjuna’s speech seems to indicate that he knows what he wants and 
ought to do, his behavior reveals inner conflict.  He drops his weapon and slumps 
down in his chariot, unmoving.  If his only wish was to avoid harming his family, 
and/or if he was sure that killing his cousins was wrong in this situation, he would take 
steps to stay the battle.  But Arjuna does nothing.  He does not leave, nor does he try 
to convince the others to lay down their weapons.   
He is arrested, I suspect, by conflicting desires and moral dilemma.  He does 
not leave the battlefield, perhaps, because as much as he wants to spare his cousins he 
also wants to regain his kingdom.  He may not try to stay the battle because while it is 
wrong to kill family members, the circumstances of the current conflict make it a just 
war.  It is his duty as a warrior to enter such a fight (BG 2.31).  Arjuna cannot fulfill 
his duty to his family (his kuladharma) without violating his duty as a warrior (his 
varṇadharma), and vice versa.  Thus he is faced with a moral dilemma. 
J. N. Mohanty thinks that the duty of non-violence (ahiṃsā), which is 
prescribed to everyone at all times by eternal duty (sanātanadharma), further weights 
one horn of Arjuna’s dilemma.1  But Arjuna does not object to killing per se, just to 
killing his family members.2  The duty of non-violence plays no role in his 
deliberations.  In fact, the former plays little role in the Gītā.  It appears, only once, in 
a list of virtues (BG 16.2) but receives no discussion.  Though it would seem to 
conflict with his duty to fight, no such conflict is recognized and the text seems to treat 
the duty of non-violence as irrelevant to Arjuna’s dilemma.  We should take it that 
                         
1 J. N. Mohanty, Classical Indian Philosophy (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2000) 108. 
 
2 Peter Della Santina, “Conceptions of Dharma in the Śramaṇical and Brāhmaṇical 
Traditions: Buddhism and the Mahābhārata,” Moral Dilemmas in the Mahābhārata, 
ed. Bimal Krishna Matilal (Delhi: Indian Association of Advanced Study in 




way.  Even Gandhi, who champions non-violence and would likely make a case for its 
role in the Gītā if he could, agrees with this reading of the text.3  
Krishna responds to Arjuna’s crisis with a lengthy discourse in which he 
reveals himself as God incarnate, imparts wisdom, and teaches yoga as a means of 
liberation (mokṣa).  He encourages Arjuna to take up yoga, seek liberation, and fight 
the battle as part of his practice.  This discourse constitutes Chapters 2 though 18 of 
the Gītā.  
 
 
Definition of ‘yoga’ 
 
 ‘Yoga’ is a noun derived from the verbal root yuj, which means  
‘to yoke’.4  As used in the Vedas (12th-9th centuries BCE), the oldest texts of Indo-
European literature, ‘yoga’ refers to the yoke that connects beasts of burden to each 
other or to a wagon.5   In the Katha Upaniṣad (KU; 6th-5th centuries BCE), the 
meditative practice of sensory restraint is likened to a chariot driver’s control of his 
horses and called ‘yoga’ (KU 2.3.11).  From here on, ‘yoga’ comes to be used to refer 
to practices such as meditation, breathing exercises (prāṇāyāma), physical postures 
(āsana), asceticism, prayer, contemplation of wisdom teachings, and selfless action.  
Mircea Eliade understands yoga, in a general sense, as “a pan-Indian corpus of 
                         
3 M. K. Gandhi, The Bhagavadgita (New Delhi: Orient Paperbacks, 2001) 17. 
 
4 Arthur Anthony Macdonell, A Practical Sanskrit Dictionary (Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidass, 2004) 245. 
 
5 Ian Whicher, The Integrity of the Yoga Darśana (Albany: State University of New 




spiritual techniques.”6  However, not all yoga practitioners have spiritual aims.  Some 
do yoga for their physical and/or mental health, for example.  What is common to all 
yoga is that it has some sort of positive transformative effect on the practitioner.  
Modifying Eliade’s definition, yoga can be defined, broadly, as a pan-Indian corpus of 
self-transformational techniques.  
 
 
Jñāna yoga, karma yoga, and bhakti yoga 
 
 Most commentators and interpreters of the Gītā take it to teach three yogic 
paths: jñāna yoga, or yoga of wisdom, a practice of contemplation and meditation; 
karma yoga, or yoga of works, a practice of selfless service; and bhakti yoga, or yoga 
of devotion, a practice of worship.7   
Jñāna yoga (yoga of wisdom) appears in BG 3.3 as jñāna yoga sāṃkyānām or 
jñāna yoga of the Sāṃkhyas. Krishna refers more frequently to sāṃkhya yoga than to 
jñāna yoga, but the sense of both is the same.  They refer to the practice of 
contemplating the true nature of the self which Krishna introduces in Chapter 2 as an 
antidote to Arjuna’s despair at the thought of killing his cousins. 
You mourn what should not be mourned 
[yet] you speak words of wisdom. 
Those who are [truly] wise 
mourn neither the living nor the dead. (BG 2.11) 
                         
6 Mircea Eliade, Yoga: Immortality and Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1969) 359. 
 
7 “Bhagavadgītā,” The Encyclopedia of Religion, vol. 2, 1987 ed.; S. Radhakrishnan, 




Never have I not existed,  
nor you, nor those rulers of men. 
Nor is it the case that  
we will ever not exist. (BG 2.12) 
Youth, adolescence, and old age 
[occur] in the body of the embodied one, 
on this matter the wise 
are not confused. (BG 2.13) 
As a man, leaving old garments, 
takes other new ones, 
so the embodied one, leaving worn out bodies,  
joins with other ones. (BG 2.22) 
As defined in the commentarial tradition, contemplation of philosophical truths and 
sustained examination of the direct experience of selfhood are the essence of jñāna 
yoga.  The goal of the practice is equanimity.    
BG 3.8-9 provides a definition of karma yoga (yoga of works). 
Perform enjoined action!  
Action is indeed better than inaction. 
Moreover, the maintenance of your body 
cannot be achieved through inaction. (BG 3.8) 
Except for action for the sake of sacrifice, 
this world is bound by action. 
Perform action for that purpose, O Arjuna, 
free from attachment.  (BG 3.9) 
Karma yoga is the practice of doing one’s duty, free from desire, as an offering to 
God.   
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 Krishna emphasizes that the karma yoga practitioner should be free from 
attachment to the phala, or fruit, of action (BG 2.51, 4.20, 5.12, 6.40, and elsewhere).  
The question of what is meant by ‘fruit of action’ warrants some attention.  It is 
consistent with most passages to take the fruit of action to be either the direct result of 
action, such as winning the war, or to take it to be the pleasure or pain occasioned by 
experience of the direct result of action.  
 Mohanty contends that the fruit is the pleasure arising from the direct result of 
action.8  He reasons that if the fruit were the outcome, then the instruction to abandon 
the fruit of action would amount to the injunction of aimlessness, and Krishna would 
have to be understood as advising Arjuna to fight the war without trying to win.  But 
since Krishna does seem to imply that Arjuna should try to win, Mohanty concludes 
that what is to be abandoned is not the aim of winning but any pleasure Arjuna hopes 
to derive from winning.  Thus, he argues, the fruit of action is properly understood as 
pleasure or pain experienced due to the result of action, such as Arjuna’s happiness at 
winning the war.  
I disagree.  BG 2.43 states that rebirth is a fruit of action.  Here phala (fruit) is 
used in the sense of a result of action that might be the basis for pleasure or pain but 
which itself is neither pleasure nor pain.  Note that in BG 2.43 the phala is not the 
direct result of action but an indirect one.  Phala is used again in the sense of a result 
other than pleasure or pain in BG 14.16, which states that the fruit of one type of 
action is ignorance.  However, that verse also states that the fruit of another type of 
action is pain.  Phala is used loosely in the Gītā.  We should understand the fruit of 
action as any result of action, direct or indirect, external (such as the state of affairs of 
the war being won) or internal (such as the variety of pleasurable and painful feelings 
Arjuna may feel upon winning the war).  
                         
8 Mohanty, Classical Indian Philosophy 118. 
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Finally, to return to the three yogas identified by commentators, bhakti yoga 
(yoga of devotion) is not defined by Krishna, but he uses the term in the following 
passage in Chapter 12. 
But those who hold me as supreme, 
surrendering all actions to me,  
meditating on me, 
worship me with undistracted bhakti yoga. (BG 12.6) 
I soon deliver 
from the sea of death and transmigration, 
those who enter into me 
in contemplation. (BG 12.7) 
Bhakti yoga enjoys rich and extensive discussion in Indian sacred literature subsequent 
the Gītā, but mention of it in the Gītā is scant. 
 There are a range of views on the relationships of these three paths.  Śaṅkara 
argues that jñāna yoga is the only path that leads to liberation; karma yoga and bhakti 
yoga have their uses but do not lead to the final goal.9  Rāmānuja exalts bhakti yoga 
and takes jñāna yoga and karma yoga as preliminaries.10  J. A. van Buitenen holds that 
karma yoga is primary and jñāna yoga and bhakti yoga subsidiary to it.11  Robert 
                         
9 Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, The Bhagavad Gita, trans. Alladi Mahadeva Sastri (Madras: 
Samata Books, 1995) 22-28. 
 
10 Śrī Rāmānuja, Gītā Bhāṣya, trans. Svāmī Adidevānanda (Mylapore: Sri 
Ramakrishna Math, 1991) 116, 124.  
 
11 J. A. B. van Buitenen, The Bhagavadgītā in the Mahābhārata (Chicago: University 




Minor argues that the three are elements of a single path he calls Gītāyoga.12  
I also hold that Krishna teaches but a single path.  Krishna, at first, calls jñāna 
yoga and karma yoga two distinct practices (BG 3.3).  He associates jñāna yoga with 
ascetic abandonment of action, argues that such abandonment of action is impossible 
(BG 3.5), and therefore finds karma yoga the superior practice (BG 3.4-7).   
Later Krishna argues that the two are really one because both paths lead to 
liberation (BG 5.4-5).  However, having the same end is not sufficient for identity, and 
Krishna implicitly recognizes this.  After making this argument, he goes on to talk 
about jñāna yoga and karma yoga as distinct.   
He argues that the renunciation of action required in jñāna yoga is difficult to 
attain, and that the same effect can be achieved more quickly and easily through 
renunciation of desire in action.  He recommends karma yoga to jñāna yoga 
practitioners (BG 5.6-12).  He implies that it is possible to practice jñāna yoga without 
practicing karma yoga, and this shows he recognizes the two as distinct.  
Based on this passage, it seems wrong to say that Krishna teaches both jñāna 
yoga and karma yoga.  He discusses the first but without recommending it.  In fact, he 
discourages the would-be jñāna yoga practitioner, saying that by itself the path is 
difficult and lengthy.  On the other hand, he both describes and recommends karma 
yoga, and his recommendation goes out to Arjuna, who has not yet committed to a 
path, and to jñāna yoga practitioners who already have.  Everyone, it seems implied, 
should choose karma yoga.   
                         
12 Robert Minor, “The Gita’s Way as the Only Way,” Philosophy East and West 30.3 
(1980): 340.  Minor argues that contemplation, renunciation of desire in action, and 
devotion, as taught in the Gītā, are mutually involved, mutually supporting, and all 
elements of a single path is calls Gītāyoga.  Krishna, he argues, teaches this one path.  
While I agree with his analysis of the inter-involvement of jñāna, karman, and bhakti, 





This is not to say that Krishna discusses jñāna yoga merely to contrast it to 
karma yoga and indicate to Arjuna what he should not choose.  Rather, Krishna 
recognizes the practical value of what lies at the heart of jñāna yoga: contemplation of 
the true nature of the self (BG 2.11-30).  Krishna teaches the latter, both describing for 
Arjuna the true nature of the self and encouraging him to reflect on this truth before 
introducing karma yoga.  By means of a transition from one to the other he says: 
But hear this! That insight of [jñāna] yoga 
is declared to you. 
Disciplined by such insight, O Arjuna, 
you will leave off the bondage of action. (BG 2.39) 
He is explicit that this element of jñāna yoga should be practiced as a part of karma 
yoga.  So while Krishna incorporates jñāna yoga into his teaching, it is wrong to claim 
that he teaches both jñāna yoga and karma yoga  as distinct paths.  He only teaches 
karma yoga.   
Krishna never calls bhakti yoga a distinct path nor submits it to comparison 
with the other two.  But he teaches Arjuna devotion as he teaches him karma yoga 
(BG 3.30, 4.10-11, 5.29, for example).  There is little reason to think that Krishna 
considers bhakti yoga a special path of yoga.13  
Most often Krishna simply urges Arjuna to practice yoga without naming a 
path.  The best way to characterize the yoga taught in the Gītā is as karma yoga which 
involves, along with the discipline of selfless action, contemplation of the nature of the 
self and a strong devotional element. I discuss the nature of karma yoga in more depth 
in Chapter 4. 
 
 
                         
13 The fact that many classical commentators do may be attributed to the rise of the 
bhakti movement which followed, and may have been a response to, the Gītā.  
 
 20 
Arjuna as the new practitioner 
 
 Arjuna, as the recipient of the karma yoga teachings, represents the new yogin, 
or practitioner.  He is fit to receive yoga teachings but as of yet has no yogic 
accomplishments.  First, he does not yet know the true nature of the self. 
You mourn what should not be mourned 
[yet] you speak words of wisdom. 
Those who are [truly] wise 
mourn neither the living nor the dead. (BG 2.11) 
Krishna’s teaching on the nature of the self is meant to correct this.  Second, Arjuna 
lets desire keep him from his duty.  
I do not want to kill them 
though they would kill [me], O Krishna, 
not for rule over all three worlds. 
How much less for this earth? (BG 1.35) 
Finally, when the Gītā opens, Arjuna does not know Krishna as God.  Krishna reveals 
his true nature to Arjuna (BG 4.5-8, 7.1-17, 9.7-10, 9.17-19, 10.20-42, 11.5-34) and 
teaches him to be a devotee and offer his actions to God.   
 
 




The Gītā’s metaphysics is not as systematic as the modern philosopher may 
like.  It is rich in its elaboration of the nature of the self (ātman or puruṣa),14 God, and 
their relationship while largely ignoring other issues.   
 The self is described as imperceptible, unchanging, immeasurable, and eternal 
(BG 2.11-25).  It may inhabit a body.  When it does, upon death of the body it may 
take up a new body just as one may discard an old garment and put on a new one (BG 
2.22).   
 The self is also described as all-pervasive (BG 2.17, 24).  So, the self is the 
same, in some sense, in all beings.  This view echoes the upanishadic identity of the 
self of a human individual and Brahman, or the absolute.  The Gītā is strongly 
influenced by the Upanishads, showing this influence in shared views and verses that 
are borrowed almost word-for-word.15  However, while the Gītā employs many 
inherited concepts, it often reinterprets them.16  Care is therefore required to 
understand the Gītā’s notion of the self.   
 BG 13.22-24 implies that there are two selves in an individual.    
Observer and consenter,  
preserver, possessor, great Lord, 
and supreme self, thus is it called, 
the great person dwelling in this body. (BG 13.22) 
Some see the self in the self 
                         
14 The terms ātman, often translated “self” and puruṣa, often translated “conscious 
being” are used interchangeably in the Gītā to refer to the human self. 
 
15 Franklin Edgerton, The Bhagavad Gītā, Harvard Oriental Series vol. 38-39 (Delhi: 
Motilal Banarsidass, 1994) 6; Radhakrishnan 525. 
 
16 Robert Minor, Bhagavad-Gītā: An Exegetical Commentary (New Delhi: Heritage 




others through [jñāna] yoga, 
but the best through karma yoga. (BG 13.24) 
Reference to the supreme self in BG 13.22 implies that there is a higher and a lower 
self.  That BG 13.24 calls the to-be-perceived self ‘the self in the self’ implies that the 
higher self is interior to the lower one.  The idea that every person has two selves, one 
ordinary and one divine, is fundamental to the yoga teachings of the Upanishads.  But 
while Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 3.1.1-2, for example, takes the two selves to be distinct like 
two birds, the Gītā sees a closer relationship.  It acknowledges just one self which can 
partake of two modes.  The higher self is the self in its inherent nature.  The lower self 
is the self qua individual.  Individuality depends on embodiment and a sense of 
individuality (ahaṃkṛta bhāva) (BG 18.17).  The latter is generated by the ego-sense 
(ahaṃkāra), a factor of normal human psychology (BG 3.27).   
The lower, or individual, self is conditioned and impermanent while the higher, 
or inner, self is imperceptible, unchanging, immeasurable, and eternal.  It is the 
witness, consenter, supporter, and experiencer.   
In Chapter 2, I argue that Krishna should be taken to hold that agency belongs 
inherently to the self.  His view, I think, is that agency belongs to the higher self, while 
it is exercised by the self qua individual. 
There is a third self beyond the higher and lower selves of the individual (BG 
15.16-18).  That self is the supreme self (puruṣottama), or God.  Krishna explains that 
he, as God, supports the two lower selves (BG 15.17).  God endows the bodies and 
minds of living beings with energy (ojas) and I suggest in Chapter 3 that this is how 
he supports lower or individual selves.  His support of the inner self is immediate.  
The inner self is a fragment (aṃśa) of God (BG 10.41, 15.7-8).   
At the same time, the individual selves and their higher selves are called God’s 
two prakṛti-s, or natures.  His lower nature (aparā prakṛti) is eightfold, consisting of 
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the material elements earth, water, fire, wind, and ether, and the mental factors of 
ahaṃkāra (ego sense), buddhi (judgment), and manas (mind) (BG 7.4).  His higher 
nature (parā prakṛti) consists of inner selves (BG 7.5).   
The Gītā does not define prakṛti and many interpreters have assumed it to have 
the same sense in the Gītā as it does in classical Sāṃkhya.  In Chapter 2 I argue that 
this is wrong and that person’s prakṛti is her ‘nature’ in the sense of her physiological 
and psychological make-up. 
Prakṛti always belongs to a self.  For the human being, the body and mind are 
the higher self’s prakṛti.  The world, all living beings in it, and their inner selves are 
God’s prakṛti.  His relationship to them can be understood as analogous to the 
relationship of a human being’s inner self to his body and mind but only to an extent.  
God’s relationship to the world is much more complex than the relationship of 
a self to a human body.  God is the origin of the world (BG 7.7).  He creates by 
emanating it from himself (BG 9.7-10).  He maintains the world’s existence for a time 
(BG 9.17-19, 10.39) then dissolves it back into himself to later emanate it anew (BG 
7.7).  This process of emanation and dissolution is cyclic and eternal.  
God is the inner self of every being (individuals’ higher selves are fragments of 
God) and the essence of every thing (BG 7.8-11).  He is also the source of the 
manifold conditions of living beings such as becoming and passing away, pain and 
pleasure, fear and fearlessness, fame and disrepute (BG 10.4-5).  He is time, the 
condition of change (BG 11.32). 
God is the best of every category of things (BG 10.21-38). 
God is greater than the world he creates and maintains.  Krishna explains “I 
support this world with a single fragment of myself” (BG 10.42) and when he reveals 
his true form Arjuna sees that the universe is fully contained in Krishna’s body (BG 
11.13).  There is a one-way dependency relation between the world and God.  
This whole world is emanated by me 
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in my unmanifest aspect. 
All beings abide in me; 
I do not abide in them. (BG 9.4) 
And yet beings do not abide in me. 
Behold my majestic power! 
Sustaining beings yet not abiding in them, 
my self is creature-manifesting. (BG 9.5) 
While the world is a self-manifestation of God (BG 10.19), he also transcends 
it in having several unmanifest aspects.  One is as space. 
Just as the great wind which goes everywhere 
abides in the eternal ether, 
so do all beings 
abide in me. Reflect on this. (BG 9.6) 
In another unmanifest aspect, God generates all manifestation (BG 8.18).  In a further 
unmanifest aspect, God is birthless and imperishable.  To know him thus is the 
ultimate goal of yoga (BG 8.20-21).   
It is said to be unmanifest and imperishable. 
They call it the highest goal 
having attained which, they are not born again. 
It is my supreme abode. (BG 8.21) 
 God’s highest unmanifest aspect is called brahman (BG 7.29, 8.3).  When 
brahman is so used it borrows its sense from the Upanishads where Brahman is the 
absolute, the world ground, the unity underlying all diverse phenomena. 
 
 




The Gītā gives a good deal of attention to psychology.  In this section I discuss 
the faculties of ahaṃkāra (ego sense), buddhi (judgment), manas (mind), and 
perceptual senses with are basic to its psychology.  And I introduce the Gītā’s two 
theories of personality and behavior.   
As I said earlier, the ahaṃkāra is merely the sense of being an individual.  It 
appears rarely in the Gītā and little more need be said about it here. 
The buddhi is the highest psychological faculty (BG 3.42) in the sense that it 
has the power to control and direct the lower ones, namely the senses and mind.  It 
seems to be understood in two senses.  Early in the text it is depicted as a faculty 
which formulates intentions to act (BG 2.41).  It can be disciplined to formulate 
virtuous intentions.  When the buddhi remains undisciplined it generates a plethora of 
selfish intentions, one, perhaps, for each desirable object encountered by the 
perceptual senses (BG 2.41).  
Later in the text the buddhi appears as the faculty of moral judgment by which 
one knows truth from falsity, right from wrong, and what is to be feared from what 
need not be feared (BG 18.30).  In an undisciplined person with a desirous nature the 
buddhi fails to correctly discern one’s moral obligations (BG 18.31).  
The “ten and one senses” are mentioned but never listed in the Gītā.  All 
commentators take them to be the five perceptual senses (sight, hearing, taste, touch, 
and smell), the five faculties of action (speech, grasping, walking, reproduction, and 
secretion), and the manas (mind).  These eleven senses are first listed in the Praśna 
Upaniṣad 4.2 and are later adopted by most post-upanishadic thinkers as part of a 
commonly accepted psychology. 17 
                         





 Krishna seems to see the perceptual senses as faculties which actively reach 
out to objects, rather than passively receiving information.  Such a conception may 
have been common in the era of, and preceding, the Gītā’s composition.  Maitri 
Upaniṣad 6.31 describes rays that reach out from the sense organs and grasp objects.  
In the commonly accepted view, the manas is a sensus communis which takes 
sensory input from the perceptual senses and builds from this input coherent 
perception.18  It is not clear that Krishna takes the manas this way.  He does not 
describe the manas but seems to assume his listener is familiar with the term. 
Where he mentions the manas, he most often simply instructs Arjuna to 
control it (BG 6.14).  He associates control of the manas with mental equanimity, 
tranquility, and single-pointedness of focus.  He uses the terms cetas and citta in the 
same way (BG 6.10, 12, 14, 23).  These two are often translated as ‘mind’ or 
‘thoughts’, as is manas.   
An additional aspect of the manas is revealed by several passages that indicate 
that the manas can be used to control the senses (BG 3.7, 3.42, 6.24).  Such control is 
required for karma yoga so that one can focus on one’s duty without being distracted 
by objects of desire.  Meditation requires complete restraint of sensory activity.  
While the manas can limit and even completely cut off sensory input, Krishna 
warns that it is liable to wander, enticed by memories of objects of the senses (BG 
3.6).  From this we see that the manas includes the faculty of memory and reflection.  
As we saw earlier, the buddhi can be used to control the manas. 
The functions of the buddhi (as a faculty of intention), manas, and ten other 
senses are illustrated in KU 1.3.3-4.  There the self is likened to the passenger of a 
chariot, the buddhi to the charioteer, the manas to the bridle, the perceptual and 
                         
18Reat, Origins of Indian Psychology 242-43. 
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volitional senses to the horses, the body to the chariot, and sense objects to the road.  
Like horses, the senses are active and appetitive.   
The Gītā seems to agree with this view of the senses and makes much of the 
connection between the senses and desire.  I discuss this further in Chapter 3.  When 
undisciplined, the senses pull a person this way and that like unruly horses pull on a 
chariot.  The manas conveys the activities of the senses to the buddhi and also serves 
as a instrument by which the buddhi can control the activities of the senses.  A 
disciplined buddhi knows what ends ought to be pursued, and controls the senses 
accordingly, like a disciplined charioteer controls his horses.  An undisciplined buddhi 
lets the senses run amok.  Implied in the simile is the relationship of the self to the 
buddhi.  Just as the lord of the chariot commands his driver who is under contract to 
serve him, the self controls the buddhi. 
Where human prakṛti is detailed in the Gītā its constituents are listed along 
with its modifications (savikāra): desire, aversion, pleasure, and pain (BG 13.6).  
These are modifications of a person’s nature in the sense that they are temporary 
psychological states that arise in a person under certain conditions.   
The Gītā devotes much theoretical attention to what might be called the 
science of personality and behavior.  In Chapter 16, it describes, in detail, two types of 
beings, the divine and the demonic.  Those of the divine type possess such good 
qualities as self-restraint, non-violence, veracity, and compassion (BG 16.1-3).  The 
demonic are arrogant, cruel, desirous, and unjust (BG 16.4-18).  Typical activities are 
also described.  The divine type tend to persevere in yoga, recite scriptures, and 
engage in acts of generosity (BG 16.1-3) while the demonic type make gratification 
their aim in action, seek wealth through unjust means, and slay their enemies just 
because they can (BG 16.4-14).   
In Chapters 14, 17, and 18, Krishna elaborates what I argue is another theory 
of personality and behavior, the guṇa theory.  The three guṇa-s, or strands, are sattva 
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(luminosity), rajas (activity), and tamas (delusion).  Agents, actions, knowledge, 
happiness, and other mental states are described according to the three guṇa-s.  
Understanding the guṇa theory is important to my overall project in this dissertation 
and I devote much of Chapter 2 to it.  Many Gītā commentators and scholars assume 
the Gītā’s guṇa theory is a theory of materialist metaphysics as it is in classical 
Sāṃkhya.  I argue against this view. 
Implicit in this theory is the view that personality is cultivated, maintained, and 
changed through behavior.  With most karman, or action, the simple rule of “like 
begets like” applies.  Engaging in most types of action produces the disposition to 
perform like action in the future (BG 6.44).  The karma yoga teaching is based on this 
principle.  Krishna teaches the practitioner to restrain desire and do his duty as an 
offering to God.  Consistent practice of karma yoga transforms a selfish person into a 
virtuous one who spontaneously acts in a spirit of sacrifice.   
Patañjali’s Yogasūtra (2nd century BCE - 2nd century CE) posits saṃskāra-s, or 
subliminal impressions, as the mechanism of this effect.19  Under this view, action 
performed out of desire, for example, leaves an impression on the subliminal mind.  
This impression remains, like a seed, until conditions are right for its ripening.  It 
ripens as an urge to act on desire.  The Gītā does not employ the concept of saṃskāra 
or anything like it.  It is not clear how current action affects future action, but it is 
clear that it does.  
The Gītā implies that psychological qualities and states also tend to reproduce 
themselves (BG 14.7-17), though again it is not clear how.  The theory of the divine 
and demonic types and the guṇa theory both associate types of behavior with sets of 
psychological qualities and states, and imply that action creates the condition for 
associated qualities and states to arise in the future.  
                         
19 Georg Feuerstein, The Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali: A New Translation and 
Commentary (Rochester: Inner Traditions International, 1989) 57. 
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That future can extend beyond the life of the body. The transmigrating self 
carries along with it the buddhi (BG 6.43), perceptual senses, and mind (manas) (BG 
15.7-8) from its previous embodiment.  One’s psychological make-up conveys into the 
next life. 
I argue in Chapter 4 that Krishna recognizes two types of action, the ordinary 
and the ideal yogic.  Ordinary action causes the self to take a new body after death 
(BG 6.41-45).  This is what it means for action to bind (bandh) (BG 2.51, 3.31, 4.22-
23, 9.28).  Ideal yogic action, on the other hand, frees one from karmic bondage and 
leads to liberation.   
The ultimate goal of yoga is liberation (mokṣa), or escape from rebirth (BG 
2.15, 2.51, 5.17).  Liberation is characterized by absolute peace (BG 2.64, 2.71, 4.39, 
5.12, 5.29, 6.15, 18.53), unsurpassed bliss, joy, and contentment (BG 5.21, 5.24, 6.21, 
6.27), and perfect equanimity (BG 2.15, 2.53, 4.22, 5.18-20, 12.3-4).   
To the end of liberation Krishna teaches the practitioner to engage in action 
that does not bind.  Escaping bondage requires transcending the guṇa-s, or the ability 
to look beyond one’s own psychology for a reason to act (BG 14.20).  I discuss 
transcendence of the guṇa-s further in Chapter 4 and argue that is a required by karma 
yoga.   
Of all guṇa-related states, desire receives the most attention.  Krishna seems to 
see it as the chief impediment to liberation and emphasizes equanimity (samatva, 
samatā, sāmya) as an important yogic requirement.  He discusses equanimity 
positively as transcendence of evaluative dualities (BG 4.22), assumption of an 
evaluative stance that regards all things as equal (BG 4.22, 5.18-19, 6.8), and 
contentment with whatever happens by chance (BG 4.22).  He describes it negatively 
as impartiality (BG 5.18-19, 6.9) and indifference (BG 6.9).   
Though marked by evaluative neutrality, equanimity ultimately must be 
understood as a state characterized by positive affect, for one who is equanimious is 
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content.  And in the recognition of sameness the equanimious practitioner identifies all 
things with God.   
He sees the self in all beings 
and all beings in the self. 
The one who is disciplined in yoga 
sees everywhere the same.  (BG 6.29) 
Who sees me everywhere 
and sees all things in me, 
to him I am not lost, 
and he is not lost to me. (BG 6.30) 
He who loves me in all beings 
is established in oneness. 
Dwelling in all things, 
that practitioner dwells, too, in me. (BG 6.31) 
Arjuna feels affection for Krishna (BG 11.41) and recognizes that Krishna feels the 
same for him (BG 11.44).20  Likewise, the practitioner who sees Krishna everywhere 
will experience the affectively positive states of loving and being loved.  
Equanimity is both a means and an end of yoga.  It is presumably meant to be 
cultivated gradually, maintained with effort first for brief and then for longer periods 
of time.  Finally, in liberation, it becomes a permanent quality.   
 
 
The Gītā’s ethics 
 
                         




A brief introduction to the Gītā’s ethics is helpful for understanding karma 
yoga which involves doing one’s duty.  
Dharma is thought to derive from the verbal root dhṛ which means ‘to sustain, 
support, or uphold’.21  It first appears in the Ṛg Veda alongside ṛta. There dharma 
refers to an individual’s obligations as based on conventions of religion and caste,22 
and ṛta refers to the “cosmic order by which the various phenomena of nature follow a 
particular course.”23  Ṛta is an impersonal law by which the universe functions 
harmoniously, in which all things, including people, have a proper place and 
function.24  
Dharma is determined by ṛta.  Moral laws and caste conventions are part of the 
cosmic order.  Ṛta is in se normative and therefore dharma need not be justified.  In 
applying dharmic norms, one “look[s] to the agreement of life with its source,” John 
M. Koller explains.25  
In the early Vedas, dharma usually occurs with yajña.  Often translated as 
‘sacrifice’, yajña refers to elaborate rituals prescribed by the Vedas for the sake of 
gaining wealth, progeny, land, a place in heaven after death, and so on.  Vedic yajña, 
according to Koller, requires “the precise intonations of various formulas by a number 
                         
21 “Dharma,” The Encyclopedia of Religion, vol. 2, 1987 ed. 
 
22 “Dharma,” Encyclopedia of Religion. 
 
23 T. S. Rukmani, “Moral Dilemmas in the Mahābhārata,” Moral Dilemmas in the 
Mahābhārata, ed. Bimal Krishna Matilal (Delhi: Indian Association of Advanced 
Study in association with Motilal Banarsidass, 1989) 23. 
 
24 “Dharma,” Encyclopedia of Religion. 
25 John M. Koller, “Dharma: An Expression of Universal Order,” Philosophy East and 




of priests and careful ceremonial activities spread over many days, sometimes even 
years.”26  Only the very wealthy could afford to have these rituals performed.  
In this era, yajña is believed to maintain the various processes of the world as 
it promotes human thriving.  Karl Werner defines it as “the ritual enactment of 
mutuality (or of the ‘give and take’ relation) between the individual and the 
universe.”27  Just as humans depend on natural forces (as personified by gods) for 
survival, so does the universe depend on human action.  In yajña human beings give as 
well as receive.  Dharma is fulfilled, then, through yajña.  
According to Arnold Kunst, by the time of the Gītā, ṛta has “recede[d] as the 
force behind dharma”28 and the term dharma conveys the sense of ṛta as well.29  That 
is, the term ṛta disappears and one’s dharma is determined by one’s station in life.  
The term svadharma, or “one’s own dharma,” is often used.  Doing one’s dharma still 
contributes to world maintenance (lokasaṃgraha), and failure to do one’s dharma is a 
threat to the world (BG 1.39-42, 3.14).  
Dharma is no longer fulfilled by yajña.  In the Gītā’s era Vedic yajña is in 
decline.  Krishna is critical of it, saying it only secures temporary abode in heaven, not 
permanent liberation from rebirth (BG 2.45, 9.20-21, 11.48).  The term yajña is 
retained but its sense reinterpreted.  Under this new view any action performed in 
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spirit of reverence for the divine is yajña.30  The latter is the appropriate attitude with 
which dharma should be performed.   
While Krishna in the Gītā seems solely concerned with svadharma, elsewhere 
in Hindu literature sanātanadharma, or eternal duty, is emphasized.  This is what is 
obligatory to everyone at all times, such as non-violence (ahiṃsā), honesty (satya), 
and non-stealing (asteya).31  This concept does not seem to play a role in the Gītā.   
Franklin Edgerton writes “the Gītā attempts no concrete definition of duty.”32  
Except for BG 18.41-44 where the duties of the brāhman, kṣatriya, vaiśya, and śūdra 
classes are described, this seems to be the case.  It is assumed, perhaps, that one knows 
what one’s duties are, as Arjuna does.  The Gītā’s ethics is role ethics and a form of 
moral realism in which moral facts are natural facts about the cosmic order.  These 
facts, which have to do with social convention, biological necessities, and the role of 
ritual in natural processes are all in principle observable.  The requirement of certain 
types of ritual for world maintenance was perceived through a special form of vision 
by the Vedic ṛṣi-s, or seers.  Under such a form of naturalism it is not necessary, 
perhaps, to describe for one what one’s dharma is.  It should be apparent.     
The Gītā’s ethics is, at the same time, a virtue ethics.  Virtues are listed (BG 
16.1-3) along with the means to cultivate them, which is yoga.  Vices and their 
consequences are warned against at length (BG 16.4-18). 
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The Gītā’s emphasis on duty has lead some to liken its ethics to that of Kant.33  
But the similarity is only superficial.  Duty, for the Gītā, is determined by social 
conventions and natural laws, not by a person’s rational nature.  The moral person 
does not self-legislate but obeys convention, scripture, and biological necessity.  Also, 
as Mohanty points out, moral laws are stated in hypothetical form in the Gītā: “If you 
wish to attain liberation then do your duty.”34 
 
 
Introduction to the Indian commentators 
 
The remainder of this chapter is an introduction to the views that Indian 
commentators bring to their readings of the Gītā.  I present the main elements of their 
metaphysics and also their views on the means and end of yoga. 
I begin with Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, two proponents of Vedānta. Vedānta 
means ‘end of the Vedas’ and refers to the Upanishads, scriptures dating from the 8th 
century BCE to the beginning of the common era.  It is also used to refer to 
philosophical systems which are based on upanishadic teachings.  Śaṅkara’s Advaita 
(non-dualist) Vedānta and Rāmānuja’s Viśiṣṭādvaita (qualified non-dualist) Vedānta 
have a common basis in the Upanishads but differ in their most basic tenets.  
The last two Indian commentators I introduce in this section, Abhinavagupta 
and Aurobindo, are Tantrics. 
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Śaṅkara (8th century CE) propounds a non-dualist metaphysics.  He is widely 
considered the greatest proponent of Advaita (non-dualist) Vedānta.  His Gītā 
commentary is the oldest extant.   
The central posit of all Vedāntic schools is Brahman.  Brahman is the creator, 
world ground, and inner self of all beings.  Advaita emphasizes the latter in its 
discussion of Brahman.  Stephen Phillips writes “Advaita is above all, doctrinally, a 
philosophy of self,” in which the identity of the self and Brahman is central above all 
else.35   
In his Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya (BSB), Śaṅkara affirms Brahman as 
“consciousness alone, devoid of other aspects contrary to this, and without any 
distinguishing features” (BSB 3.2.16).36  This view, he argues, is declared in the 
Upanishads, such as Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (BU) 4.5.13, which states 
As a lump of salt is without interior or exterior, entire, 
and purely saline in taste, even so is the Self [or 
Brahman] without interior or exterior, entire, and pure 
intelligence alone.37 
His view is that Brahman is, essentially, awareness.  As such, it is undifferentiated and 
has no attributes such as color, form, or texture (BSB 3.2.14).38  He further cites such 
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upanishadic passages such as KU 1.3.15 which calls Brahman “soundless, touchless, 
colorless, undiminishing.”39  
 Brahman is called “truth, knowledge, infinity” (Taittirīya Upaniṣad (TU) 
2.1),40 and elsewhere, bliss.  These define Brahman’s essence.  Śaṅkara argues that 
these terms, which have different meanings in everyday usage, refer to the one, 
undifferentiated Brahman just as ‘father’, ‘son’, and ‘husband’ may refer to one man.   
Śaṅkara acknowledges that form, color, and so on are attributed of Brahman in 
places in the Upanishads, such as in BU 1.3.22 where it is implied that Brahman has 
the three worlds as its body.41  Śaṅkara explains that Brahman is only spoken of in 
such a way “for the sake of meditation” (BSB 3.2.12).42  Many forms of meditation 
involve an object, such as the breath, and consist in maintaining awareness of that 
object.  Here Śaṅkara seems to have in mind meditations with an ideational focus 
which use an image of Brahman as an object of meditation.  For Śaṅkara, passages 
like BU 1.3.22 are practical, not representative of the nature of Brahman. 
As consciousness, Brahman is “by nature eternal, pure, intelligent, and free” 
(BSB 3.2.22).43  The self, too, shares in this nature, according to Śaṅkara, for the 
Upanishads declare that the self is identical to Brahman.  He interprets the mahāvākya 
(great utterance) “tat tvam asi” (“you [an individual self] are that [brahman]”; 
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Cāndogya Upaniṣad (CU) 6.8-16)44 to assert straightforward identity of the individual 
self and Brahman.   The essence of the individual self is consciousness.  It is without 
attributes, eternal, changeless, and intrinsically free.  The individual self is no less than 
Brahman, and Brahman is no more than the individual self.   
Briefly, Brahman/the individual self is free in the sense of being without 
desire, compulsion, or necessity in general.  As we will see, action, in Śaṅkara’s view, 
is illusory.  The freedom he attributes to Brahman is not related to agency. 
Śaṅkara holds Brahman to be the self of all beings, and at the same time, the 
world ground.  Brahman is “the cause, origin, continuance, and dissolution of the 
universe” (BSB 1.1.5).45  The CU 3.14.1 states: 
All this is Brahman.  (This) is born from, dissolves in, 
and exists in that [Brahman].46 
Śaṅkara holds the difficult position that Brahman is attributeless and undifferentiated, 
and the cause of the world of diverse, distinct phenomena.  He argues that Brahman 
must be the efficient cause because there was nothing else that existed in the 
beginning.  He argues that Brahman must be the material cause of the world because it 
is entailed by the upanishadic claim that by knowing Brahman everything else is 
known, just as by knowing one lump of clay, all things made of clay are understood 
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(CU 6.2.1).47  Furthermore, Śaṅkara acknowledges, the Upanishads state that Brahman 
created by undergoing modifications (TU 2.7).48   
What sort of modification can a changeless entity undergo?  Śaṅkara explains 
that worldly phenomena are created by Brahman like images in a dream are generated 
by one who sleeps (BSB 2.1.28).49  He likens everyday experience to dreaming.  
Śaṅkara holds that the world created by Brahman is merely apparent, and illusory 
because it seems to be real.  Thus, his view is called māyā-vāda or illusionism.   
Śaṅkara explains that illusory images appear through superimposition on the 
conscious self.  He defines superimposition as the appearance of one thing as 
something else, and cites the experience of mother-of-pearl appearing to be silver as 
an example.  His view is that through superimposition what is really Brahman, the 
self, or consciousness, appears as a myriad of phenomena. 
Just as mistaking shell for silver does not affect the nature or value of the shell, 
superimposition of worldly phenomena on Brahman does not affect Brahman.  The 
appearance of transitory phenomena does not render Brahman changeable, for 
example.  And, the appearance of natural evil such as pain does not affect the “merit 
or demerit” of their locus (preamble to BSB 1.1.1).50  The problem of evil is thus 
dismissed.   
Śaṅkara supports his illusionism with the following argument.  The existence 
of Brahman is indubitable, he argues.  The self is a “self-revealing” entity which is 
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known immediately (preamble to BSB 1.1.1).51  Everyone knows his self exists; no one 
ever thinks “I do not exist.” (BSB 1.1.1).52  That self is Brahman, and therefore 
Brahman exists.  Objects, on the other hand, are not self-revealing.  They are known 
mediately through the senses.  Sublation is always possible.  Just as we are mistaken 
when taking mother-of-pear to be silver, we might always be mistaken in taking mere 
appearance for real objects.  Because of this ever-present possibility, objects cannot be 
determined, through perception, to be real or unreal (BSB 2.1.27).53  Śaṅkara seeks, 
through this argument, to cast doubt on the status of the objects we perceive.   
He rests his ultimate conclusion about the status of objects on upanishadic 
authority.  He cites BU 2.3.6, which reads: “Now therefore the description [of 
Brahman]: ‘Not this, not this.’ Because there is no other and more appropriate 
description than ‘Not this.’”54 Śaṅkara takes this as a denial of the reality of apparent 
phenomena.  “All creation, based on Brahman, is denied to be true by saying ‘Not so, 
not so’” (BSB 3.2.22).55   Śaṅkara also finds support in CU 6.1.4, which states that “all 
transformation . . . is name only.”56  He takes this to mean that the act of naming is 
prior to the appearance of namable entities.  That is, phenomena are apprehended as 
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distinct only because of the mind’s propensity to apply names.  Based on such 
passages, Śaṅkara argues, “creation is know to be unreal” (BSB 3.2.22).57 
This illusory world has yet a certain nature in his view.  It is constituted by the 
guṇa-s, or strands, which generate objects, agency, and actions according to strict 
causal laws.  Causation too belongs to the realm of illusion.  
In Śaṅkara’s view, freedom from illusion is the goal of yoga.  Such freedom is 
achieved in brahma-vidyā, or knowledge of Brahman.  Brahma-vidyā is discussed in 
the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 1.12 which states “After deliberating on the experiencer, 
the things experienced, and the ordainer, one should know all these three to be but the 
Brahman I speak of.”58 
Deliberation is the means Śaṅkara recommends to this realization.  But, as 
Phillips points out, the realization is not an intellectual one.  “It is, it must be stressed, 
a mystical self-experience that the Advaitins have in mind, a radical change of  
consciousness, not an intellectual view.”59  Brahma-vidyā is the experience of oneself, 
the objects of perception, and perception as all one and all Brahman.  It is the 
perception of apparent distinctions as illusory. This realization releases one from the 
process of transmigration (BSB 1.1.1).60  The realization of Brahman is liberation.  
Otherwise put, liberation is Brahman (BSB 3.4.52).61 
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The Upanishads teach that Brahman “is to be sought for, he is to be inquired 
into” (CU 8.7.1).62  Śaṅkara names the prerequisites for the practice of deliberation: 
“dispassion for the enjoyment of the fruits of work here and thereafter; a perfection of 
such practices as controlling the mind, control of the senses and organs, etc.; and a 
hankering for liberation” (BSB 1.1.1).63  Deliberation on Brahman is jñāna yoga (yoga 
of wisdom) and consists in hearing teachings, contemplating them, and meditating on 
them as described in BU 2.4.5: “The self . . . should be realized, should be heard of, 
reflected on, and meditated upon.”64 
While Śaṅkara does teach that jñāna yoga leads to liberation, he also argues 
that liberation is not a product.  For, causation is illusory.  Śaṅkara’s promise that 
jñāna yoga leads to liberation is meant for the ignorant, and it is to the ignorant that 
yoga instruction must appeal.  However, one who has achieved brahma-vidyā 
recognizes that his realization happens instantaneously, nay, atemporally.  For 
brahma-vidyā is just Brahman, and Brahman is uncaused and eternally present (BSB 
3.4.52).65  
Śaṅkara holds that action and agency are illusory.  In his commentary on the 
Gīā he argues that karma yoga, while emphasized in the Gītā, cannot lead to 
liberation.  Śaṅkara states that karma yoga “consists in the performance . . . of works 
as a means to mokṣa, requiring a knowledge of virtue and sin, and presupposing that 
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the self is distinct from the body and is the doer and enjoyer.”66  He explains that this 
set of presuppositions is based on the “idea of agency and multiplicity,”67 which is 
accepted only by the ignorant.  He argues that the self, as Brahman, does not change, 
and hence really does not act.68  Still, Krishna teaches karma yoga in the Gītā, and 
Śaṅkara does recognize some value in it.  He explains that it is a means to purify the 
mind and prepare one for jñāna yoga.69  But he maintains that ultimately jñāna yoga is 
necessary for liberation.70 
Śaṅkara takes Krishna in the Gītā to represent Brahman.71  He explains that 
Krishna’s apparent individuality is due to māyā (illusion).  In this way, Śaṅkara is able 
to interpret the devotional elements of the Gītā as encouragement to seek brahma-
vidyā (knowledge of Brahman).  And the latter is, of course, to practice jñāna yoga.  
Rāmānuja (12th century CE), the founder of Viśiṣṭādvaita (qualified non-
dualist) Vedānta, responds to Śaṅkara in formulating his system.  Rāmānuja maintains 
the unity of all things with Brahman but in a way very different from Śaṅkara’s.  In 
further contrast to his predecessor, Rāmānuja emphasizes common-sense realism 
about perception. 
For Rāmānuja, Brahman is the “supreme person.”  He often refers to Brahman 
by the term īśvara (God, Lord), and in this section I use the latter term. 
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Īśvara, Rāmānuja explains in his Śrī-bhāṣya (ŚB), is the “abode of all 
auspicious qualities to an infinite degree and is free from all worldly taint” (ŚB 
1.1.1).72  Īśvara is also “the creator, preserver, and destroyer of this universe, which it 
pervades and of which it is the inner ruler.”73  The cosmos of sentient beings and 
insentient objects is the body of īśvara, and īśvara, as inner ruler of that body, is its 
self.  Thus, Rāmānuja holds that īśvara is a differentiated entity and has a “twofold 
characteristic.”74  That is, it possesses two sets of attributes.  First, it possesses all good 
qualities such as existence, consciousness, and bliss, each to the greatest extent.  
Second, it possesses the cosmos, which consists of insentient material nature and 
sentient individual selves, as its body.  
Rāmānuja understands māyā not as ‘illusion’ but as ‘power’.75  Thus, where 
Śaṅkara takes apparent diversity to be a product of illusion, Rāmānuja takes it to be a 
product of īśvara’s creative power.  He holds that īśvara must be both the efficient 
and material cause of the world.  He argues, as Śaṅkara does of Brahman, that īśvara 
must be the efficient cause because there is nothing other than īśvara that could be the 
efficient cause.  He further argues, again as Śaṅkara does of Brahman, that īśvara 
must be the material cause of the world because it is entailed by the upanishadic claim 
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that by knowing īśvara everything else is known, just as by knowing one lump of 
clay, all things made of clay are understood (CU 6.2.1).76   
He differentiates between non-substance, which includes qualities (the three 
guṇa-s, or strands, belong to these), causal efficacy, and universals, and substance, 
which includes material nature (prakṛti), individual selves (jīva), and īśvara.  He 
accepts one fundamental relation, that of inseparability (apṛthak-siddi).  This relation 
may hold between a substance and a non-substance, and thus he accounts for 
substances having states and undergoing change.  The inseparability relation may hold 
between substance and substance.  Three important instances of this relation are the 
inseparability of an individual self with a body, īśvara and an individual self, and 
īśvara and the cosmos as a whole.  A substance standing in a relation of inseparability 
to either a substance or non-substance is termed qualified (viśiṣta).77 Rāmānuja holds 
that īśvara is qualified by individual selves and material objects.   
Rāmānuja is thus able to maintain the reality of the world of diverse, finite 
entities, while affirming the non-duality (advaita) of the world with the infinite 
Brahman.  For Rāmānuja non-duality is inseparability, not identity.  He argues that 
individual selves are finite and cannot be identical to īśvara, as Śaṅkara holds.78  Still, 
individual selves are one with īśvara.  A relationship of inseparability holds between 
them in which individual selves qualify īśvara like an attribute qualifies a substance.  
Rāmānuja illustrates the relationship in a variety of ways, seeking to “bring out all the 
implications of such relationship,” according to Svāmī Tapasyānanda.79  
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For one, Rāmānuja describes it as a body-self (śarīra-śarīrī) relationship. 
Rāmānuja’s claim that īśvara stands in a self-body relationship to the cosmos was 
introduced above.  Just as īśvara stands in a self-body relationship to the entire 
cosmos, he likewise stands in a self-body relationship to each individual self.  He is 
the inner self of each individual self.80  Cyril Veliath explains that for Rāmānuja, 
īśvara is the “inner director” of all individual selves; īśvara “owns, directs, and 
governs” them.81 
Rāmānuja describes the relationship between individual selves and īśvara in 
another way which rests on the distinction between two forms of predication.  The first 
is termed coordinate predication in terms of identity (aikya samānādhikaraṇya) and 
the second coordinate predication in terms of substance and attribute (guṇa 
samānādhikaraṇya).  “This is that Devadatta [who was seen earlier under different 
conditions]” exemplifies the first type.  ‘This’ and ‘that’ have a common referent, 
Devadatta.  “Blue lotus” exemplifies the second type, which holds between two or 
more attributes having identity of substratum.  In the example, blueness and lotushood 
refer to two attributes both inhering in a common substratum, material nature, without 
losing their individuality.82   
Rāmānuja takes the ‘you’ and ‘that’ of “tat tvam asi” (“you [an individual self] 
are that [brahman]”; CU 6.8-16)83 to refer to two non-identical attributes which have a 
common substratum.  His aim is to preserves the individuality of both the individual 
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self (jīva) and īśvara while accommodating the upanishadic doctrine of identity.  
Svāmī Tapasyānanda explains:  
The almighty God [īśvara] and the little jīva can never 
be equated with each other.  But the mighty īśvara, who 
is the indweller in the cosmic body, is also the indweller 
in every jīva.  Thus every jīva individually is the body 
of īśvara, just as the cosmos as a whole is too.84 
Rāmānuja takes ‘that’ (tat) to refer to īśvara as the indwelling self of the cosmic body.  
He takes ‘you’ (tvam) to refer to īśvara as the indwelling self of each individual self.85  
‘That’ and ‘you’ both refer to īśvara, variously qualified. 
  Further, Rāmānuja calls īśvara substance (prakāri) and the individual selves 
and material nature his modes (prakāra).  The modes of a substance do not exist apart 
from the substance.  In the same way, individual selves and material nature do not 
exits apart from īśvara.  Modes may be various and distinct from each other but do not 
differ from the substance in which they inhere.  In the same way, while individuals 
selves are distinct from each other and from material nature, they are not distinct from 
īśvara.86   
Kalidas Bhattacharya explains that, in Rāmānuja’s view, individual selves are 
distinct from one another but “adjectival to God [īśvara],”87 and form a unity with 
īśvara.  Bhattacharya identifies two types of unity for comparison.  The first is a loose 
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unity which admits of separability, such as a man with a stick.  The second is a close 
unity in which separability is not possible, such as holds between blueness and a 
flower in a blue flower.  The unity of individual selves with īśvara, he explains, is of 
the close variety.  Individual selves cannot exist separate from īśvara, and though 
īśvara can exist without them, he, in fact, never does.   
 Rāmānuja also likens the relationship of īśvara and individual selves to the 
relationship between master and subordinate (śeṣa-śeṣī).  Like the subordinate for the 
master, individual selves exist “for the use and purpose” of īśvara.88  The realization 
of one’s subservience, holds Rāmānuja, is the source of the greatest delight possible 
for an individual self, as it is for a master’s subordinate.  Svāmī Tapasyānanda 
explains “they find the real meaning of their existence in such realization.”89   
For all his effort in elaborating the īśvara-jīva relationship, Rāmānuja still 
flounders on a key point.  Does agency belong to the individual self, or does īśvara 
determine behavior?  In places he states that actions are determined by dispositions, 
desires, and other psychological factors that obey strict causal laws.  Rāmānuja 
explains that īśvara endowed individuals selves with dispositions, desires, and other 
factors in creating them.  Thus, in places, Rāmānuja holds that one’s behavior is due 
solely to one’s nature as given by īśvara.  In others places he seems to hold that the 
individual self does have agency.  Veliath concludes that Rāmānuja does not arrive at 
a “satisfactory answer” to this question.90  I do see Rāmānuja as making a 
commitment, ultimately, to determinism.  I discuss this issue in Chapter 2.  
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Rāmānuja understands liberation as release from transmigration.  In his view, 
the knowledge of īśvara’s nature results in liberation.91  Such knowledge reveals 
īśvara as the inner self of the individual self.  This destroys ignorance about one’s 
own true nature.  Upon the destruction of ignorance, he holds, the individual self 
ceases to cling to bodily existence.92  At the same time, the karmic residues of past 
actions are destroyed.93  He understands karmic residue as the dispositions, caused by 
actions both good and bad, to perform similar actions in the future.  Karmic residue is 
a condition of embodiment, in Rāmānuja’s view.  When it remains upon death it 
causes the individual self to take on a new body.  
Rāmānuja holds that full realization of īśvara is only possible upon death.  
Connection to a body, he explains, obstructs full realization of the self’s true nature 
(ŚB 3.2.12).94  This obstruction can only removed by death.  
As Phillips says of brahma-vidyā in Advaita, knowledge of īśvara is not mere 
intellectual understanding of the scriptures that describe īśvara’s nature.  For, 
Rāmānuja argues, it is well known that one may be versed in the scriptures and yet not 
be liberated (ŚB 1.1.1).95  Meditation is required.  Rāmānuja defines meditation as 
“constant remembrance,” and explains that, when perfected, constant remembrance 
“assumes the same form as seeing or direct perception” (ŚB 1.1.1).96  But constant 
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remembrance alone does not yield vision of īśvara.  Īśvara must reveal itself to the 
aspirant.  He does so only to that aspirant who loves him, for “he who extremely loves 
this self is loved by this self” (ŚB 1.1.1).97  For Rāmānuja, constant remembrance is a 
form of bhakti (devotion).  He holds bhakti as ultimately necessary for liberation.  He 
writes: “Seeking refuge with the Lord is the only means for . . . the attainment of self-
realization.”98 
Still, in his Gītā Bhāṣya (GB), Rāmānuja recognizes three form of yoga.  He 
allows that the aspirant may choose between jñāna yoga, karma yoga, and bhakti 
yoga, “according to [his] liking.”99  
Rāmānuja takes these three paths as distinct, though mutually involved.100  
That is, each one involves jñāna (knowledge), karman (action), and bhakti (devotion).  
The difference between the three yogas seems to be a matter of which of these 
elements is emphasized.  
The jñāna yoga practitioner must do action in order to sustain the body.101  
Jñāna yoga generates devotion because the knowledge it emphasizes is knowledge of 
īśvara.102  Personalistic and possessed of all good qualities, to know īśvara is to love 
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him.  Jñāna yoga leads directly to the abiding state of single-minded contemplation of 
īśvara which is the ultimate means of realizing īśvara.103 
Karma yoga, likewise, involves knowledge.  According to Rāmānuja, some 
wisdom is a prerequisite of karma yoga practice, as Krishna teaches Arjuna about the 
self (in BG 2.11-30) before instructing him in karma yoga practice.104 Karma yoga 
involves devotion because works performed by a the practitioner are to be sacrificed to 
īśvara.105 
Finally, bhakti yoga requires knowledge of īśvara just as jñāna yoga and 
karma yoga do.  And, in addition to the meditative practice of joyous contemplation of 
the divine, the bhakti yoga practitioner engages in a variety of works as part of his 
practice.  This includes prayer, recitation of the various names of īśvara, prostration, 
and activities, Rāmānuja writes, “such as performing worship and doing actions 
helpful to worship, like building temples and cultivating temple gardens.”106   
While Rāmānuja holds bhakti yoga supreme,107 he recommends an aspirant 
begin with karma yoga since “there [is] no chance of errors.”108  By ‘error’ he seems to 
mean misdeeds in a moral sense.  Violation of morality results in karmic residue that 
binds the individual further to bodily life, thus serving as an obstacle to liberation.  
Rāmānuja explains that error cannot occur because action performed in karma yoga is 
                         
103 Rāmānuja, Gītā Bhāṣya 115-16. 
 
104 Rāmānuja, Gītā Bhāṣya 116. 
 
105 Rāmānuja, Gītā Bhāṣya 144. 
 
106 Rāmānuja, Gītā Bhāṣya 304. 
 
107 Rāmānuja, Gītā Bhāṣya 293, 596. 
 




obligatory.109  He assumes that it is a simple matter for the practitioner to do only what 
is obligatory.  
Rāmānuja seems to recommend that karma yoga should be practiced before 
jñāna yoga.  The former is a good preparation because it reduces attachment to sense 
objects.110  Further, he promises that all rites performed as karma yoga culminate in 
meditation.111  The reason is that karma yoga removes “sin,” or the subliminal residue 
left by past misdeeds, which “obstruct[s] the origination of knowledge” (SB 1.1.1).112 
This is all the more reason to begin with karma yoga and proceed later to jñāna yoga.  
Rāmānuja holds that jñāna yoga leads one to bhakti yoga.  For the goal of 
jñāna yoga, he writes, is “vision of the self,”113 and explains that vision of the seeker’s 
self is an “accessory to bhakti.”114  The reason is that to know one’s own true nature is 
to know īśvara, since īśvara is the inner self of one’s self.  Meditation on the self 
progresses to meditation on īśvara.  
To meditate on īśvara is, according to Rāmānuja, to “practice the succession of 
memory of unsurpassed love of [īśvara].”115  At this stage, meditation is not 
dispassionate but an exercise of fervent bhakti.  In Rāmānuja’s view, liberation can be 
gained only through love. 
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The Tantric Abhinavagupta (11th century CE) calls his system svātantryavāda 
or voluntarism.  Modern scholars such as K. C. Pandey and Paul Muller-Ortega call it 
Kashmir Śaivism.   
Abhinavagupta holds a theistic non-dualism in which the unity of all things is 
identified with Lord Śiva.  His view amounts to idealism, as he describes Śiva as a 
universal mind in which all selves and all phenomena have their existence.  
Phenomena lack self-existence, yet are real as expressions of Śiva.   
Śiva, in Abhinavagupta’s view, has two powers: kriyāśakti, or power to act, 
and jñānaśakti, or power to know.116  The former is exercised as the ability to manifest 
phenomena.  The latter is exercised in manifesting limited subjects, objects, and all 
other factors involved in cognition.  These two powers are ultimately not distinct; 
Śiva’s power to manifest phenomena is his power to know.117  For, the phenomena 
Śiva generates are of the nature of thought, and what is of such nature is necessarily 
known.  On the other hand, the power to know presupposes a power to manifest 
knowable phenomena.   
Abhinavagupta likens Śiva to a mirror and worldly phenomena to a mirror’s 
reflections.118  A mirror’s reflections appear distinct from the mirror but in reality are 
not.  Similarly, worldly phenomena appear distinct from Śiva but are not. Like a 
mirror, Śiva is unaffected by the appearances, and the changes in them, which have 
him for their medium.  Unlike a mirror, Śiva is self-aware, produces appearances 
independently, and is aware of the appearances he so produces.  Pandey explains that 
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“reality,” in Abhinavagupta’s view, “is the mind and the universe is nothing but the 
thought of the universal mind.”119   
Abhinavagupta takes the power to act and the power to know as essential to 
Śiva.  They are not differentiable from their possessor, in his view, just as there is no 
difference between fire and its power to burn.  Abhinavagupta holds that Śiva is his 
consciousness and creativity.  
He argues for his idealism as follows.  Objects, as we perceive them, are mere 
appearances to the mind.  We cannot infer, based on this experience, that mind-
independent external objects exist which underlie our perceptions.  Such objects 
themselves would be imperceptible, and “inference [cannot] operate in relation to 
those things which have never been an object of direct experience.”120 That is, 
inference to imperceptible objects is invalid, and so we must take objects to be merely 
apparent and mind-dependent. 
Abhinavagupta explains that the objects manifested by Śiva, being of the 
nature of thought, are luminous (prakāśamaya) or apparent.121  Luminosity, or the 
“light of consciousness,” is the essence of objects.  Therefore, the objective is not 
essentially different from the subjective.  But objects cannot be identical with 
individual subjects.  He explains they are “cognized as separate from the individual 
subjects, because of their having been separated from the individual subjects.”122  An 
object may be perceived by a subject for a time, then not perceived, and later 
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perceived again.  Objects are not identical with individual subjects, and therefore, “the 
[appearance] of objects . . . is logically possible only if they be admitted to be within 
the true subject [Śiva].”123  Abhinavagupta reaches this conclusion in some haste.  He 
may have in mind an argument like the one later made by George Berkeley:  objects 
can exist only in the consciousness of some conscious subject, but they cannot exist in 
individual subjects.  God (or for Abhinavagupta, Śiva) is the only other candidate, so 
they must have their existence in God (or Śiva).124 
The subjects manifested by Śiva are essentially self-conscious (vimarśa).  
Abhinavagupta argues that knowledge and doubt presuppose self-consciousness, so 
anyone involved in the philosophical enterprise must admit his view.  “If we deny self-
shining nature to subject,” he writes, “there remains no room for questions and 
answers.”125  His reason seems to be that the cognition “I know” involves the 
awareness that “I exist.”   
Abhinavagupta claims that knowledge also invariably involves a “stir.”126  This 
stir is the power of action, and “becomes directly perceptible as physical action.”127 He 
takes the capacity for action as an aspect of sentience and observable through 
introspection.  He sees self-consciousness and freedom as inextricable.  
Being self-conscious, the self is likewise luminous (prakāśa) or apparent.  The 
former straightforwardly entails the latter.  
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Abhinavagupta argues that it follows from the luminosity of the self and 
objects that Śiva exists.  He proceeds by reductio ad absurdum, supposing Śiva did 
not exist.   
But if [the individual selves] be self-confined . . . how 
[could they] make the objects shine (manifest)?  But if 
the objects also be admitted to be essentially self-
shining, then, they also being self-confined, the 
distinction between the perceiver and the perceived will 
be lost.128 
His seems to mean the following.  If Śiva did not exist, individual selves might be 
luminous, but they would be “self confined,” or limited to self-consciousness.  If Śiva 
did not exist there would be no objects to serve as the objects of knowledge, and 
individual selves could be conscious of only of themselves. For, though luminous, 
individual selves would still not have the ability to make objects apparent (or 
manifest).  Further, if Śiva did not exist, luminosity might still belong to objects in 
themselves, but then the objects would be “self-confined,” or without observers.  
Subject and object would both be both luminous and “self-confined” and thus there 
would be no real difference between subject and object, which would make knowledge 
impossible, an absurd conclusion.  Since there is knowledge, Abhinavagupta seems to 
argue, Śiva must exist. 
Abhinavagupta maintains that Śiva “includes the whole of the objective 
universe within itself,”129 but it does not follow, he argues, that all objects will be 
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apparent at all times.  Rather, Śiva “makes some objects manifest as separate from 
itself [as individual subjects],” and “this is called the power of knowledge.”130   
Abhinavagupta, further, lets the experiences of objects as luminous and our 
selves as self-conscious and free inform his view of Śiva’s nature.  Pandey writes that 
Abhinavagupta’s “conception of the macrocosm is based on a very careful study of the 
microcosm.”131  Abhinavagupta holds to the typically Tantric view that the microcosm 
and macrocosm are homologous.  According to this view, if objects are luminous 
(prakāśa), then so is Śiva.  Similarly, he reasons that since subjects are self-conscious 
and free (vimarśa), so must be Śiva.  Abhinavagupta seems to arrive at his 
understanding of Śiva’s nature this way, and then evoke Śiva to explain luminosity, 
self-consciousness, and freedom. 
Abhinavagupta holds that the individual selves and objects manifested by Śiva 
reflect his nature.  They are identical to Śiva and likewise to each other in essence, if 
not appearance.  This entails that since Śiva is omniscient and omnipotent, so are 
individual subjects.   
Furthermore, in Abhinavagupta’s view, Śiva is free in a libertarian sense and 
so are individual subjects.  Abhinavagupta calls Śiva the svātantrā icchā, or free 
will.132  His manner of creation differs from “ordinary everyday creation” which 
depends on supporting causes such as clay and wood.133  Śiva’s freedom is such that in 
creating, his will is the only cause.  Śiva’s actions have his cause in his will alone; 
determination by any other factor is ruled out.    
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Abhinavagupta makes an argument for Śiva’s freedom based on experience, 
again letting examination of the microcosm support his view of the macrocosm. 
. . . in the case of the various creations of city and army, 
etc. by the simple will of a [yogic adept] there is no 
possibility of representing them to be due to different 
material causes . . .  
Therefore, it may be admitted that such is the spiritual 
power of a [yogic adept] that it makes the objects, which 
are nothing else than various manifestations of spiritual 
power, manifest.  Therefore, it is possible that [Śiva], 
whose power of freedom is acknowledged, manifests 
these objects of the world . . . . why not admit 
[unlimited] freedom of the sentient [universal] self . . . 
which has the support of experience?134 
The argument goes: advanced yoga practitioners have been seen to create cities and 
armies without material cause, from pure will.  Therefore, it is possible that Śiva 
creates in this way too, and there is no reason to think he should not, given that some 
adepts do.  While the modern reader is not likely to have witnessed an adept achieve 
such acts, yogic literature acknowledges many such siddhi-s (accomplishments) the 
advanced practitioner may come to exhibit.  While these powers most often take the 
form of extra-sensory perception  or extraordinary control over one’s own body, such 
as the ability to levitate, some texts acknowledge miraculous creative powers.135  
Those of Abhinavagupta’s milieu would probably not have balked at such a premise.   
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The goal of yoga, in Abhinavagupta’s view, is freedom from all limitation.  
His notion of liberation includes more than freedom from transmigration.  It is a state 
of unlimited being, knowledge, power, and bliss.  In his view, liberation is gained 
through realization of one’s identity with Śiva.  The practitioner who has reached the 
goal knows “I alone, who am essentially light [or self-consciousness and freedom], am 
shining [as the objects that appear to be distinct].”136  He achieves unitive vision, 
seeing all things as consisting of his own consciousness. 137  His realization goes 
beyond a mere belief about the world to seeing the world with new eyes.  His vision 
empowers him to “act and create as Śiva himself.”138 His human body and mind, being 
manifestations in consciousness, are not obstacles to his realization.  Liberation is 
possible for the embodied.  More than that, immortality of the body is possible.  The 
liberated practitioner may choose to manifest for himself an undying body.139  
In unrealized individual selves, Abhinavagupta explains, omniscience, 
omnipotent, and true freedom are present but veiled by ignorance.140  Thus, he asserts 
both omniscience and ignorance of ordinary human beings, which seems problematic.  
He has the further problem of positing the existence of individual selves in the non-
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dual, self-conscious totality that is Śiva.  He addresses these problems by elaborating 
the limiting conditions of the finite self. 
Abhinavagupta describes the finite self as conditioned by five factors.141  The 
first is kāla (time), which engenders the idea succession in relation to the body and 
objects of knowledge.  Second is vidyā (knowledge), which gives rise to limited 
cognitive ability.  The primary cognitive ability vidyā supports is that of distinguishing 
between pleasure and pain.  The third factor is kalā (constituent part of a sacrifice, 
mechanical or fine art).  It gives rise to notions of what ought to be done.  The fourth 
is rāga (passion), which is responsible for the tendency of the mind to superimpose 
qualities such as beauty onto perceived objects.  Rāga gives rise to the intention that 
something in particular be done to the exclusion of other ends.  Finally, niyati 
(necessity) generates attachment to certain objects.142  These conditions together 
constitute the ignorance of individual selves.  This ignorance is the basis of their 
apparent individuality. 
Finite selves are ultimately identical with Śiva, but their ignorance blocks 
realization of this fact.  There is something odd in this view.  It amounts to saying that 
Śiva submits himself to ignorance.  Why would he do that?  At bottom, as Muller-
Ortega puts it, is the “bald statement that the finite self is maintained in its condition 
because of the will of Śiva.”143 
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Still, the theory of the five-fold conditions is helpful as an elaboration of the 
nature of the finite self.  Importantly for us here, it shows that the capacity for willing 
possessed by an ordinary individual differs significantly from Śiva’s unlimited 
freedom.  “Those who are essentially of the nature of pure consciousness but are 
without supreme freedom . . . have been made so by the highest Lord.”144  Willing is 
conditioned by the recognition of pleasure and pain, which is made possible by the 
factor vidyā and constrained by the subliminal impressions accrued through past 
experience.  Abhinavagupta explains that finite selves perceive objects “according to 
the residual traces [of past experience] . . . as associated with different indicatory 
words such as ‘This is dear’, ‘This is [an] enemy’.”145  That is, objects are associated 
with various past pleasures and pains.  This association determines desire.  “When we 
remember a past pleasure we desire for the object that gave it.”146  Desire, which is due 
to the factor rāga, determines what will be done.  Thus, the will of a finite self is 
determined to specific choices by the tendency to cognize some things as pleasurable 
and  some things as painful, and by past experience of pleasure and pain and the 
desires they engender.  On the other hand, Śiva is not so constrained.  His will is 
entirely unconditioned.   
Should the unrealized individual wish to embark on the path of yoga practice, 
Abhinavagupta teaches an esoteric practice that emphasizes chanting, restraint and 
redirection of the body’s subtle energies (prāṇa), meditation, and ritual.147  Other 
elements are included such as contemplation of geometrical designs (maṇḍala and 
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yantra), consumption of alcohol and meat, and sexual ritual.  Muller-Ortega notes that 
the lineage avails itself of teleological justification: “Any means is valid if it will 
accomplish the goal of taking man to [the] divinized state.”148  
While he took enough of an interest in the Gītā to produce a brief commentary 
on the text, the Gītā is not emphasized in Abhinavagupta’s own practical teachings.  
This does not mean that the text was of no practical value to him, or had no influence 
on his yoga teachings.  It may be that the practices described in the Gītā were so well-
incorporated into popular religion by Abhinavagupta’s time that they fell into the 
background of common practices that served as a foundation for the more involved 
practices of Abhinavagupta’s lineage. 
Aurobindo (early 20th century CE), a Tantric, propounds a non-dual view in 
which all things belong to a totality identical with Brahman.  Unlike Abhinavagupta, 
Aurobindo is a realist who acknowledges the existence of matter along with 
immaterial mind and spirit.  In Aurobindo’s view, Brahman is the common source and 
substratum of both the material and immaterial. 
Brahman, as Aurobindo understands him, has twin aspects.149  He is the 
indefinable, inconceivable, timeless absolute, and at the same time the omnipresent 
reality of phenomenal existence.  In his latter aspect, Brahman is matter, mind, life, 
time, change, cause and effect, self-consciousness, the self in each individual, and the 
bliss inherent to all sentient beings.   Aurobindo explains that Brahman possesses 
yoga-māyā, or consciousness-force, through which he self-manifests as the universe.150  
Aurobindo conceives of the universe as evolutionary in nature and describes its 
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manifestation as proceeding in stages, as follows.151  Matter is manifested first.  
Through apparently dead, life is veiled in matter.  With time, life evolves out of 
matter.  Living beings arise, evolving organs and faculties necessary to sustaining life.  
Life is insentient at first but is a veiled form of consciousness.  Mind eventually 
evolves out of life and sentient beings appear.  Mental faculties are crude at first but 
become more sophisticated over time.  Human beings possess the highest mental 
faculties of all beings and are destined to develop even higher ones.  Aurobindo finds 
in people an innate impulse to “God, light, bliss, freedom, [and] immortality,”152 and 
maintains that this impulse is the underlying motivation of all human behavior.  It 
indicates, in his eyes, that evolution beyond our current mental faculties is inevitable.  
Aurobindo does not attempt to elaborate the number and nature of the evolutionary 
stages that lie ahead.  To do so is perhaps beyond our current intellectual abilities.  
However, he believes the final stage is to manifest God.  The telos of the universe’s 
evolution can be ascertained, he thinks, by reflecting on the universe’s source.  
Omniscience, omnipotence, immortality, perfect goodness, and bliss will appear.  
Human beings will manifest these qualities as they have mind.  
Aurobindo qualifies his predictions of omniscience, omnipotence, and 
immortality.  Immortality is possible for the self but not the body.  As for omniscience 
and omnipotence, these qualities will be attained by mankind collectively, not by 
individuals.  Brahman seeks to express in mankind, he writes, “some image of the 
unity, omniscience, omnipotence which are the self-conception of the Divine.”153  The 
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burgeoning of science and technology in Aurobindo’s era seemed, to him, to be proof 
of our collective evolution toward omniscience and omnipotence.   
Both Aurobindo and Abhinavagupta assert a microcosm-macrocosm 
homology, but they take different entities for the microcosm.  Abhinavagupta 
identifies individual human beings as microcosmic reflections of the macrocosmic 
divine.  Thus he attributes omniscience and omnipotence to all human individuals.  
This is problematic, since most of us know ourselves to be of limited knowledge and 
power.  Aurobindo avoids this problem by taking mankind as a whole as the 
macrocosmic reflection of the divine.  His view allows that the individual be limited 
while Brahman’s omniscience and omnipotence are still fully reflected in mankind. 
All human endeavors, Aurobindo holds, contribute to the end of reflecting 
Brahman’s omniscience, omnipotence, bliss, and freedom.  Hence Aurobindo takes 
the most liberal stance possible on the question of what constitutes valid yogic means 
to liberation. “All life,” he writes, “is either consciously or subconsciously a yoga . . . . 
all life, when we look beyond its appearances, is a vast yoga of [Brahman] attempting 
to realize [his] perfection.”154  
Aurobindo holds that that the will guiding all actions is Brahman’s.  He 
explains that Brahman “uses the individual as . . . a means”155 to make manifest divine 
qualities.  “It is this vast [divine] impulse which the modern world, without quite 
knowing its own aim, yet serves in all its activities and labors subconsciously to 
fulfill,”156 he writes.  Thus, in his view, individuals qua distinct beings are not free, for 
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their actions are determined by Brahman.  But as individuals are ultimately one with 
Brahman, his will is their own, and in this sense Aurobindo will say they are free.  
Aurobindo maintains that individuals can and inevitably will come to 
recognize this freedom.  He claims certain kinds of extraordinary knowledge are 
possible for individuals.  Telepathy, knowledge of what is inherently hidden, and 
knowledge of others’ minds are all possible for us, though still with limitations.157  But 
most important is knowledge of the identity of all things with Brahman.158  With this 
knowledge “the external draws into oneness with the internal,”159 as external objects 
and oneself are seen as one.  At this point, the individual ego dissolves and identity 
with Brahman is fully realized. 
There [in this realization] is the central throne of the 
cosmic knowledge looking out on her widest dominion; 
there the empire of oneself with the empire of one’s 
world; there the life in the eternally consummate being 
and the realization of his divine nature in our human 
existence.160 
Aurobindo holds that this divine nature is veiled for much of man’s evolution.  
Yoga-māyā, Brahman’s creative power, generates illusion in the minds of individual 
selves, making them see themselves as separate beings.161  With time and further 
evolution, individuals outgrow their delusion and come to see themselves as belonging 
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to inseparable unity.  Aurobindo sees illusion as finite, not an abiding condition of the 
phenomenal world, as Śaṅkara thinks.  
While Aurobindo holds that “all life is . . . yoga,”162 he does acknowledge a 
special value in systematic yoga practice.  It can take one to liberation more quickly 
than the activities of everyday life, he maintains.  In his reading of the Gītā he 
distinguishes karma yoga, jñāna yoga, and bhakti yoga as three distinct steps of yoga 
practice.163  He describes these steps as follows.  Karma yoga is the first.  He defines it 
as sacrifice of all inner and outer activities to God.  It culminates in the renunciation of 
desire and prepares the practitioner for jñāna yoga.  Contemplation of the true nature 
of the self is jñāna yoga.  It leads to realization of the true nature of the self and 
abandonment of the belief that one is the agent of one’s actions.  Jñāna yoga paves the 
way for bhakti yoga, surrender of the whole being into unity with the divine.  Bhakti 
yoga is the final stage of evolution, the letting go of all illusion of separateness.  This 
step brings the realization that one participates, through all action, in divine work.
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The problem of free will in the Gītā 
 
The Gītā contains several verses that seem prima facie to deny free will.  For 
example, BG 3.27 reads: 
Actions are performed, in all cases,  
by the guṇa-s of prakṛti. 
One who is deceived by self-conceit  
thinks ‘I am the doer’. (BG 3.27) 
BG 3.5, 3.28, 5.8-9, 14.19, and 18.40 make similar statements.  If the guṇa-s 
are understood as material and if it is assumed that they obey strict causal laws then 
such verses read as statements of determinism.   
At the same time, other verses in the Gītā seem to affirm freedom.  For 
example, a theory of action given in BG 18.12-15 states that an agent is necessary 
though not in itself sufficient for action.  It presents the agent as distinct from the body 
and mind.  It seems to imply freedom.  
The very occasion for the Gītā’s teachings requires freedom in the sense of 
choice and self-determination. The Gītā begins with a moral dilemma: ought Arjuna 
engage in war or spare his cousins?  It seems he has alternatives and cannot decide 
between them.  In Chapter 11, Krishna shows Arjuna that his cousins will certainly die 
as all mortals must.  He asks Arjuna to be his instrument in bringing about their deaths 
(BG 11.33).  This request would be meaningless if Arjuna could not choose to agree or 
refuse.   
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What counts most in favor of a voluntarist reading of the Gītā is that it is a 
yogic text.  Krishna’s chief concerns are instructing Arjuna in yoga and encouraging 
him to practice.  The possibility of practice rests on human freedom.  Effort and choice 
are intrinsic to practice and freedom is the ability to make effort and choose.  The 
Gītā, as a yogic text, requires a voluntarist reading. 
Krishna is explicit in affirming effort (BG 6.36, 12.5) and control (BG 2.61, 
6.36, 8.2, 12.14).  What is more, he portrays yoga as a means to extraordinary control 
such as the ability to withdraw the senses from their objects (BG 2.58).   
Krishna recognizes that “some practitioners practice sacrifice to a god” (BG 
4.25), “others offer the activity of the senses into the fire of yogic self-restraint” (BG 
4.27), while others recite the Vedas or control their breathing as forms of sacrifice (BG 
4.28-29).  On the other hand, wicked people do not practice at all, following their own 
inclinations instead of scriptural injunctions (BG 16.23).  What seems implied here is 
that wicked people make the wrong choice.  While Krishna teaches karma yoga, he 
acknowledges that a variety of paths exist from which a practitioner may choose. 
In BG 12.8-11, Krishna offers Arjuna a set of yogic options.  They seem to 
represent a range of karma yoga variants that differ according to difficulty.  Arjuna is 
to choose from them based on his ability.  
Fix your thoughts on me alone, 
resting your mind on me. 
You will then dwell in me, 
there is no doubt. (BG 12.8) 
But, if you are not able 
to fix a steady mind on me, 
then seek to reach me 
through yoga practice, O [Arjuna]. (BG 12.9) 
But, if you not able to practice, 
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be intent on my work. 
Working toward my ends in action, too, 
you will achieve success. (BG 12.10) 
But if you cannot do that either, 
then take refuge in my power. 
The fruits of action abandoned, 
act, then, with self-restraint.  (BG 12.11) 
Krishna allows Arjuna to assess his own ability and practice accordingly.  Effort and 
choice are suggested in Krishna’s offering this set of options.  
Adolf Janáček argues that voluntarism is suggested in the Yogasūtra by what it 
recognizes as obstacles to yoga.1  The obstacles it lists, states such as laziness, 
indecision, carelessness, and shakiness of limb, are all “volitional opposites.”2  
Similarly, states such as trembling and sinking of the limbs (BG 1.29), having a 
wandering mind (BG 1.30), and being confused about what is obligatory (BG 2.7) are 
obstacles to Arjuna’s carrying out his duty on the battlefield.  As Janáček points out, 
taking such states as obstacles suggests voluntarism. 
The practical orientation of the Gītā requires that the few verses that seem 
deterministic be interpreted as consistent with an assumption of freedom.  This is what 
I will to do.  
  
 
Treatment of free will in Gītā scholarship East and West 
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 Western Gītā scholars who have considered the question of free will argue that 
certain metaphysical elements of the text imply determinism and conclude that yoga 
involves realizing that freedom is illusory.  Eliot Deutsch, Robert Minor, George 
Teschner, and Simon Brodbeck all do this and offer similar arguments.  I let  Teschner 
represent the group as he makes the lengthiest and most thorough arguments.  I present 
his work later in this chapter. 
 Indian commentators recognize the free-will problem and devote to it more 
careful consideration.  Rāmānuja, Abhinavagupta, and Aurobindo give readings of the 
Gītā that attempt to balance deterministic sentiment with a commitment to some form 
of freedom.   
Only Śaṅkara of the great classical commentators denies freedom altogether.  
He is forced to do so by his non-dual, illusionist metaphysics.  In his view, the human 
self is not other than Brahman, the One, and all apparent distinctions are illusory. 
Bodies, external objects, and actions are mere appearances with no underlying reality.  
Freedom is an illusion in a world of illusions.  
Abhinavagupta holds an idealist view in which individual selves and objects 
exist like dream images in the consciousness of Lord Śiva.  Unlike the images of 
dreams, they obey causal laws.  Abhinavagupta explains that Śiva’s creative activity is 
like “the circulating motion of the potter’s wheel under the stick.”3  That is, worldly 
events are fully determined.  An ordinary person’s actions count as worldly events and 
are performed “mechanically, as by a puppet.”4  But Abhinavagupta holds that genuine 
freedom is possible through yoga.  As I discussed in Chapter 1, Abhinavagupta 
explains human individuality as based on five conditions generated by Śiva that give 
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rise to the perception of time, limitation of cognitive ability, notions of what ought to 
be done, desire, and intention.  The self which transcends these conditions realizes 
himself as identical to Śiva and achieves Śiva’s genuine freedom and boundless 
creative ability.   
It takes some work to determine Rāmānuja’s position on freedom. He reads BG 
3.27-29, 5.8-9, and 14.19 as attributing all behavior to the guṇa-s which he takes to be 
psychological factors that obey deterministic laws.  However, he affirms agency in 
other portions of his commentary.  On BG 13.22 he writes that the self (ātman) rules 
the body and freely “directs the senses.”5  In his commentary on BG 18.13 he calls the 
self the agent of action.   
Rāmānuja seems to be aware of the tension between claiming the guṇa-s 
determine action and calling the self an agent.  In his commentary on BG 14.19 he 
explains: “The self, pure [that is, passive] in nature by itself, gains agency by contact 
with the guṇa-s springing from past [action].”6  That is, the embodied self only has 
agency due to contact with the guṇa-s.  In his view, the guṇa-s ultimately determine 
action, not the self.  He writes that there is “no agent of action other than the guṇa-s . . 
. the guṇa-s are themselves the agents according to their nature.”7  The self has agency 
vicariously through them.  The self is merely a witness that takes itself for an agent 
when, in contact with a body, it is privy to inner states that cause action.  The intimate 
relationship the self has with these states makes it easy to identify with them, but in 
this the self is mistaken.   
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This conclusion is not made prominent in Rāmānuja’s commentary.  It only 
emerges with careful reading.  Cyril Veliath sees Rāmānuja grappling with the 
problem of agency but does not recognize the commitment I take Rāmānuja to 
eventually make.  Veliath finds that Rāmānuja makes contradictory statements in the 
Gītā Bhāṣya (GB) about the locus of agency.  He cites Rāmānuja as stating that 
prakṛti (material nature, for Rāmānuja) brings about all actions (GB 5.14), that the 
individual self is the source and originator of all action (GB 13.20, 18.14-16), and that 
God is the originator of all action, using individual souls as his instruments (GB 3.32, 
18.12-13).  Ultimately, Veliath charges,  
Rāmānuja has not provided us with a satisfactory answer 
to the question as to who is the real agent of actions . . . . 
He appears to be caught between his desire to preserve 
the purity of the Brahman, and the responsibility of the 
human person for his acts.8 
Rāmānuja does seem reluctant to deny either horn of his dilemma.  I see him as 
eventually affirming determinism.  Still, because he does not make this conclusion 
prominent, his commitment to it seems weak. 
In his Essays on the Gita, Aurobindo takes the guṇa-s as energies that 
constitute all natural things and obey deterministic laws.  He holds that behavior of the 
body and mind is fully determined, while the self is passive.9  “A man is what his 
nature has made him and cannot do otherwise than as his nature compels him.”10  At 
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the same time, he insists that there is a sense in which the self is free.  He asserts that 
while an individual’s behavior is absolutely determined, absolute freedom is another 
aspect of the self’s relationship to nature.11  He articulates a form of compatibilism in 
his reading of the Gītā. 
The self has absolute freedom, in Aurobindo’s view, in being distinct from 
mental and bodily events.  He explains that the self may realize this freedom by 
disidentifying with the body and mind.12  While want and pain, for example, may be 
present, the self that refuses taking them as his own achieves a certain sort of freedom 
from them.  This freedom is significant from that self’s perspective. For while desires 
and pain be present they do not cause him suffering. 
Elsewhere in his Essays Aurobindo struggles to establish real freedom for the 
self in its relationship to a body and mind bound by causal laws.  He writes that while 
some people act on compulsion, in others the self approves or disapproves behavior.  
In such people the body and mind are the executive powers of the self.13  Aurobindo 
does not want this enhanced status of the self to land him in the libertarian camp 
though.  He makes an awkward attempt to find some middle ground when he writes 
“nine-tenths of our freedom of will is palpable fiction.”14  This qualification suggests 
that freedom is real though severely limited.   
While the commentators are concerned with the issue of freedom, none of 
them attributes a robust enough sense of freedom to the Gītā.  Their work is not of 
much help to me in my project of developing a libertarian reading of the text. 
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I proceed next to some notions basic to the free-will debate in Western 
philosophy so that my reading of the Gītā may be accessible to a Western audience.  
Then I examine Teschner’s view and show that it is flawed because of the 
interpretation of the guṇa-s he makes.  Careful examination of the passages of the 
Gītā that discuss the guṇa-s establishes what I think is the correct understanding of the 
Gītā’s use of the term.  Finally, I offer a libertarian reading of the Gītā that solves the 
prima facie problem of free will.   
 
 
Notions basic to the free will debate in the West 
 
Robert Kane, in Free Will, discusses notions important to the debate about free 
will in Western philosophy.  
According to Kane, free will may be understood in a variety of ways: being 
free from coercion or manipulation by others, action being up to oneself, the sources 
of action being in oneself, having open alternatives in action, and having been able to 
do otherwise.15 
Kane provides a general definition of determinism.  “Any event is determined 
. . . just in case it must be the case that given the determining conditions . . . the event 
will occur.”16   
Kane explains that determinism threatens free will in two ways.  First, if an 
event must be the case, then the event is not up to the agent, and there are no open 
alternatives.  Second, if the sources of one’s actions are in something outside oneself 
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(namely, the determining conditions), then the sources of one’s actions are not in 
oneself.17  
Only the first notion of free will, being free from coercion or manipulation by 
others, is compatible with determinism.  Hume and other compatibilists hold that one 
is free when there is an “absence of constraint or impediments preventing us from 
doing what we want to do.”18  Or, in Hume’s words, liberty is only “a power of acting 
or not acting, according to the determinations of the will,” which belongs to anyone 
“who is not a prisoner in chains.”19 
 Compatibilists hold that one’s desires and consequent behavior may be 
determined by things outside oneself (such as upbringing, physiology, and so on), but 
one is free as long as one is able to act on one’s desires.  Kane calls such freedom 
“surface freedom,” and distinguishes it from “metaphysical freedom” which he 
identifies with the latter senses of freedom listed above such as action being up to 
oneself and one having open alternatives in action. 
I will refer to the first sense of freedom above as “freedom in a Humean 
sense.”  I use “free will” or “genuine freedom,” in contrast, to refer to what Kane calls 
“metaphysical freedom.”   
 
 
George Teschner’s determinist interpretation 
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George Teschner maintains that Krishna is a determinist.  He argues that 
determinism is entailed by the Gītā’s metaphysics.  But his approach to understanding 
the Gītā’s metaphysics is misguided.  He lets his understanding of the terms puruṣa, 
prakṛti, and guṇa as used in the Gītā be supplied by another text, the Sāṃkhyakārika 
(SK).   He assumes that use of these terms in the Gītā indicates that the latter holds 
metaphysical views akin to those of the Sāṃkhya school, but he is wrong. 
The SK espouses a dualist metaphysics with two types of entity: puruṣa, or 
consciousness, and prakṛti, or material nature.  In the Sāṃkhya view, there is a 
plurality of puruṣa-s with each puruṣa possessing a body and mind.  The puruṣa is 
held to be an unchanging, passive witness to mental and bodily events. Prakṛti is 
characterized as non-conscious, changing, and active.  
According to Sāṃkhya cosmogony, the conjunction of puruṣa and prakṛti 
stimulates prakṛti to evolve into buddhi or mahat  (intelligence), ahaṃkāra (sense of 
self), manas (mind), the five perceptual capacities (hearing, touching, seeing, tasting, 
and smelling), the five action capacities (speaking, grasping, movement, excreting, 
and procreating), the five subtle elements (sound, contact, form, taste, and smell), and 
the five gross elements (space, wind, fire, water, and earth).  These evolutes together 
with puruṣa and mūlāprakṛti (original, unevolved prakṛti) are the twenty-five 
ontological principles recognized by Sāṃkhya (SK 22-32).20 
The SK describes prakṛti as constituted by the three guṇa-s of sattva, rajas, 
and tamas, which are material but permit of great subtlety.  Each guṇa has 
characteristic functions.  Sattva illuminates and gives rise to pleasure, rajas excites 
and gives rise to pain, and tamas restrains and gives rise to delusion (SK 12). 
According to J. N. Mohanty, the guṇa-s of the SK are best understood as “feeling 
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substances,”21 or “affective components.”22  They are material and affective at the 
same time, allowing the theory to account for physical and mental events, emotions, 
and moral qualities, all of which are prakṛtic, or natural (SK 12).   
The SK also describes the guṇa-s as inseparable and existing in everything in 
combination.  It explains that they underlie all phenomena in different amounts and 
combinations, and account for all apparent diversity (SK 12, 13, 15, 16).  This view is 
called guṇapariṇāma (transformation of the guṇa-s).23   
The SK takes the guṇa-s as mutually dependent in their activity.  It holds that 
the characteristic functions of a guṇa is realized only when that guṇa dominates over 
the other two.  For example, sattva alone does not produce pleasure.  It produces 
pleasure only when rajas and tamas are present in an object but in lesser quantities 
than sattva (SK 12).   
According to the Sāṃkhya view, prakṛti is the domain to which the mind and 
body belong.  Under this view, action belongs to the body and mind alone and is fully 
determined by the guṇa-s.  The puruṣa is called a non-agent (SK 10, 19, 20). 24  
However, because of the conjunction of puruṣa and prakṛti, puruṣa appears to have 
agency and prakṛti appears to be sentient (SK 20).  In truth what is sentient, puruṣa, is 
inactive and what is active, prakṛti, is insentient.   
The goal of yoga, according to Sāṃkhya, is to realize this truth and achieve 
disidentification of puruṣa and prakṛti.  Disidentification amounts to puruṣa turning 
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away from prakṛti, or withdrawing awareness from all worldly events, including those 
of one’s own body and mind.  Upon disidentification, puruṣa witnesses only itself. 
Teschner takes verses like BG 3.27 to straightforwardly express the 
determinism entailed by such a metaphysics.    
Teschner refers to the theory of the dehin (embodied one) in the second chapter 
of the Gītā to support his view. The dehin, or embodied puruṣa, is described as 
immortal and unchangeable even though the body can change and be killed.  The view 
is captured in BG 2.20 and 2.25: 
Never is this born, never does it die. 
Never will this become, having come to be,  
not come to be anymore. 
This is unborn, eternal, constant, and primeval. 
Even when the body is killed, this is not killed. 
 (BG 2.20) 
This is imperceptible, this is unthinkable,  
this is immutable, so it is said. 
Therefore, knowing thusly  
you should not grieve.  (BG 2.25) 
Teschner cites this passage in support of his view that  “action is not conscious, but is 
governed by the attributes of material nature, and consciousness does not act, but is 
the eternal non-doer.”25  
However, Krishna’s teaching about the dehin does not indicate determinism.  It 
may be consistent with a determinist reading of the text, but what Teschner needs to 
show is that such a reading is right.    
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Teschner tries further to support his determinist reading of the Gītā by pointing 
to BG 4.13: 
The four classes were created by me  
according to their shares of guṇa-s and actions. 
Though I am the doer of that,  
know me as the imperishable non-doer. (BG 4.13) 
Teschner writes “even Krishna  admits to being a non-doer.”26  He argues that even 
God’s behavior is determined by the guṇa-s.  This goes much too far.  The idea that 
God’s behavior may be determined by his creation is absurd in its incompatibility with 
the understanding of God developed in the Gītā.  Further, Teschner’s reading of this 
verse shows carelessness, for while Krishna calls himself a ‘non-doer’ he also calls 
himself a ‘doer’.  Teschner simply ignores this latter assertion. 
 Teschner’s main problem is that he turns to the SK to understand terms used in 
the Gītā when he should look to the Gītā itself.    
 
 
The guṇa-s in early Sāṃkhya 
 
The terms puruṣa, prakṛti, and guṇa, used in several ancient and classical 
texts, are first given systematic philosophical treatment in the SK, Sāṃkhya’s 
foundational text.  Krishna attributes portions of his teaching to Sāṃkhya.  Teschner 
makes the leap that the Sāṃkhya to which Krishna refers is the Sāṃkhya of the SK.  
This is a mistake.  The Gītā, probably composed somewhere between the 6th 
and 2nd centuries BCE, belongs to what scholars of Sāṃkhya consider early 
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Sāṃkhya.27 The scholarly consensus is that early Sāṃkhya is not a single system of 
thought but consists in a variety of related proto-theories found in a handful of texts. 
There is no one, well-developed view of the guṇa-s that can be attributed to early 
Sāṃkhya.  The SK appeared later.  Composed as early as the beginning of the 3rd 
century CE28 and as late as the 6th century CE,29 this text belongs to what scholars 
identify as the classical Sāṃkhya period.  
Teschner commits a fallacy of anachronism when he takes the guṇa-s of the 
Gītā to be those of the SK.30   
Scholars of Sāṃkhya show that there are several key metaphysical 
commitments of Classical Sāṃkhya that the Gītā does not share.  According to E. H. 
Johnston, guṇapariṇāma does not appear in the Gītā.31  He is right.  Furthermore, 
there are no verses that clearly give the guṇa-s a role in the Gītā’s metaphysics.  
The SK affirms a view of causation called satkaryavāda, the view that effects 
pre-exist in their causes “like curds in milk” (SK 9).  Under this view, production is 
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Dasgupta, Philosophical Essays 187; Franklin Edgerton, The Bhagavad Gītā, Harvard 
Oriental Series vol. 38-39 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994) 40; Mohanty, Classical 
Indian Philosophy 5; R. C. Zaehner, The Bhagavad-Gītā (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1969) 15.  Stephen Phillips avoids this error, recognizing that “Sāṃkhya finds several 
early formulations both in the Upanishads and in the Gītā.” Stephen H. Phillips 
Classical Indian Metaphysics (Chicago: Open Court) 1995, 26. 
 




just the redistribution of guṇa-s into combinations consisting of new proportions of 
each sattva, rajas, and tamas.  This view seems to entail determinism.  
Johnston points out that satkaryavāda does not appear in the Gītā.32  What is 
more, the text does not offer any account of causation.   
 Johnston writes that the use of the word guṇa in the Gītā is “puzzling.”33  He 
thinks the term is used in the first twelve chapters of the Gītā to refer to moral and 
psychological conditions and from the thirteenth chapter on to mean ‘material factor’ 
in the same sense as in the SK.34  Gerald Larson holds that the sense of guṇa 
throughout the Gītā is that of moral and psychological conditions but writes “at points 
. . . the guṇa-s seem to constitute the very nature of prakṛti” as in the SK.35  Larson 
also cites verses in the last third of the text (BG 13.21-23, and 14.5-10, 19-20) in 
support of this suggestion. 
If Johnston and Larson are right then the views of Teschner stand.  It is easy 
enough to evaluate Johnston’s and Larson’s suggestions.  As it turns out, the only 
substantive discussions of the guṇa-s in the Gītā are found in the last third of the text 
in BG 14.5-24, 17.2-22, 18.5-9, and 18.19-44.36  While it is here that Johnston and 
Larson think the Gītā’s guṇa-s seem most like those of the SK,  I will show that these 
passages depict the guṇa-s as strictly psychological.  The guṇa-s of the Gītā, I will 
conclude, are not the guṇa-s of the SK.  
 
                         
32 Johnston, Early Sāṃkhya 25. 
 
33 Johnston, Early Sāṃkhya 31. 
 
34 Johnston, Early Sāṃkhya 31. 
 
35 Larson, Classical Sāṃkhya 129. 
 
36 Zaehner, Bhagavad-Gītā 15. According to Zaehner, these passages provide the best 
account of the guṇa-s anywhere in early classical literature. 
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The guṇa theory of the Gītā 
 
 Of the terms puruṣa, prakṛti, and guṇa  the Gītā devotes the most attention to 
discussion of the latter.  Extensive treatment of the guṇa-s is found in BG 14.11-17, 
17.2-22, and 18.19-44.   The guṇa-s are frequently mentioned elsewhere but in 
contexts not rich enough to indicate much about their nature.  Examination of BG 
14.11-17, 17.2-22, and 18.19-44 shows, I argue, that Krishna considers the guṇa-s sets 
of personality traits, affect, and behaviors. 
 BG 14.11-17 discuss the dominance of sattva, rajas, and tamas.  Dominance of 
sattva is indicated by knowledge, rajas by activity, unrest, and greed, and tamas by 
inactivity and negligence.  ‘Negligence’ probably refers to failure to perform 
obligatory duties.  BG 14.9-17 list effects of the dominance each of the guṇa-s.  
Dominance of sattva results in knowledge and rebirth in “stainless worlds” among 
those with knowledge.  Dominance of rajas results in desire, pain, and rebirth among 
those attached to action.  Dominance of tamas results in ignorance, delusion, and 
rebirth by a deluded mother.  
From BG 14.11-17 it remains unclear what kind of things sattva, rajas, and 
tamas are and what it means for them to be dominant.  Note, however, that most of the 
items named as their indicators and effects are psychological in a broad sense of the 
latter that includes the mental, moral, affective, and behavioral.  The guṇa-s have as 
indicators and effects cognitive states (knowledge, ignorance, and delusion), 
desiderative states (greed and desire), a moral quality (negligence), behaviors or 
behavioral states (activity, inactivity, and unrest), a feeling (pain), and various stations 
one may achieve in rebirth.   
Also note that the passage states that activity is a sign of rajas.  This asserts 
that where there is activity, there is rajas.  It does not mean that where there is rajas 
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there will necessarily be activity.  The passage does not state that rajas causes activity.  
And in fact, activity is nowhere called an effect of rajas. 
BG 17.2-22 and 18.19-44 categorize people as sattvic, rajasic, or tamasic 
according to the type of religious observance they perform (BG 17.2-4), their taste in 
food (BG 17.8-10), and the kind of agent they are (BG 18.26-28).  For example,  
The sattvic worship the gods, 
the rajasic the benevolent semi-divine yakṣa-s and evil 
rakṣa-s, 
and others, the tamasic people, 
worship the dead and a host of ghosts. (BG 17.4) 
Promoting vigor, purity, will power, health, 
happiness, and pleasure, 
juicy, smooth, firm, and pleasant to the stomach, 
such foods are favored by the sattvic. (BG 17.8) 
Also considered sattvic, rajasic, or tamasic are types of personal discipline (BG 17.14-
19), religious sacrifice (BG 17.4, 11-13), gifts (BG 17.20-22), knowledge (BG 18.20-
22), action (BG 18.23-25), moral judgment (buddhi) (BG 18.30-32), resolve (dhṛti) 
(BG 18.33-35), and happiness (sukha) (BG 18.37-39).  For example, 
But that gift which is given to return a favor, 
or just for the outcome, 
and with reluctance, 
is thought to be rajasic. (BG 17.21) 
That happiness which, at first and subsequently, 
is the confusion of the self, 
causing sleepiness, sloth, and carelessness, 
is declared to be tamasic. (BG 18.39) 
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Thus people, cognitive states, mental faculties, moral faculties, dispositions, goals, 
deeds, and emotions can be sattvic, rajasic, or tamasic.  In these lengthy passages, the 
guṇa-s are used as categories. 
Winthrop Sargeant considers the guṇa-s categories.  He writes in a footnote to 
BG 14.10 that the guṇa-s are “three types of personality, or three phases of 
behavior.”37  The are used as guṇa-s, but taking them as such makes it difficult to 
interpret passage in which the guṇa-s seem to be considered entities. 
Krishna implies the guṇa-s are states in speaking of their causes and effects.  
As we saw in BG 14.9-17,  one’s station in rebirth is caused by the dominance of a 
particular guṇa.  BG 14.6-9 explain that each guṇa causes attachment to certain 
psychological states and thereby “binds” one.  The passages states that sattva binds a 
person with attachment to knowledge and happiness, and rajas to work, while tamas 
binds with negligence, indolence, and sleep (BG 14.6-8).  To bind, in this context, is to 
keep a person involved in the cycle of corporeal life, death, and rebirth.   
Krishna says less about causes of the guṇa-s.  BG 14.7 may mean that desire 
and attachment cause rajas. 
Know that rajas is characterized by passion. 
It [arises from or is the source of] thirst and attachment. 
It binds down the embodied, O Arjuna, 
by attachment to karman (BG 14.7) 
It is not clear whether rajas arises from desire and attachment or is the source of the 
latter.  BG 14.8 states that ignorance causes tamas. 
But know that tamas is born of ignorance, 
confusing all embodied beings. 
It binds, O Arjuna, 
                         
37 Winthrop Sargeant, The Bhagavad Gītā, ed. Christopher Chapple Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1984) 572. 
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by carelessness, lethargy, and sleepiness. (BG 14.8) 
Based on examination of BG 14.11-17, 17.2-22, and 18.19-44, I suggest we 
take guṇa-s as sets of psychological features, where the psychological is broadly 
construed to include the mental, moral, affective, and behavioral.  When Krishna 
seems to talk about a guṇa as an entity, I suggest he has in mind the states, faculties, 
and other features that belong to that guṇa as a set.  For example, when he says that 
sattva causes attachment to virtue, we should take this to mean that the features that 
belong to the sattvic set cause attachment to virtue.  At other times, Krishna uses the 
guṇa-s as categories and we can understand those categories as the sets to which 
certain states and so on belong.  We can understand dominance of a guṇa as the 
prevalence of the states and so on that belong to that guṇa as a set. 
   Health, happiness, knowledge, virtue, and unselfishness exemplify the sattvic.  
Sickness, pain, desire, attachment, and selfishness exemplify the rajasic.  Sloth, 
sleepiness, ignorance, confusion, negligence, and carelessness exemplify the tamasic.   
 Action is sattvic, rajasic, or tamasic depending on the agent’s motivation. 
Sattvic action is obligatory action performed without desire (BG 18.23).  
Rajasic action is action done out of desire for the fruit (result) of action (BG 18.24).  
Finally, tamasic behavior is irrational, done out of compulsion and without regard for 
consequences, even personal injury (BG 18.22, 25).  The behavior of an addict, for 
example, is tamasic.   
Note that not all obligatory action is sattvic.  The same obligatory act may be 
sattvic, rajasic, or tamasic, depending on why it is done.  
In Chapter 18 the reason for sattvic action is described only negatively.  Sattvic 
action is not done from desire.  BG 17.11 and 20 suggest that sattvic action is done 
because it ought to be done.  BG 17.11 states that sattvic sacrifice is made by 
concentrating the mind on the thought “this ought to be sacrificed” (yaṣṭavyam eveti), 
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and BG 17.20 that the sattvic gift is given with the thought “this ought to be given” 
(dātavyam iti).   
If this is correct, then sattvic action is performed out of a sense of duty, rajasic 
from desire, and tamasic from delusion.  But this is an idealized picture which Krishna 
most likely presents as a teaching tool.  Actual reasons for action may be mixed, 
including duty, desire, and delusion together.    
Arjuna, who represents the new yoga practitioner, exhibits sattvic, rajasic, and 
tamasic attributes in the Gītā’s Chapter 1.  His interest in his doing his duty is sattvic, 
his desire not to kill his kin rajasic, and his inactivity when he slumps down in the 
chariot tamasic. According to BG 14.10, this is normal. 
Sattva exists, O Arjuna, 
prevailing over rajas and tamas,  
rajas over sattva and tamas, 
and tamas over sattva and rajas. (BG 14.10) 
I understand this to mean that one possesses a variety of sattvic, rajasic, and tamasic 
features at all times, with one type being prominent.  The particular combination 
makes up one’s personality.   
The guṇa theory is compatible with choice.  Sattvic, rajasic, and tamasic states 
such as sense of duty, desire, and delusion give an agent reasons to act but do not 
cause him to act.  Even compulsion, a tamasic state, does not cause an agent to act.  
The person in whom tamas is dominant still possesses sattvic and rajasic states and 
therefore still has sattvic and rajasic reasons to act.  
BG 3.5 states that everyone is forced by the guṇa-s to engage in action (karma 
kāryate).   
No one ever, for a single instant, 
stands still as a non-doer. 
Indeed, everyone is caused to perform action, 
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even against his will, by the guṇa-s of [their] nature. 
(BG 3.5) 
This need not mean, as the determinists would have it, that all behavior is causally 
determined by the guṇa-s.  The verse recognizes the existence of will with the phrase 
“even against his will.”  
I take this verse to mean that the states, faculties, and affects that belong to 
sattva, rajas, and tamas cause an agent to act in the sense that those states and so on 
gives reasons for action from which the ordinary agent must choose.  Though Krishna 
speaks of ‘everyone’, he only means ordinary agents here, for some agents transcend 
the guṇa-s and still act.  I show why in Chapter 4.  Krishna uses ‘everyone’ and ‘this 
whole world’ in other places where he must mean to refer only to ordinary agents.  For 
example, in BG 7.13 Krishna says “this whole world is confused . . . they do not 
recognize me.”  He does not mean ‘whole world’ literally, for elsewhere he 
acknowledges that there are yoga practitioners who live in the world and yet do 
recognize him (BG 14.19).  By ‘whole world’ he means the workaday world, the 
world of ordinary people.  This is what he means by ‘everyone’ in BG 3.5.  
BG 3.6 makes it explicit that there is no such thing as not acting.  The ascetic 
who sits without moving is still acting.  He restrains his powers of action 
(karmendriyāṇi saṃyama), but such restraint is a form of action.  Action requires a 
reason, and I take BG 3.6 to mean that for ordinary people the guṇa-s provide reasons.  
And because they provide a number of reasons, one cannot avoid choosing.  
The three guṇa-s are portrayed elsewhere as swaying an agent (BG 3.34, 
14.21-23).  They have a certain pull on an agent, and I take it to be the pull of the 
reasons they generate. While this pull contributes to action, the agent is in principle 
free to resist.  Krishna implies this repeatedly when he instructs Arjuna to resist desire. 
The Gītā’s guṇa theory is a simple theory of psychology that establishes sets 
of mental states and faculties, moral states and faculties, affects, and behaviors.  It 
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provides accounts of rational behavior and rebirth in terms of these sets of things.  
This theory is compatible with free will and furthermore implies it.   
 Nothing in BG 14.11-17, 17.2-22, or 18.19-44 indicates the Sāṃkhya view that 
the guṇa-s are the material constituents all natural phenomena.  Rather, the guṇa-s are 
presented as having to do with the mind, morality, behavior, and rebirth.  In the Gītā,  
guṇa theory is a theory of psychology, where the latter is taken broadly to include the 
mental, moral, behavioral, and experiential aspects of human nature.   
A tenet of this theory is that rebirth is related to psychology in that the station 
one achieves in rebirth is determined by one’s psychological make-up and conduct in 
previous lives.  
 
 
The guṇa-s and prakṛti 
 
Several verses in the Gītā refer to the guṇa-s “of prakṛti” or the guṇa-s “born 
of prakṛti” (BG 3.5, 3.27, 13.21, 14.5, 18.40).  The Gītā does not define prakṛti and 
many interpreters have assumed it has the same sense in the Gītā as it does in classical 
Sāṃkhya (material nature constituted by the three guṇa-s).  This is a mistake.  The 
guṇa-s of the Gītā are not the guṇa-s of classical Sāṃkhya, and this is reason to think 
that the sense of prakṛti in the Gītā is also different.38  
                         
38 There are other reasons to take the sense of prakṛti in the Gītā as different from its 
sense in the SK.  First, when Krishna calls the individual selves God’s prakṛti, he 
employs prakṛti in a way clearly inconsistent with classical Sāṃkhya.  The selves are 
conscious and unchanging, while Sāṃkhya’s prakṛti has the opposite qualities.  Also, 
the SK’s prakṛti is twenty-fourfold, while God’s lower prakṛti is eightfold, and his 
higher prakṛti one.  Further, the constituents of prakṛti are fixed, according to classical 
Sāṃkhya, until yogic achievement results in disintegration of one’s material nature.  
But according to the Gītā, while ahaṃkāra is ordinarily a constituent of human nature, 
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Krishna describes the prakṛti of human beings as the body, buddhi (judgment), 
ahaṃkāra (ego sense), manas (mind), senses, and modifications of these such as 
desire (BG 13.6).   He says that God has two prakṛti-s, the material world and the set 
of all individual selves (BG 7.4-5).  Prakṛti is something, first of all, that is possessed 
by a self.  
I take prakṛti as used in the Gītā to mean ‘nature’ in the sense of the particular 
set of qualities belonging to a thing by virtue of its constitution.  God’s two prakṛti-s 
constitute his nature, and a person’s body, mind, and their characteristic qualities and 
functions constitute her human nature.  The “guṇa-s of prakṛti” are the states and 
faculties that can be categorized as sattvic, rajasic, or tamasic that constitute a person’s 
psychological make-up and thus are part of her nature.   
 
 
The puruṣa, agency, and motivation 
 
The SK understands the puruṣa as pure consciousness, a mere witness to 
cognitive states and physical feelings with no involvement in action.  However, 
Krishna calls the puruṣa a witness and a consenter (anumantā) (BG 13.22).  I suggest 
that in the Gītā the puruṣa is taken to exercise agency in consenting to do a particular 
action for a particular reason, such as fighting the war out of desire for fame.  
The puruṣa is not an unmoved mover.  It does not move anything.  Rather, its 
consent coordinates two sources of motivation.  First, there is the pull of states like 
desire and knowledge of duty generated by the guṇa-s.  These are necessary but not 
sufficient for action.  Second, there is the push of bodily energy (ojas).  According to 
BG 18.61: 
                                                                       
the realized yoga practitioner is without ahaṃkāra (BG 13.8, 13.11).  A person’s 
prakṛti can change in constitution, according to the Gītā. 
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The Lord abides in the hearts  
of all beings, O Arjuna. 
By his power he causes all beings,  
riding on this support, to move.39 
God causes beings to move by endowing their bodies with ojas, or energy. 
And, pervading the sun, 
I cause living beings to continue living by [endowing 
them with] energy (ojas). 
And I nourish all medicinal herbs 
as soma, which constitutes their [healing] essence. (BG 
15.13) 
He does so as the process of digestion. 
As the digestive fire, 
I dwell in the bodies of living beings. 
In contact with [other vital winds]  
I digest the four kinds of food. (BG 15.14) 
                         
39 Śrī Śaṅkarācarya, The Bhagavad Gita, trans. Alladi Mahadeva Sastri (Madras: 
Samata Books, 1995) 497. Śaṅkara interprets the second line of this verse as “like 
wooden dolls mounted on a machine” supplying ‘wooden dolls’, the comparative 
‘like’, and taking yantra to mean machine. The result is an interpretation very much in 
line with his determinist project.  Unfortunately, Rāmānuja, Sargeant, Minor, and 
others seem to have been influenced by Śaṅkara to read this verse along similar lines.  
However, the verse permits of other interpretations, and more literal ones at that. As I 
have said (in the Introduction), in my translation I attempt to stay as true to the text as 
possible by representing the most common meanings of terms and by not supplying 
anything conceptually significant. However, when alternative meanings are available 
and all relatively common, I choose what is most compatible with my reading, and 
hold to a principle of charity.  
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The energy provided by digestion is necessary but not sufficient for action. The claim 
made in BG 18.61 that God “causes all beings . . .  to move” should be taken to mean 
that God supplies a necessary condition of voluntary motion.  
I suggest the view that God endows people’s bodies with ojas, or energy, a 
push, while reasons generated by the guṇa-s are pulls. These pushes and pulls are 
motivational, but are themselves insufficient for action.  Action ensues when the 
agent, through consent, coordinates the push of bodily energy with the pull of a 
reason.   
The agent is free.  It is up to him to choose how to direct his God-given bodily 
motion.  Choosing amounts to consenting to a reason for action and the end it entails.  
Proponents of determinism take the claim in BG 18.61 that God “causes all 
beings . . . to move” to mean that God provides sufficient conditions of movement and 
thus determines action.  They commonly cite this verse as support for their position.  
But what about the guṇa-s?  Brodbeck comes to the awkward conclusion that action is 
causally determined by both the guṇa-s and God together, though he cannot say how.  
Deutsch sees the guṇa theory and Divine rulership as two “interrelated” denials of free 
will.40  However, he does not say how they are interrelated.  Robert Minor makes the 
most sense: “all is Krishna  and under his control,” including of course the guṇa-s, and 
therefore “the logical conclusion . . . is a determinism.”41  
Brodbeck and the others are wrong to take BG 18.61 as unequivocal support 
for their determinist reading, for the claim that God “causes all beings . . . to move” 
may well mean that God establishes necessary but not sufficient conditions for motion.  
                         
40 Simon Brodbeck, “Calling Kṛṣṇa’s Bluff: Non-Attached Action in the 
Bhagavadgītā” Journal of Indian Philosophy 32.1 (2004): 92; Eliot Deutsch, The 
Bhagavad Gita (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968) 181. 
 




As I argue above, features of the text that seem to indicate voluntarism greatly 
outweigh those that seem to indicate determinism.  BG 18.61 should be interpreted in 
light of the text’s overall voluntarist tone. 
 
 
Three forms of agent causation  
 
The account of motivation I propose attributes a form of agent causation to the 
Gītā.  To better understand the Gītā’s agent causation, I compare it with the forms of 
agent causation articulated by Roderick Chisholm and Timothy O’Connor. 
Chisholm holds a form of agent causation in which: 1. an agent is not an event, 
that is, is uncaused; 2. an agent causes events; and 3. an agent does so as a prime 
mover unmoved.42  Chisholm defines two kinds of causation. The first is transuent 
causation, in which an event is caused by an event, which itself is caused.  The second 
is immanent causation in which an event is caused by a non-event.  Agents cause 
events by immanent causation. 
J. David Velleman worries that Chisholm’s view deviates from “our scientific 
view of the world [which] regards all events and states of affairs as caused, and hence 
explained, by other events and states.”43  He takes it as a rule that events are the basic 
elements of explanation and rejects immanent causation. 
Velleman may be right, there may be no place for non-events in our modern-
day scientific world view.  However, non-events are highly significant in the Gītā’s 
                         
42 Roderick Chisholm, Human Freedom and the Self (University of Kansas, 1964) 7-
12. 
 





explanations of things.  Krishna is not an event.  He is uncaused, eternal, and 
unchanging, according to Chapters 10 and 11.  Puruṣa-s are not events.  They are also 
unborn and eternal, according to BG 2.20. BG 2.25 states outright that the puruṣa is 
immutable.  It is not subject to causation.  At the same time, God and puruṣa-s are 
agents.  The Gītā agrees with Chisholm on his first point that an agent is not an event. 
It agrees with him on his second point that agents cause events. However, 
puruṣa-s cause events as part of a set of conditions that are sufficient to cause action.  
This set includes the ojas (energy), reasons, and the puruṣa’s consent.  Chisholm’s 
agent, on the other hand, is alone sufficient to cause action. 
Agent causation in the Gītā further differs with Chisholm on his third point.  
The puruṣa does not cause action by producing movement.  Like a king, the puruṣa 
causes action by granting consent.  The king is dependent on his advisors to 
recommend courses of action; likewise, the puruṣa is free to choose only from reasons 
presented by the guṇa-s.  This is passive in that the puruṣa itself does not generate 
motion.  It is causal in that the consent of the puruṣa belongs to a set of conditions that 
are together sufficient for action.  The puruṣa’s efficacy is like that of the king.  The 
king’s power rests on an agreement by his subjects to obey him.  Likewise, the puruṣa 
is called the inner ruler of the body, mind, and senses, and its efficacy depends on the 
proper functioning of these faculties.  
O’Connor criticizes Chisholm for making the agent “god-like” and “utterly 
unfettered.” 44  In Chisholm’s view, only the agent has power to trigger voluntary 
movement.  He does not recognize a person’s reasons for action as having any motive 
power.  O’Connor thinks that, while we are free, our reasons move us to act.  He asks: 
“How can agents cause things to happen without its being true that they do so in virtue 
                         
44 Timothy O’Connor, “The Agent as Cause,” Free Will, ed. Robert Kane (Malden: 




of certain features of themselves at the time?”45  He insists that an adequate view must: 
1. show how reasons move a person to act, not as external pressures but as one’s own 
reasons; and 2. acknowledge that reasons do not usually have equal weight.46   
In O’Connor’s agent causation, an agent acts on himself by influencing his 
own psychological and physiological events.  The agent’s causation is exercised in 
effecting “an action-triggering state of intention” to act in accordance with reasons 
present within himself.  The agent’s reasons are potent and ready to cause action.  But, 
they cannot do so without the agent’s intention as a trigger.  How does the agent’s 
intention do this?  O’Connor’s account is cursory.  Intending to act in accordance with 
present reasons is a basic form of activity, not reducible to any other process, and not 
further explicable.  This would seem to imply that intending to act is itself sufficient to 
cause action.  The agent’s control over less immediate effects rests on this basis.  
The weakness of O’Connor’s view is that he posits what he calls a “distinctly 
personal form of causality” that is unlike any other form of causality and that he 
refuses to describe.  He makes the negative statement that agent causation is not 
mechanistic, but at the same time he explains that an agent “triggers” action.  A gun is 
a machine, and the trigger of a gun works by generating motion that sets off, by chain 
reaction, the forceful motion of the bullet.  The pulling of the trigger and the ensuing 
chain reaction constitute of bundle of conditions which together are sufficient to cause 
action.  O’Connor implies that agent causation is mechanistic by the metaphor he uses.  
The Gītā’s agent causation satisfies O’Connor’s demand that an adequate view 
show how reasons move a person to act and acknowledge that reasons do not usually 
have equal weight.  It improves on O’Connor’s view by offering an account of how 
the agent exercises its special form of causation. 
                         
45 O’Connor, “Agent as Cause” 200. 
 
46 O’Connor, “Agent as Cause” 203. 
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Libertarian interpretation of verses that suggest determinism 
 
Let me return to those verses that prima facie seem to deny free will.  I take 
BG 3.27 as representative of the group.  It claims that the guṇa-s perform action.  The 
verse, recall, reads: 
Actions are performed, in all cases, 
by the guṇa-s of prakṛti; 
One who is deceived by self-conceit 
thinks ‘I am the doer’. (BG 3.27) 
Let me begin by noting that action is, in Krishna’s view, performed by the 
body, speech, mind (manas), or intelligence (buddhi) (BG 5.11, 18.15).  In the body, 
the immediate causes of action are the karmendriyāni (literally, “action senses”), or 
powers of action of the hands, feet, mouth, genitals, and anus (BG 3.6), as set in 
motion by the puruṣa’s consent to act on a reason.  The action senses, as I have 
argued, are empowered by God by means of the process of digestion.  All this seems 
to indicate that the claim in BG 3.27 that the guṇa-s perform action is not meant 
literally. 
I suggest that BG 3.27 is instructive.  It tells the practitioner to abandon the 
thought “I am the doer” and instead attribute action to the guṇa-s.  Instructions like 
this appear elsewhere (BG 5.8-9, 14.19, 18.26).  They do not deny agency.  They are, 
rather, part of a contemplative practice of disidentification supposed to free one from 
attachment to one’s actions.  Attachment to action leads to rebirth and suffering.  The 
route to freedom is seeing that one is not a sole agent (kevala kartṛ).  BG 18.16-17 
expresses this:  
This being so, he who sees himself  
as a sole agent, 
Because wisdom is not yet ripe,  
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does not really see.  He is a fool. (BG 18.16) 
He who has no self-conceit,  
whose intelligence is not polluted, 
Even killing these people,  
he does not kill, and is not bound. (BG 18.17) 
The message is not that one is not free but that one’s agency is not in itself sufficient 
for action.  While one is free to act, one acts in dependence on a number of factors.  
BG 18.14-15 lists the five factors necessary for action.  One is the agent.  The other 
four, including God, are also necessary.   
Matthew McKenzie cites BG 18.14-16 and argues that “we come to believe 
that we are the sovereign lords of our own actions and lives.47  He also takes BG 18.14 
to show that the agent is necessary for action, but not in itself sufficient. 
BG 3.27, recall, states “One who is deceived by self-conceit  
thinks ‘I am the doer’.”  Self-importance is an impediment to yoga.  The practitioner 
should eventually come to see all beings as equal to himself and adopt as his 
overarching goal the one goal that benefits all equally, that of world maintenance.  The 
recognition that he is not the sole agent of his actions lessens his self-conceit.  
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Karma yoga involves performing obligatory action without desire.  The 
concept of niṣkāma karman (action without desire) has been seen by several modern 
scholars of Indian philosophy as a prima facie problem.  Roy Perrett, Simon 
Brodbeck, and Tara Chatterjea all argue that action requires desire, therefore desireless 
action is impossible, and so Krishna’s karma yoga teaching cannot be taken literally.  
But I will argue that desire is not considered necessary for action in the Gītā, and 





Perrett begins his problematization of the concept of niṣkāma karman by 
claiming that it is “a commonplace of classical Indian action theory that desire is a 
necessary causal condition of an action,” naming the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā as schools 
that hold such a view.1  He asserts that the Gītā must share the view that action 
without desire is impossible and so finds the niṣkāma karman concept prima facie 
contradictory.  Krishna cannot, he thinks, instruct practitioners to both perform 
obligatory action and completely abandon desire at the same time.  Rather, he must 
mean for them to be free of a particular kind of desire.   
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Christopher Framarin calls this a “subset interpretation” of niṣkāma karman.2  
Such an interpretation asserts that not all desires are to be abandoned but only a certain 
subset of them.  
 To flesh out his interpretation, Perrett appeals to Harry Frankfurt’s notion of 
ordered desires.  A first-order desire, according to Frankfurt, has an action as its 
object, for example, to fight the battle.  He defines second-order desires as desires that 
have first-order desires as their objects, such as a desire not to want to fight the battle 
because people will die.  First-order desires, Perrett holds, are necessary for action but 
not second-order ones. 
 Perrett goes on to define an “attached desire” as a first-order desire for an 
action along with a second-order desire for the first-order desire.  An example is the 
desire to fight the battle along with a desire to want to fight the battle because winning 
could yield fame.  Since Perrett thinks first-order desires are necessary for action, and 
Krishna instructs Arjuna not to abandon action, Perrett concludes that first-order 
desires must be allowed and second-order desires abandoned.  In his view, the desire 
to fight the battle is permissible. 
What Perrett thinks is not allowed is desire or aversion for first-order desires.  
Rather, he holds, the practitioner should allow the content of his first-order desires to 
be supplied by “the social norms that determine svadharma” or one’s own duty.3  
Perrett gets one thing right: the practitioner must allow duty to determine his ends, not 
desire.  But Perrett’s view fails because he does not show how this might be done 
without second-order desires.  His view does not allow that the practitioner adopt the 
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second-order desire to have only svadharmic first-order desires or the second-order 
desire to reject first-order desires that conflict with duty.  Having appropriate first-
order desires can be nothing more than accidental, under Perrett’s view.  Perrett cannot 
account for yogic self-discipline.       
Frankfurt defines freedom of will as consisting in conformity of one’s first- 
and second-order desires and the strength of will to act on them.4  To abandon what 
Perrett calls attached desires is to abandon free will as Frankfurt defines the latter.  
Frankfurt calls those who lack second-order volitions (second-order desires 
that first-order desires be effective) wantons.5  They act without restraint on whatever 
first-order desires they have.  First-order desires are restrained through second-order 
volitions.  Perrett cannot differentiate between the practitioner and the wanton. 
A better subset interpretation would take as allowable second-order desires for 
first-order desires that accord with one’s duty, and first order desires that accord with 
one’s duty.  This interpretation better accounts for karma yoga as a discipline.  I do 
not endorse this view, however. 
Chatterjea, like Perrett, argues that classical Indian schools of thought all 
regard desire as a necessary condition of action.6  If this is true of the classical 
systems, then it must be true of the Gītā, she implies.   
She too argues that niṣkāma karman can only require that some desires be 
abandoned.  She proposes that these are selfish desires, while the desire to do good for 
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the sake of others is not prohibited. 7 She gives a Humean account of motivation in 
which a pre-existing desire, paired with a relevant belief, causes action. She explains 
that for the niṣkāma karman practitioner the non-selfish desire to do good coupled 
with a true normative belief, such as Arjuna’s “I should fight this battle,” gives rise to 
a desire which motivates right action, such as Arjuna’s fighting the battle.   
 In teaching niṣkāma karman, she argues, Krishna teaches the “allied concept” 
of equanimity.8  By ‘allied’ she seems to mean ‘equivalent’.  She argues that non-
selfish desires are those which are compatible with equanimity, while desires not 
allowed under niṣkāma karman are incompatible with equanimity.  Thus, the 
requirement of desirelessness is equivalent to the equanimity requirement.   
In response to Chatterjea, Framarin argues that even non-selfish desires violate 
the equanimity requirement.  He offers the following example.  “My desire to see my 
nieces flourish disposes me toward joy and disappointment in the same way that my 
desire that I flourish does.”9  This is a poor example since it is not clear that the desire 
to see his nieces flourish is a non-selfish desire.  Rather, his desire to see his neices 
flourish might be based on an emotional attachment to his nieces by virtue of which 
their happiness causes him happiness and their suffering causes him to suffer.  
Assuming flourishing is a condition of happiness, his desire that his nieces flourish 
may be selfish, for when they experience happiness so does he.  His desire to see his 
nieces flourish may dispose him to joy and disappointment just as his desire to flourish 
does because both are selfish desires.  Framarin fails to show Chatterjea’s solution 
inadequate. 
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But Chatterjea’s proposal that the niṣkāma karman practitioner should be 
motivated by a non-selfish desire to do good is inadequate.  For even if this desire 
does not dispose one to joy, it might dispose one to disappointment, and the latter is all 
we need to show to show that Chatterjea’s solution violates the equanimity 
requirement.  A person with a non-selfish desire to do good wishes to do good not 
because he expects it will bring him happiness but because he recognizes doing good 
as a worthwhile end in itself.  Suppose this person is involved in an auto accident, 
fully paralyzed, and rendered mute.  No longer able to act, he might reasonably feel 
disappointment at his condition.  He knows there is now one less person in the world 
engaged in doing good.  Something of inherent value, his doing good, has been lost.  
This is a basis for disappointment.  Chatterjea’s solution fails. 
While Perrett and Chatterjea start with claims about classical Indian 
philosophy of action, Brodbeck turns to ancient texts.  He claims that ancient Indian 
views of action are uniform in holding desire necessary for action.  He quotes passages 
from the Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad (BU), the Mahābhārata, and the Manusmṛti that 
recognize a connection between desire and action. For example, Manusmṛti 2.2-4 
states: “Never is any activity of a desireless one seen in this world.”10 He goes on to 
say that because ancient texts share the view that desire is necessary for action so must 
the Gītā, and niṣkāma karman is therefore an incoherent notion.   
Brodbeck’s argument is weak.  If the Gītā is an ancient text then Brodbeck is 
simply begging the question.  If the Gītā is not an ancient text, then his generalization 
about ancient texts has no bearing on what views we can reasonably expect to find 
affirmed in the Gītā.  
Taking niṣkāma karman to be an incoherent notion, Brodbeck is led to deny 
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agency altogether.  I examined his arguments in the previous chapter.  Though Krishna 
instructs the practitioner to act for the sake of maintaining the world (lokasaṃgraha),  
Brodbeck claims that “it is clear that we cannot make philosophical progress without 
ignoring some of what Krishna says.”11  We are not forced to this in my reading.  
Brodbeck follows George Teschner in reading the Gītā through Sāṃkhya.  
Perrett and Chatterjea, in contrast, seem to accept the Nyāya theory of motivation as 
standard.  In that view, knowledge (jñāna) that performing an action will increase the 
agent’s pleasure or decrease his pain (without causing greater harm) brings about 
desire (cikirṣa).  Desire brings about the will to do (pravṛtti), which produces motor 
effort (ceṣtā) in the form of action (kārya).12  
This formulation does not appear in the Gītā, but as I will show, some 
passages describe perception as giving rise to desire, and desire as causing action.  The 
Gītā agrees that desire can contribute to action, but it does not hold that desire is 
necessary for action.  Note that the Nyāya view holds desire necessary for action but 
not sufficient for action.  The Gītā describes several kinds of action: sattvic, rajasic, 
and tamasic action, action of one who has transcended the guṇa-s, and God’s action.  
They are each different in how they are motivated.   
 
 
Purushottama Bilimoria’s view 
 
Purushottama Bilimoria makes no broad claim about the Indian tradition but 
simply asserts that Krishna accepts two presuppositions which inform his teaching.  
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The first is that desire determines intention and action.  Bilimoria attributes this to the 
BU 4.4.5.13  The second is that action is necessarily conditioned by an antecedent 
desire.  He does not cite a basis for this.  Together the two express a biconditional 
relationship between desire and action: there is action if and only if there is desire.   
Bilimoria offers a non-literal interpretation of niṣkāma karman, but his differs 
from the others.  It is not a subset interpretation.  He writes, “the Gītā does not aspire 
to total eradication of desire.”14  He thinks it may be impossible to be completely free 
of desire.  And, suppression of desire is contrary to self-love.  It can lead to pathology 
and deterioration of well-being.15  Instead, he argues, the Gītā teaches equanimity 
toward desire as also toward the pairs of opposites such as pleasure and pain.  
Bilimoria understands equanimity not as indifference but as avoidance of extreme 
reactions.  With regard to the pairs of opposites, to have equanimity means not being 
“too excited when experiencing joy,” for example, “nor feeling too ruffled when 
feeling sorrow.”16  Extreme reactions are a problem, he seems to hold, because they 
can blind one to what is right and wrong in a situation.  One should regard one’s 
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desires with a degree of aloofness.17  This allows “balanced harmonious [moral] 
judgment.”18  One still acts on desires but only the morally appropriate ones.  
Equanimity enables one to do one’s duty not by sheer force of will or suppression of 
one’s nature but gracefully, in a way that balances “self-love” and “the wider horizon 
of cultural sensitivities.”19 
Bilimoria’s interpretation portrays karma yoga as a discipline practicable for 
flesh-and-blood people, an effective means to liberation that does not require excising 
affect and longing, qualities at the heart of what it is to be human.  But Krishna makes 
stricter demands of the practitioner.  In the early phase of yoga practice Krishna 
recognizes that the practitioner will still experiences desires.  Krishna instructs him to 
endure the agitation they cause (BG 5.27).  But Krishna teaches that with practice 
desires “turn away” (BG 15.5), and complete desirelessness, mentioned many times in 
the text (BG 2.56-57, 2.64, 6.10, 12.17), is achieved.  Desirelessness does seem to be a 
goal of karma yoga, draconian as this might seem. 
At the end of his paper Bilimoria argues that desire can be transformed.  “The 
energy (śakti) of desire can be redirected to another object of concentration and 
thereby transformed into another passion, viz. love.”20  He has in mind, specifically, 
the love of God.  The means to this transformation is to see God in all objects of 
desire, remembering that God is all.  Equanimity contributes to this redirection of 
energy, giving the practitioner enough “distance” from objects of desire that he is free 
to choose his object of concentration.  The lover of God makes God’s aim, the 
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universal good, his own and thinks of himself as working in collaboration with God 
for this sake.  The motive for this work is love. 
Bilimoria seems to renounce the view that desire is required for action when he 
allows that love can motivate all of a person’s actions.  When directed to the right 
object, energy that was tied up in desire becomes love, according to him.  And this 
energy, in the form of love, can motivate action.  He seems to hold that energy, not 
desire, is necessary for action.  This view is compatible with a literal reading of 
niṣkāma karman, and I endorse it. 
 
 
Influence of Humeanism 
 
Perrett, Chatterjea, and Brodbeck contend that the Indian philosophical 
tradition is homogeneous in its view of action.  A careful and lengthy survey of texts 
would be required to support such a claim, but they do not offer one.  Furthermore, 
according to J. N. Mohanty, classical Indian theories do not exhibit a uniformity of 
views about action.  While the Nyāya and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā schools hold that desire is 
necessary for action, Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā does not.21  According to the latter, all that 
is necessary for action is the belief that it should be done.  This school holds that 
imperative statements of the form “x should be done” have the power to form the 
necessary belief.   
Furthermore, Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Abhinavagupta, and Aurobindo, who are 
certainly well-acquainted with the Indian tradition, do not read the Gītā as holding that 
desire is necessary for action.  
                         




This tenet, however, is fundamental to the Humean theory of motivation which 
has been called “a dogma in [Western] philosophical psychology.”22  
Hume sees the human being as a “mighty complicated machine” which obeys 
deterministic laws like everything else.  He explains that sensory impressions produce 
internal feelings of pleasure or pain, and passions, such as desire, aversion, grief, joy, 
and hope arise immediately from internally felt pleasure and pain.23  Passions 
determine the will, 24 he holds, and the will determines action in a mechanistic 
fashion.25  He insists that people can be free, defining liberty as the power to do what 
one wants.  This power belongs to everyone “who is not a prisoner in chains.”26 
Hume offers an empirical argument for his theory of motivation.  From our 
experience, he claims, “our actions have a constant union with our motives [and] 
tempers.”27  Observation of the constant conjunction of passions with action is the 
basis for acknowledging the necessity of passion for action.   
 According to Michael Smith, Hume is the source of “the standard picture of 
human psychology,”28 a neo-Humean theory which enjoys “a fair degree of uncritical 
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acceptance” today.29  According to this theory, the source of motivation for an action 
is a relevant desire to φ and a means-end belief that by ψ-ing one will φ.30  A desire 
and a belief, together in the right kind of relationship, are necessary for action.    
Whatever the source, Perrett and the others are unduly influenced in their 
readings of the Gītā.  They make claims about the Gītā without paying sufficient 
attention to the text itself. 
 
 
Contradictory statements about action 
 
To be fair, there is much in the Gītā to discourage the philosopher. The text is 
peppered with verses that make apparently contradictory statements.  In BG 4.13 
Krishna claims he is both a doer and a non-doer. 
The four classes were created by me  
according to their shares of guṇa-s and actions. 
Though I am the doer of that,  
know me as the imperishable non-doer. (BG 4.13) 
BG 18.17 seems to say that certain people can kill and not kill at the same time. 
He who has no self-conceit 
and whose intelligence is unstained, 
even killing these people, he does not kill 
and is not bound.  (BG 18.17) 
BG 4.18 seems to say that action is not what it seems.  
Who sees action in inaction 
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and inaction in action, 
he is wise among men. 
He is disciplined in performing all actions.  (BG 4.18) 
 Although it appears to have philosophical content, Franklin Edgerton argues 
that because of the prevalence of contradictory passages, we must take the Gītā as a 
mystical poem whose “appeal is to the emotions rather than to the intellect.”31   
The Gītā is surely a mystical poem par excellence.  Still, it has a coherent view 
of action that is developed with some care, though it may not be as clear and complete 
as the modern philosopher would like. 
 
 
The Gītā’s theory of action 
 
Western action theorists often launch discussions of the nature of action by 
making an initial distinction between what is action and what is not.  Dretske contrasts 
“things we do” with “things that happen to us.”32  The difference is causal.  The former 
have their causes in us, while the latter are caused by things outside us.  For Dretske, 
shivering and voluntarily moving one’s arm are both things one does.  The are both 
internally caused.  He further contrasts voluntary behavior, which has intent and 
results from conscious choices, and involuntary behavior, which is done without a 
conscious reason.33  Reaching to turn the stove down when one has decided a skillet is 
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too hot is voluntary behavior.  Pulling one’s hand from a hot stove is involuntary 
behavior.  It is done before one is conscious of a reason to do so.  Dretske considers 
what he calls internally produced changes such as shivering, sweating, growing hair, 
and the like and counts these as involuntary behavior.  They do not require a reason.34  
Action, according to Dretske, is “either itself something one does voluntarily 
or deliberately (e.g., playing the piano) or a direct consequence . . .  of such a 
voluntary act (e.g., unintentionally disturbing one’s neighbors by intentionally playing 
the piano).”35  
Action is first at issue in the Gītā in Chapter 1.  A distinction similar to 
Dretske’s between voluntary and involuntary behavior is implicit.  Arjuna is upset by 
the sight of his relatives arrayed on the opposite side of the battlefield and exclaims: 
My limbs sink 
and my mouth dries up. 
My body trembles 
and my hair bristles.  (BG 1.29) 
The Gāṇdiva bow slips from my hand 
and my skin burns. 
I cannot stand 
and my mind seems to reel.  (BG 1.30) 
                         
34 Note that having certain conscious reasons, ones that are emotionally disturbing, 
say, can make one shiver or sweat.   
 
35 Dretske, Explaining Behavior 5.  This is a preliminary account.  Ultimately he 
articulates a nuanced causal view in which “behavior . . . is to be identified with a 
complex causal process, a structure wherein certain internal conditions or events 
produce certain external movements or changes” (p. 21).  He holds that action results 
from two kinds of causes: triggers and structural causes, or dispositions to behave 
certain ways in response to certain triggers.  
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The point seems to be that he has lost his capacity for voluntary behavior.  He cannot 
control his limbs or his weapon.  At the same time, he is overcome by a set of 
involuntary reactions: a dry mouth, trembling, and goose bumps. 
 After giving a description of his physical state, Arjuna describes his mental 
state.  He says that he sees no good in killing his relatives, nor does he desire any of 
the pleasurable things, such as victory or rule of the empire, that he could gain by 
fighting.  He sees no reason to fight.  Thus the text seems to recognize that voluntary 
behavior is done for a reason.  
Action continues to be a prominent theme throughout the text, but it is not until 
Chapter 18 that a theoretical account is offered.  This account, offered by Krishna to 
support Arjuna in making good choices, covers only voluntary action.  There is a 
theory of the saṃgraha, or elements, of action (BG 18.18), a theory of the kāraṇa, or 
causal factors, of action (BG 18.13-14),  and a theory of codanā, or  incitement, of 
action (BG 18.18). 
BG 18.15 states that action may be performed by the body, speech, or mind.  
According to BG 18.18, every action has three saṃgraha (elements): a karaṇa, or 
instrument; a karman, or act; and a kartṛ, or agent. Since not all action requires an 
instrument such as a sword, ‘instrument’ here must refer to the body, speech, or mind.  
Note that karman (act) is used here to explain something about karman (action).  
Karman (act) as an element of action may refer to movement, sound, or thought, as 
distinct from the instrument (body, speech, or mind) which performs these.  BG 18.18 
names the agent as a factor distinct from the instrument of action.  This indicates 
voluntarism.  Under a determinist reading the instrument and act are enough to 
constitute action, and there is no role for an agent.  Inclusion of the agent as one of the 
factors of action indicates libertarianism. 
A theory of the causal factors (kāraṇa) of action appears at BG 18.13-15. 
Learn from me, O Arjuna,  
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these five causes, 
declared in the Sāṃkhya doctrine, 
of the accomplishment of all actions.  (BG 18.13) 
The seat (adhiṣṭhāna), the agent (kartṛ),  
and also the various instruments (karaṇa-pṛthag-vidha), 
and the various motions (vividhāḥ pṛthakceṣṭāḥ),  
and, too, divinity (daiva) as the fifth.  (BG 18.14) 
Whatever action may be undertaken 
with the body, speech, or mind, 
be it right or wrong, 
these five are the causes.  (BG 18.15) 
As this is the key passage on action on the text, it will do to review with some care the 
scholarly and commentarial treatment it has received.   
The handling of this passage by the Western Gītā scholars has for the most 
part been limited to simple translation.  Translations by Edgerton, R. C. Zaehner, 
Robert Minor, and Winthrop Sargeant agree with the above translation except on the 
treatment of daiva (divinity).  And in that they betray determinist leanings.  Edgerton 
and Zaehner translate it ‘fate’.  Minor does too and argues that this is the common 
meaning of the word in the Mahābhārata.36  Sargeant translates it ‘divine 
providence’.37  Both of these imply determinism, which is unacceptable. 
 Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja give the passage more attention.  
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Śaṅkara takes the seat to be the body.  The kartṛ, which I translate ‘agent’, is 
not an agent but a passive witness, in his view.  It is Brahman as Ātman partaking of 
apparent individuality.  The various instruments are the organs of sense and the 
various motions are the functions of the vital winds (vayu) such as breathing.  He takes 
divinity to refer to gods such as Āditya with whose help the organs of sense, like the 
eye, function.38  These five together are sufficient for action. 39  Śaṅkara considers 
action to be illusory in accordance with his metaphysics.  The witness (kartṛ) is 
required, for what is merely apparent must have an observer.  
 Rāmānuja also takes the seat to be the body.  He explains that the agent is the 
individual self (ātman), but as I discussed in Chapter 2 Rāmānuja ultimately concludes 
that the self only has agency vicariously through the guṇa-s.  He takes the various 
instruments to be the five motor organs (speech, hands, feet, reproductive organs, and 
organs of evacuation) and the mind, and the various motions to be the five prāṇa-s, or 
vital winds, that sustain the body and senses.   
Rāmānuja interprets divinity as God.  He claims in this portion of his 
commentary that God is the “main cause in completing the action.”40  The individual 
self is dependent on God, “having him for [his] support, empowered by him, and thus 
deriving power from him.” 41 God also enables the agent by creating him and 
maintaining fundamental conditions necessary for action including physical existence, 
the passage of time, and the agent’s ability to choose.  While the individual self carries 
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out action his actions are subject to God’s consent.42  This seems to mean that God’s 
support might be withdrawn.  The five factors together are required for action, but, 
Rāmānuja emphasizes, God has primacy among causes in that the other four depend 
on him in making their contribution to action.  
This account of God’s relationship to human action is compatible with a 
libertarian reading of the Gītā.  But as I showed in the last chapter, Rāmānuja 
flounders on the issue of human freedom.  He ultimately, and inconsistently, decides 
that the guṇa-s produce all action while the self merely witnesses.  He explains that 
the guṇa-s are under God’s control, and so God determines action through the guṇa-s. 
I contend that the kartṛ (agent) mentioned in BG 18.13-15 is the individual self 
(ātman or puruṣa) and is meant to have agency in a full-fledged sense.  In my view, 
there is a certain causal primacy the agent enjoys over the other four.  As I argued in 
the previous chapter,  God endows people’s bodies with ojas, or energy (a push),43 
while the guṇa-s generate reasons (pulls).  The agent determines when, how, and 
toward what end to direct his God-given bodily energy.   The agent’s role is primary in 
the sense of determining these features of a particular action. 
Krishna addresses the causes of action from another angle in BG 18.18 where 
he describes the incitement (codanā) of action.  Śaṅkara understands incitement as a 
                         
42 Rāmānuja, Gītā Bhāṣya 560. 
 
43 As I discussed in Chapter 3, Krishna states “I support all beings with energy (ojas)” 
(BG 15.13), and explains that he supports breathing beings (prāṇin) as the process of 




set of conditions necessary for action,44 Rāmānuja as factors that induce action,45 and 
Abhinavagupta as the inclination to act.46  
Incitement is best understood as inclination.  In terms of my push-pull model 
of motivation, it is the pull of a reason.  Krishna says that it is threefold, produced by 
jñāna, or knowledge, jñeya, or the object of knowledge, and the parijñātṛ, or knower.  
These three are mutually dependent.  Knowledge requires a knower and an object; a 
knower requires knowledge and an object; to be an object of knowledge requires a 
knower and knowledge.   
According to the Gītā, reasons for action involve these three together.   The 
text does not indicate how they must be involved.  But as I will show, ordinary agents 
(everyone except highly advanced practitioners) necessarily recognize objects of 
knowledge as relevant or irrelevant to duty, pleasurable or painful, or objects of 
compulsion.  Objects are ends for agents in virtue of the recognition of these qualities.  
The recognition of one of these qualities in an object by an agent is what constitutes a 
reason.   
Jennifer Hornsby defines intention as a cognitive event of “trying or attempting 
to act.”47  For her, intention is a primitive state which causes muscle contraction and 
movement of the body.   
Incitement is unlike intention in Hornsby’s sense.  Incitement is not irreducible 
and does not in itself cause action.  The consent of the agent is also necessary.   
                         
44 Śaṅkarācarya, Bhagavad Gita 460. 
 
45 Rāmānuja, Gītā Bhāṣya 561. 
 
46 Abhinavagupta, Abhinavagupta: Gītārthasaṅgraha, trans. Arvind Sharma (Leiden: 
E. J. Brill, 1983) 270. 
 
47 Jennifer Hornsby, Actions (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980) 33. 
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The knower that plays a role in incitement (BG 18.18) and the agent that is one 
of the five factors of action (BG 18.14) must be the same; they are the self (ātman or 
puruṣa).  This identity is the tie between the theory of incitement and the theory of 
causes.  The puruṣa qua knower is distinct from the puruṣa qua agent, though. The 
puruṣa qua knower does not cause action.  But for the puruṣa qua agent to participate 
in causing action incitement is required.  Therefore, the puruṣa qua agent must be a 
knower. 
BG 18.19-28 further develop the account of incitement.  It describes three 
kinds of knowledge: sattvic, rajasic, and tamasic.  The text does not articulate three 
types of incitement, but from the three types of knowledge three types of incitement 
can be derived.  The passage also describes three types of agents and actions according 
to the guṇa-s.  Each type of agent is defined, in part, by a his or her reason for acting.  
Each type of action is defined, at least in part, by the reason for which it is 
characteristically performed.48   
Knowledge, reasons for acting, and actions may be either sattvic, rajasic, or 
tamasic.  I take an agent to be sattvic, rajasic, or tamasic when he or she is engaged in, 
respectively, a sattvic, rajasic, or tamasic action.  For a person to be considered sattvic, 
rajasic, or tamasic in a general sense, the bulk of his psychological states and behavior 
must fall into one of the three sets.  A sattvic person may at times engage in tamasic 
behavior.   
                         
48 This is an idealized picture which Krishna presents as a pragmatic tool.  It draws 
strict distinctions between sattvic, rajasic, and tamasic action.  Yet experience seems 
to show that in actual action what Krishna calls ‘incitement’ often involves a 
combination of the sattvic, rajasic, and tamasic.  When it does, we seem warranted in 
categorizing an action according to the guṇa dominant in its incitement.  Thus, we 
might call an action as ‘sattvic’ through it involves an element of desire, for example.  
However, this is not how sattvic, rajasic, and tamasic action are portrayed in the Gītā 




I now turn to the particular types of incitement, beginning with the rajasic 
because it is the most common.  Rajasic knowledge is that which shows the knower 
distinct things, separate and various in their qualities (BG 18.21).  Such knowledge is 
gained through the senses.   
Earlier verses describe the senses as related to desire. BG 2.60 refers to the 
‘tormenting senses’.  BG 3.34 explains that in every sense is situated attraction or 
aversion for its object and warns that one should not come under their sway.  The Gītā 
sees the senses as doing dual duty: they generate knowledge of external events and 
bodies and they yield attraction or aversion to those phenomena.49  Attraction and 
aversion pull on the knower.  Rajasic knowledge has for its object sensible objects 
seen as attractive or the opposite.  The knower of rajasic knowledge has desire or 
aversion for each object of knowledge.  Rajasic incitement, then, is the pull of desire 
on the knower to possess or avoid an object of rajasic knowledge.  If the puruṣa 
consents to it, rajasic action results.  I say ‘if’ because a person may refuse rajasic 
incitement and choose sattvic, or tamasic, action.  
                         
49 Many modern Western psychologists agree that perception is evaluative with regard 
to attraction and aversion. Research by a team led by Kimberly J. Duckworth has been 
important in establishing this view.  Duckworth et al have shown that novel stimuli 
such as nonsense words and abstract images elicit evaluative responses of like or 
dislike in subjects immediately, as they are perceived.  In the paper presenting their 
work, Duckworth et al cite numerous studies conducted since the 1930’s that establish 
the same evaluative responding for non-novel stimuli such as English words, sounds, 
and representational pictures.  The team argues that in light of these previous results, 
their work on novel stimuli “strongly support[s] the position that evaluation is both 
unique and ubiquitous.” Kimberly J. Duckworth, John A. Bargh, Magda Garcia, and 
Shelly Chaiken, “The Automatic Evaluation of Novel Stimuli,” Psychological Science 
13.6 (2002): 518.  In a 1995 New York Times article on this area of research, 
psychologist Michael Posner states that the view is so well-accepted that most more 
recent models of how the mind processes information take this automatic evaluation 
into account. Daniel Goleman, “Brain May Tag All Perceptions with a Value,” New 
York Times 8 Aug. 1995, C1. 
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The rajasic agent is one who chooses to act on rajasic incitement. BG 18.25 
describes him as greedy and desirous of obtaining the fruits of action.  According to 
BG 18.24, rajasic action is performed with the desire to obtain something.  Desire is 
necessary to rajasic action. 
Sattvic knowledge shows the knower one imperishable being in all the 
manifold things of the world, including himself (BG 18.20).  The object of sattvic 
knowledge is unity in phenomenal diversity.  
Desire is ruled out for the sattvic knower.  Desire minimally requires the belief 
that there is something one lacks which can be an object of desire.  Such a belief is 
incompatible with the sattvic perception of unity. 
The sattvic knower is without desire, so sattvic incitement cannot involve 
desire.  The sattvic agent is, accordingly, described as one who acts free from desire 
(BG 18.26).  These are negative descriptions.  Does the sattvic agent have a positive 
reason to act?   
The sattvic knower has sattvic buddhi, or intelligence, and perceives what 
ought to be done and what ought not be done (BG 18.30).  He directly perceives his 
duty and so knows what is obligatory for him at any given time.  Knowledge of duty is 
his reason for action.  Sattvic sacrifice, for example, is said to be done with the sole 
thought that it ought to be done (BG 17.11), and sattvic giving of gifts is done with the 
thought that the gift ought to be given (BG 17.20).  Note that though the sattvic agent 
perceives the unity of all beings and things, this knowledge does not contribute 
significantly to his motivation.  He does not act from compassion, for example, but 
simply from duty.  Sattvic action is duty for duty’s sake.  
Sattvic incitement, then, is the pull of duty on one who perceives his own duty 
and is free from desire.  If the self consents, sattvic action results. Obligatory action 
performed without desire for the results is categorized as sattvic (BG 18.23).  Desire is 
not necessary to sattvic action. 
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Incitement that is classified as tamasic also does not involve desire.  Tamasic 
knowledge fixates the mind on an object of little significance (BG 18.22).  The 
tamasic knower is one who is without any real purpose, neither duty nor desire (BG 
18.22).  He is irrational.  He performs action without regard to the consequences for 
himself or others (BG 18.25).  Tamasic incitement is best understood as the pull of 
senseless obsession.   
Such a person seems to be out of control of his behavior.  The self beset by 
tamas still chooses what action to perform; he is still a consenter (BG 13.22).  But 
tamas produces fixation, and so his psychology makes available only one choice.  
Because no one exists for a moment without acting (BG 3.5) he must make this choice.  
Hence BG 18.28 calls the tamasic agent stubborn. 
Of the three kinds of action described in this passage only the rajasic requires 
desire.  Neither the sattvic nor the tamasic do.  Both these are examples of niṣkāma 
karman (desireless action).  Niṣkāma karman also includes God’s action and karma 
yoga.  I discuss these last two in the next chapter. 
 
 
Maintenance of the body 
 
If activities like eating and sleeping are duties and desire is required in their 
performance, then some duties require desire and niṣkāma karman cannot be simply 
desireless action if that action is to be dutiful. 
Krishna cites maintenance of body as a valid reason for the practitioner to act 
(BG 3.8).  World maintenance must include it, for if others’ lives ought to be 
maintained so should one’s own.  Later, the Gītā explicitly recognizes the need for 
food and sleep.  The practitioner is instructed to eat and sleep in moderation (BG 6.16-
17).   
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To eat in moderation would seem to require awareness of one’s feelings of 
hunger.  Moderation presumably means eating enough to satisfy one’s hunger but not 
more.  The same goes for sleep and the feeling of sleepiness.  Eating appropriately 
also requires knowing when to eat.  This would seem to require hunger.  Again, the 
same seems true of sleep and sleepiness. 
If hunger and sleepiness are desires, then the duty to maintain the body cannot 
be carried out without acting from certain desires.  
The question of whether hunger and sleepiness are desires is not taken up in 
the text.  But Krishna consistently depicts desire as psychological.50  He says that 
desire is produced by the senses or by the mind contemplating sense objects (BG 2.62, 
3.34) and that it abides in the senses, mind, and buddhi (BG 3.40).  The body is not 
mentioned in these passages.  It seems to have no involvement in producing or 
sustaining desires. BG 4.19-21 supports this suggestion by implying that the body is 
free from desires.  It instructs the practitioner to exclude desire from his actions and 
instead, “perform actions with the body only.”  
Abhinavagupta argues that desire involves imagining (vikalpa), and that giving 
up imagining is the key to abandoning desire.51  He means, perhaps, that one who 
desires an object imagines possessing or achieving it.  Western theorists often 
characterize desires as states with which the world must fit, a view attributable to G. 
E. M. Anscombe.52  A desire, they hold, has as its object a state of affairs that does not 
obtain.  This would seem to involve imagination.  A desire is satisfied when the world 
                         
50 Some yogic theory places desire in the vital energy sheath (prāṇāmayakośa) of the 
person.  However, the Gītā does not mention the theory of sheaths (kośa) and takes 
desires as psychological, not energetic. 
 
51 Abhinavagupta, Gītārthasaṅgraha 148. 
 




fits it, that is, if the state of affairs which is its object comes to pass. What 
Abhinavagupta and Anscombe hold of desire is not spelled out anywhere in the Gītā, 
yet it is consistent with the text and helps answer the question about hunger and 
sleepiness. 
If desires are psychological, not bodily, then hunger and sleepiness are best 
understood as bodily feelings that motivate action in the sense of giving an agent 
reasons to act.  These feelings, like desires, have a pull on the agent.  But they are 
unlike desires in that they do not involve imagining. 
They may motivate action without being represented in the mind as desire.  
One may be moved by hunger without imagining a scenario in which one’s hunger is 
satisfied.  This, I suggest, is what the practitioner is supposed to do.  When hungry, he 
should not think about food that is not present but should be content with what chance 
may bring (BG 4.22, 12.19).  He should see a cow, dog, and elephant as equal (BG 
5.18) even though a cow gives milk.  When a situation fails to satisfy a practitioner’s 
hunger he should simply keep on.  He should continue to pursue the task of feeding 





What motivates a practitioner to try to do niṣkāma karman? 
In teaching Arjuna, Krishna assumes it is possible to refuse the promptings of 
desire, and to the this end teaches two kinds of restraint.  One is withdrawal of the 
senses from their objects.  Sensory contact with any object produces desire to possess 
or avoid it (BG 3.34).  One means to disarming desire is to eliminate it by checking 
sensory activity.  This is not compatible with action.  When the senses are restrained in 
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this way they cannot generate knowledge of one’s environment.  This form of restraint 
is taught in sitting meditation instruction (BG 6.11-14).   
Another form of restraint is also taught.  In BG 5.21-24 Krishna describes one 
whose senses are restrained as able to bear the impulses generated by desire and wrath.  
This is called sensory restraint, but it does not involve the senses being withdrawn.  
They contact external objects and generate knowledge of those objects as well as 
attraction or aversion for them.  The senses themselves are not actually subject to 
restraint but are allowed to function as normal.  What is restrained is one’s response to 
the desires the senses produce.  One who has mastered such restraint is described in 
BG 2.70: 
Rivers enter the ocean 
which remains unmoved as it is being filled. 
He into whom desires enter thus 
attains peace, not one who has all kinds of desires. (BG 2.70) 
Desires still exist and have force in this person.  But discipline holds him steady as the 
ocean when he experiences desires. 
Maintaining discipline takes a good deal of effort (BG 2.40).  The senses, in 
producing desire, can sway a person (BG 3.34) and even carry him away (BG 2.60). 
One who controls the senses and resists desire is, correspondingly, described as firm 
or steady (BG 2.55-58).  Standing firm is not easy.  What reason can one have for 
taking up and maintaining such a difficult practice?  
Arindam Chakrabarti considers the issue of yogic motivation.  Krishna 
promises that liberation, supposed to be blissful, results from niṣkāma karman practice 
(BG 2.15, 3.19).  This, Chakrabarti writes, seems to be offered as a reason to engage in 
the practice.  But if one practices out of a desire to gain liberation, one is not 
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practicing niṣkāma karman, he argues.53  He understands karma yoga as disallowing 
any kind of desire. 
Chakrabarti acknowledges the Vedāntic view that desire for liberation 
(mumukṣutva) is essential to practice.  He cites Sadānanda Vedāntasāra who explains 
that desire for objects other than the self is to be avoided.  Since desire for liberation is 
directed toward the self, it is allowable for the practitioner, and in fact necessary.   
Rāmānuja agrees.  In his view, when the Gītā advocates “absence of desire” 
this means “dispassion toward all objects different from the spiritual self.”54  At the 
same time, in his view, desire for release is necessary for yoga practice.55  He 
understands desire for release as equivalent to desire for the spiritual self.  (Sadānanda 
Vedāntasāra and Rāmānuja offer subset interpretations of karma yoga.) 
Chakrabarti maintains that niśkāma karman is to be understood as action 
without any desire whatsoever, so desire for liberation is not an allowable source of 
motivation for the practitioner.  He goes on to argue that desire for liberation is 
insufficient as a source of motivation for yoga practice.  He cites Vācaspatimiśra as 
warning: “nurtured by the assurance of a permanent happiness in liberation, the 
demoness of desire, given a little scope, will bind the aspirant even to nearer available 
worldly pleasures.”56 Desire for liberation is just desire for very great pleasure, he 
argues, and this will not do as yogic motivation.  He worries that such desire is more 
easily satisfied by worldly pleasures, or at least the ‘demoness of desire’ makes it 
                         
53 Arindam Chakrabarti, “The End of Life: A Nyāya-Kantian Approach to the 
Bhagavadgītā,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 16 (1988): 329. 
 
54 Rāmānuja, Gītā Bhāṣya 435-36. 
 
55 Rāmānuja, Gītā Bhāṣya 90. 
 
56 Chakrabarti, “The End of Life” 330. 
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seem that way, and the practitioner with this motivation will be distracted by worldly 
pleasures and ultimately thwarted in his path. 
Chakrabarti recognizes only one difference between the pleasure of liberation 
and worldly pleasures: the former is permanent while the latter is temporary.  He 
assumes that pleasure is qualitatively homogenous, and so one pleasure can satisfy the 
desire for another.   
This seems wrong.  If there were a shortage of cocoa and vanilla were to 
become the more easily-accessible ice-cream flavor, the true chocolate ice cream 
aficionado would still long for his favorite.  The pleasure of vanilla ice cream cannot 
satisfy the desire for the pleasure of chocolate ice cream.  Likewise, worldly pleasures 
will not satisfy one who longs for the bliss of liberation.   
In renouncing desire, the practitioner eschews pleasure and pain 
(sukhaduḥkha) and other pairs of opposites (BG 5.3).  But he finds pleasure (sukha), 
joy (ārāma), and light (jyoti) within, in the self (BG 3.17-19, 5.21, 5.24).  Pleasure 
(sukha) comes, according to Krishna, in two fundamental varieties.  The first is that 
gratification generated by contact with desirable external objects.  The second is the 
bliss inherent to the self.   
Meanwhile, ‘desire’ seems to be used in a limited sense in the Gītā, such that 
worldly phenomena alone may be the objects of desire.  Under this usage, pleasure 
which arises from contact with external objects may be an object of desire, while the 
bliss of the self cannot be. 
Indeed, when one is attached 
neither to the objects of the senses nor to actions, 
when one has given up all intentions, 
then he is said to have attained yoga.  (BG 6.4) 
Only actions and objects of the senses are candidates for being objects of desire.  
While the text often mentions desire for the fruits of action, it never mentions desire 
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for liberation, mental discipline, equanimity, or the bliss of self-knowledge.  It seems 
that in Krishna’s view, desire does not take such things as objects.  Rather, he 
understands desire, like Anscombe, as a state that is satisfied or frustrated by events in 
the world.  Since liberation is not a worldly event it cannot be the object of desire.  For 
Krishna then, desire for liberation cannot give a practitioner a reason to practice.  
Chakrabarti argues that the motive appropriate to the practitioner is vairāgya, 
or indifference.  He describes indifference as the state of feeling “no more of all that” 
with regard to worldly pleasures and pains that comes from a recognition of their 
valuelessness.57 Indifference “guarantees its own peaceful effect,” liberation, yet is 
incompatible with desire for that effect.58   
Vairāgya can also be translated as ‘aversion’ or ‘disgust’.  To make his 
solution work Chakrabarti must differentiate the practitioner from the depressive who, 
from aversion or disgust, feels that the pleasures and pains of the world are without 
value.  He does not do this.  A depressive who is completely indifferent may cease to 
act from desire and opt for suicide.  His action counts as niśkāma karman but not 
yoga.  For one thing, Krishna includes care of the body in what is enjoined of the 
practitioner.  But in general, the practitioner acts for the sake of world maintenance.  
He recognizes value in the world itself, if not in worldly pleasures and pains.  The 
depressive, on the other hand, is disgusted by the world. 
Aurobindo better addresses the issue of yogic motivation.  He acknowledges, 
first, that desire is the ordinary motive for human action. He warns against the view 
that the practitioner finds something outside himself, like the Vedic injunctions, or 
                         
57 Chakrabarti, “The End of Life” 333. 
 
58 Chakrabarti, “The End of Life” 333.  Patañjali, in his Yoga-Sūtra, sees vairāgya as 
essential to yoga. YS 1.12 (abhyāsa-vairāgyābhyām tan-nirodhaḥ) asserts that the goal 




dharma (duty), to give him a reason for action. Aurobindo writes: “We cannot become 
impersonal by obeying something outside ourselves, for we cannot so get outside 
ourselves; we can only do it by rising to the highest in ourselves, into our free Soul 
and Self which is the same and one in all and has therefore no personal interest.”59  
Aurobindo calls this “acting Godwards.”60  In his view, the inner self gives one reason 
to practice yoga.   
Aurobindo’s understanding of nature is teleological and he interprets the Gītā 
in accordance with it.  In his view, human existence is a process of evolution to higher 
and higher embodiments of consciousness.  In The Life Divine he writes “To fulfill 
God in life is man's manhood. He starts from the animal vitality and its activities but a 
divine existence is his objective.”61  The motivation to practice yoga is inherent and is 
realized in the “psychic being” within each person.  The psychic being “points always 
towards Truth and Right and Beauty . . . all that is a divine possibility in us.”62  It 
influences behavior to the end of developing the mind and body into instruments of 
expression of divine nature.  In those who identify strongly with their lower selves, the 
influence of the psychic being goes unnoticed.  For those with more self-knowledge, 
the psychic being produces a “certain sensitive feeling for all that is true and good and 
beautiful, fine and pure and noble, a response to it, [and] a demand for it.”63   
                         
59 Sri Aurobindo, Essays on the Gītā (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1959) 150. 
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In practicing niṣkāma karman, according to Aurobindo, the practitioner “puts 
away the lower self that desires and enjoys.”64  Through restraint of the lower self, one 
gradually develops knowledge of the inner self which is one with God.65   The 
individual becomes aware of his divine nature.  
The Gītā mentions no such thing as the psychic being. Aurobindo’s view is 
still, strictly speaking, consistent with the Gītā except on one point.  Krishna states 
that not everyone reaches liberation (BG 16.20), while Aurobindo argues to the 
contrary. But Krishna seems to agree with Aurobindo that those who practice yoga are 
born with the motivation to do so. 
In Chapter 16 Krishna explains that there are two types of beings, the divine 
(daiva) and demoniac (āsura).  It is unclear whether this division is natural or, like the 
theory of the guṇa-s, is a pragmatic division meant to be instructive.  The divine type 
are endowed with qualities necessary for yoga practice (devotion to pursuit of self-
knowledge or jñānayoga vyavasthiti, freedom from desire, compassion for all beings, 
and patience) and qualities conducive to doing one’s duty (non-violence, veracity, and 
modesty; BG 16.1-3).  They are assured of liberation (BG 16.5).  Krishna tells Arjuna 
that, though he is currently beset with desire, he is of the divine type.  The demoniac 
type, on the other hand, possess none of these qualities.  They can expect to be reborn 
again and again (BG 16.20).   
Krishna does not elaborate on the issue of yogic motivation.  He does say that 
the divine type is devoted to the pursuit of self-knowledge (jñānayoga vyavasthita).  
But like Arjuna at the beginning of the Gītā, people of the divine type may not always 
be actively pursuing self-knowledge.  This quality must be dispositional.  But it is not 
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clear what conditions are required for the disposition to practice yoga to produce the 
motivation to do so. 
Elsewhere Krishna speaks of those who are mokṣaparāyaṇa, or intent on 
liberation (BG 5.28).  Self-knowledge is their highest goal.  They direct their 
intelligence (buddhi) and minds (manas) toward it and discipline their behavior for the 
sake of it (BG 5.17).  Being intent on liberation may be an occurrent state produced by 
the divine type’s inherent disposition to practice yoga.  
If it is produced thus, and even if it is not, something must occasion the arising 
of the state of being intent on liberation.  It is conditioned.  Arjuna lacks this state at 
the beginning of the Gītā.  It arises in him during the course of the dialogue.   
I suggest that what makes Arjuna intent on liberation seems to be the taste of 
self-knowledge he gets from Krishna’s teaching.  Arjuna exemplifies the new 
practitioner.  Krishna makes yoga practice possible for him, I propose, by giving him 
his first taste of self-knowledge, the teaching in Chapter 2 on the imperishable nature 
of the self (BG 2.53).  This teaching is intended to bring Arjuna relief from his grief at 
the thought of his kinfolk’s demise (BG 2.25-30).  This relief comes from a glimpse of 
self-realization, perhaps, and constitutes a first taste of joy at the self within.  This 
taste is enough to allow Arjuna to resist the desire to flee the battle and instead stay 
and do his duty to fight.  This begins Arjuna’s practice of karma yoga.   
If being intent on liberation depends on the experience of joy it depends on the 
experience of something desirable and this makes it problematic.  Chakrabarti’s worry 
about the desire for liberation applies to being intent on liberation as well. 
Chatterjea and Framarin point out that karma yoga is defined in terms of both 
desirelessness and equanimity, and suggest that when application of the desirelessness 
criterion is problematic one can appeal to the equanimity requirement.  Their 
suggestion is helpful here.  If being intent on liberation does not dispose one to joy or 
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disappointment at worldly events, we can accept it as an allowable reason for 
practicing niśkāma karman. 
As I argued above, The Gītā uses ‘desire’ in a technical sense in which only 
worldly phenomena can be its objects.  Therefore, all desires are “states with which 
the world must fit.” Anything with this direction of fit will fail Framarin’s test, for 
anything with this direction of fit is satisfied or frustrated by worldly events.  
Satisfaction brings joy, at least to a degree, and frustration always brings some upset.  
Anything with this direction of fit disposes one to joy or upset at worldly events. 
Being intent on liberation does not have desire-like direction of fit.  It is a state 
with which one’s self-knowledge and self-identify must fit (BG 4.19-20, 4.34-35, 5.7). 
Such a state is not satisfied or frustrated by worldly events and does not dispose one to 
joy or disappointment at such events.  It satisfies the equanimity requirement and is 
allowable in karma yoga. 
One might point out that being intent on liberation is also a state with which 
one’s affective and desiderative states must fit.  It is satisfied when one is content with 
the self alone, free from desire, and experiences unconditioned bliss.  So, it seems, it 
might dispose one to joy at inner events such as a period of successfully restraining of 
desire.  It might dispose one to disappointment when one experiences an inner event 
such as a moment of anger.  One might argue that Framarin’s test is not broad enough 
because states that dispose one to joy or disappointment at either worldly or inner 
events violate the equanimity requirement.  
Being intent on liberation would likely dispose the new practitioner to joy and 
upset at temporary yogic successes and failures.  But this is not really a problem.  Joy 
or disappointment as affective responses to inner events are themselves inner events.  
They are not the self.  Being intent on liberation motivates one to turn away from inner 
events and look toward the self.  Over time, with consistent practice, it leads one to 
permanently abandon such joy and disappointment.  It disposes one to joy and 
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disappointment at inner events only in the short term.  In the long term, it disposes one 
to freedom from these reactions.  It engenders equanimity, and thus is compatible with 
niṣkāma karman. 
Being intent on liberation can lead to self-knowledge.  Thus it disposes one to 
experience the joy of self-knowledge.  Such joy is a permanent quality of the self and 
is compatible with equanimity.  Equanimity is not joylessness but contentment with 
one’s current condition, whatever that may be.  It is tranquility.  Tranquility does not 
rule out joy. 
Because being intent on liberation is compatible with niṣkāma karman and the 
only occurrent state mentioned by Krishna as serving as a source of yogic motivation, 








 I have discussed niṣkāma karman in general and have shown that several form 
of niṣkāma karman appear in the Gītā.  Karma yoga is one of them.  In this chapter I 
present a careful consideration karma yoga and the key notions that pertain to it. 
 
 
Definition of karma yoga 
 
Krishna promises that karma yoga practice will free one of karmic bondage 
(BG 2.39), free one from rebirth (BG 2.51), and lead to liberation (BG 2.51). 
Krishna gives a compact discussion of karma yoga in BG 2.39-53.  We glean a 
definition of the practice from the following verses. 
The Vedas belong to the realm of the three guṇa-s. 
Be free of the three guṇa-s, O Arjuna,  
free of the pairs of opposites, ever-abiding in truth, 
destitute of possessions, self-possessed.  (BG 2.45) 
Your claim is to action alone, 
never, at any time, to its fruits. 
Do not let the fruits of action be your motive; 
do not be attached to inaction either. (BG 2.47) 
Established in yoga, perform actions, 
having abandoned attachment, O [Arjuna], 
being even-minded toward success and failure. 
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Yoga is equanimity, so it is said. (BG 2.48) 
These verses establish karma yoga as performance of action free of the influence of 
the guṇa-s and without selfish interest in the outcome.  This is not yet a complete 
definition.  
Krishna adds to the positive description of karma yoga in Chapter 3. 
Perform enjoined action!  
Action is indeed better than inaction. 
Moreover, the maintenance of your body 
cannot be achieved through inaction. (BG 3.8) 
Except for action for the sake of sacrifice, 
this world is bound by action. 
Perform action for that purpose. O Arjuna, 
free from attachment.  (BG 3.9) 
As the ignorant work 
attached in action, O [Arjuna], 
let the wise work, unattached, 
for the sake of world-maintenance. (BG 3.25) 
Surrender all your action to me 
by contemplating the supreme. 
Free from desire and indifferent to possessions,  
fight, your fever departed. (BG 3.30) 
Now a complete definition is possible.  Karma yoga is the practice of doing one’s duty 
as a sacrifice for the sake of world maintenance, free of the influence of the guṇa-s, 
and without attachment.  It involves surrendering all actions to God.  
Of course, many elements of this definition are not yet clear.  While I have 
explored disinterestedness in previous chapters, karma yoga goes beyond 
disinterestedness.  In what follows I take up, in turn, the notions of performing duty as 
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a sacrifice for the sake of world maintenance, transcendence of the guṇa-s, 
nonattachment, and surrender of  action to God.  Through this discussion, a nuanced 
interpretation of karma yoga emerges. 
First, however, I note briefly the role of meditation in karma yoga. 
 
 
Note on the role of meditation in karma yoga 
 
BG 2.39-53, which provides Krishna’s initial definition of karma yoga, 
concludes with a mention of meditation. 
Your mind is confused by the Vedas and goes in 
different directions. 
When your mind is made immovable 
in deep, stable meditation, 
then will you achieve yoga. (BG 2.53) 
Krishna gives detailed meditation in Chapter 6, where he describes a form of sitting 
meditation that is to be practiced in a secluded place with the eyes closed and the 
senses and mind restrained.  Such deep meditation is not compatible with doing one’s 
duty, in that they both cannot be performed at the same time.  Meditation is prescribed 
for the karma yoga practitioner and he must find time for it as duty permits.   
Though a worthy topic in itself, it is out of the scope of my project to discuss 
meditation further.  My concern is with karma yoga generally, while meditation is a 
particular kind of action that Krishna recommends to Arjuna. 
 
 




Recall that sattvic action is the performance of duty because it ought to be 
done without interest in the outcome.  This is not the same as karma yoga.  Sattvic 
action is duty for duty’s sake.  The agent’s sole concern is for duty and he fails to see 
anything of value beyond this.  He exercises virtue and further cultivates this quality in 
himself, but this cannot lead to the ultimate freedom sought after by the yoga 
practitioner.  Rather, sattva binds the doer of sattvic action to virtue (BG 14.5), 
causing him to be reborn again as a virtuous person who continues to be concerned 
solely with virtue.   
There is a sense in which sattvic action though not motivated by desire is yet 
self-regarding.  The duty the agent is concerned to do is his svadharma, or his own 
duty.  And, he does it because it is obligatory for him.  
The practitioner of karma yoga, on the other hand, sees beyond his duty to the 
role the performance of his duty plays in the world.  He does his duty not simply 
because it is enjoined of him but because it contributes to world maintenance.  Further, 
he is not concerned with world maintenance merely because that is enjoined (BG 
3.25).  His concern is based on compassion for others and interest in participating in 
God’s work (BG 3.21-24).   
These latter concerns arise out of his devotion to God.  The devotee comes to 
see God in all things and all beings, including himself (BG 6.30).  As he identifies 
with all things through God, his sphere of concern expands.  For one who so identifies, 
self-interest takes the form of universal compassion.  The accomplished practitioner 
has compassion for all beings (BG 12.3, 16.2) and delight in the welfare of all beings 
(BG 5.25, 12.4). He acts for the one reason that all might share equally: world 
maintenance (loksaṃgraha).  Obligatory action maintains the natural processes like 
rainfall and crop growth (BG 3.14) and thereby the lives of living beings.  It also 
maintains the social order of the social system, which, if it fell apart, would lead to 
hell (BG 1.40-44).   
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God also acts for the sake of world maintenance (BG 3.22-24).  
These worlds would perish 
if I did not perform action. 
I would be a creator of confusion. 
and I would destroy these creatures.  (BG 3.24) 
Adopting God’s ends as one’s own is part of devotion.  Krishna says, “Thinking solely 
of me . . . . they follow may path” (BG 4.10-11).  It seems that the very notion of 
devotion includes patterning one’s behavior, as much as possible, after God’s.  
Furthermore, the devotee may reason that since God is the “enjoyer of all sacrifice” 
(BG 5.29), taking up God’s ends makes one’s actions a fitting sacrifice to God.   
 
 
Transcendence of the guṇa-s 
 
The notion of transcendence of the guṇa-s is prima facie obscure.  Initially, it 
is clear that it contributes to the goal of yoga.  For the guṇa-s bind one to rebirth.  To 
achieve immortality one must escape their effect. 
The embodied one who transcends 
the three guṇa-s arising from the body 
is released from birth, death, old age, and pain. 
He attains immortality. (BG 14.20) 
States, faculties, and so on that belong to sattva, rajas, and tamas, in a 
distribution unique to one, make up one’s personality.  They cling to one’s inner self 
upon death and one thereby retains the disposition for personality and embodiment 
and is reborn.  
I will argue that transcendence of the guṇa-s is the abandonment of sattvic, 
rajasic, and tamasic action; it is rising above one’s personality.  The text makes it clear 
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that one who transcends the guṇa-s continues to act.  I argue that the guṇa-s play no 
role in such action, which I call nirguṇa karman, or action without involvement of the 
guṇa-s.  Nirguṇa karman is desireless and counts as a form of niṣkāma karman. 
Actions require incitement, or ends and reasons.  The ordinary person pursues 
ends that his sense of duty, desires, and delusions make seem worthwhile.  But 
nirguṇa karman, I will argue, entails adopting God’s ends and pursuing those ends out 
of devotion to God.  Transcendence of the guṇa-s is directly related to the notion of 
performing duty as sacrifice for the sake of world maintenance. 
I will further show that transcendence of the guṇa-s is related to the notion of 
surrendering one’s actions to God.   
Rāmānuja and others recognize transcendence of the guṇa-s and surrender of 
action to God as closely related concepts.  This much of my view is not new, but my 
treatment of these two concepts is.  Earlier views have been based, in one way or 




Classical commentators on transcendence of the guṇa-s 
 
Śaṅkara holds that phenomena are illusory.  At the same time they are 
produced by the guṇa-s according to strict causal laws.  Māyā, or illusion, has a 
certain nature.  It is constituted by the illusory guṇa-s which generate illusory agents, 
objects, and actions.    
Transcendence of the guṇa-s, as he understands it, is a significant yogic 
achievement.  He defines it as disidentification with the merely apparent reality the 
guṇa-s generate, where disidentification with x is the recognition that x is not one’s 
 
 135 
self.  In his view, to transcend the guṇa-s is to realize that one’s body, mind, and 
actions are not one’s own.   
For Śaṅkara the self in all beings is one and the same.  It is called Brahman and 
in the Gītā is represented by Krishna.  The goal of yoga is the realization of 
Brahman/the self.  Transcendence of the guṇa-s contributes to this goal as the 
realization of the unreality of the non-self.  Surprisingly, this realization has an effect 
on one’s illusory person: one stops engaging in all action except that which is 
necessary for the “bare maintenance of the body.”1  One continues to care for one’s 
body because yoga practice depends on it.  Further contemplation may still be required 
to reach the final goal.  Until this goal has been reached it is advantageous for one to 
retain one’s current body as the process of death and rebirth would delay yogic 
success.  When contemplation culminates in realization of the true nature of the self 
the practitioner abandons all action. 
For Rāmānuja, a realist about the world, the guṇa-s determine all actions but 
not as constituents of material nature.  In his view the guṇa-s are psychological factors 
produced by action which cause the performance of similar action in the future.  For 
him, transcendence of the guṇa-s is disidentification with their activities.  One who 
has achieved disidentification “understands that there is no connection between [the 
guṇa-s] and himself” and sees that the guṇa-s alone perform action.2   
Rāmānuja too holds that disidentification changes a person.  Upon realization 
of one’s profound helplessness, he thinks, one no longer experiences desire for one’s 
actions or their results.  For Rāmānuja the guṇa-s generate desire, but disidentification 
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with the activity of the guṇa-s is more than disidentification with desire.  It destroys 
desire and it does so generally.  While it is difficult to cite examples of this advanced 
yogic achievement there are everyday examples of the destruction of particular desires 
through disidentification with their sources.  For one, a student newly arrived in a 
foreign country for a semester of study abroad may experience the strong desire to 
abandon her studies there and return home. But suppose she meets other foreign 
students and hears that they each have, at one time or another, experienced similar 
desires.  Then she may recognize her desire to go home as a symptom of 
homesickness.  Doing so may transform her desire into mere nostalgia, the 
recollection of her home that, however wistful, does not motivate her to return.  The 
guṇa-s, like homesickness, are just psychological factors. Rāmānuja holds that their 
effects can be observed and discounted by the practitioner.   
Rāmānuja explains that “seeking surrender to the Lord . . . is the only means 
for transcending the guṇa-s.”3  In his view the guṇa-s are controlled by God.  
Surrender to God (prapatti) is acceptance of this fact and entails disidentification with 
the guṇa-s and, positively, identification with God.   
Identification with the guṇa-s is “delusive identification.”4  “Such 
identification is overcome,”  Rāmānuja explains, ”through contemplation of the real 
nature of the self.”5  The Gītā states that God is the self of all beings. Rāmānuja 
explains, according to his Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, that God is the inner self of all 
selves, while individual selves along with the material world constitute the body of 
God.  Thus, surrender to God entails identifying with God as one’s true self.   
                         
3 Rāmānuja, Gītā Bhāṣya 481. 
 
4 Rāmānuja, Gītā Bhāṣya 173. 
 




BG 14.27 explains that God is the foundation (pratiṣṭhā) of the śāśvata 
dharma, or eternal moral law.   
For I am the foundation of brahman, 
of the immortal and imperishable, 
of the eternal moral law, 
and the highest bliss. (BG 14.27) 
Rāmānuja argues that surrender to God, beyond entailing identifying with God, further 
entails surrender to duty.  “Although the expression ‘eternal dharma’ is indicative of 
the conduct to be observed, in BG 14.27 it means the goal to be obtained,”6 Rāmānuja 
explains.  Duty itself cannot be the practitioner’s goal for everyone has his own duty 
by virtue of birth and social station.  To say duty is a goal must mean that the 
practitioner aims for the perfect performance of his duty.  This goal can only be 
achieved through surrender to God.   
Rāmānuja’s view seems to be that through surrender to God the practitioner 
looses himself from the influence of the guṇa-s over his behavior and submits himself 
to the influence of God and obedience to God’s order. 
Abhinavagupta describes the guṇa-s as qualities that arise in an individual self 
due to ignorance.7  The ignorant takes themselves to be individual, mortal, and of 
limited knowledge and power.  In truth, according to Abhinavagupta, the individual 
self is essentially identical Śiva and possess Śiva’s omniscience, omnipotence, and 
freedom in full.  The ignorant take the objects of cognition and action to be distinct 
from each other and themselves when in truth the cosmos is one and is Śiva.   
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7 Abhinavagupta, Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarśinī, ed. R. C. Dwivedi, trans. K. C. 




Abhinavagupta refers to the guṇa-s as qualities.8  He offers a brief account of 
their natures and functions, as follows.9  Sattva is characterized by pleasure and it 
generates knowledge of distinct objects.  Rajas is characterized by pain, and functions 
as action.  Tamas is characterized by the absence of pleasure and pain; it produces 
limitation. 
Abhinavagupta explains that limited subjects have “being and its negation”10 
due to their ignorance.  Being refers to consciousness, which in Abhinavagupta’s non-
dual idealism is omniscient, creative, and eternal.  It may be negated in a subject 
apparently but not essentially.  Its negation is ignorance.   Ignorance is an apparent, 
non-essential quality of the limited self.  Abhinavagupta identifies this quality as the 
guṇa tamas.  The presence of non-being (ignorance or tamas) limits the extent to 
which being (consciousness) can manifest in the domain of what is apparent to an 
individual self.  Consciousness thus limited wrongly takes selves and objects to be 
distinct.  Abhinavagupta identifies such knowledge as the guṇa sattva.   
Similarly, the limited subject has “bliss and its negation.”11  The manifestation 
of Śiva’s unconditioned bliss in an individual is limited by the presence of ignorance 
which views the objects of experience as distinct from himself and thus engenders the 
belief that experiences are conditioned by external objects.  Bliss manifests on the 
level of appearances as limited, conditioned pleasure.  This property belongs to the 
guṇa sattva.   
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Pain, according to Abhinavagupta, belongs to rajas and arises when the 
conditions of pleasure are not met.  Rajas is also the quality of action in limited 
subjects.  The objects of such action are thought to be separate from the self. 12 Thus 
action is conditioned by sattva as limited knowledge and tamas as ignorance, the 
limiting condition.  This may be why Abhinavagupta explains the guṇa rajas as a 
“mixture” of sattva and tamas. 
According to Abhinavagupta, action by a limited subject is never free from the 
three guṇa-s.13  But the yoga practitioner can transcend the guṇa-s by dispelling 
ignorance (tamas) and  realizing his true nature as identical with Śiva.  In so doing, he 
realizes his omniscience, omnipotence, freedom, bliss, and immortality.  In his vision 
of oneness of all things, Abhinavagupta holds, he rises above conventional morality.  
the latter is based on the ignorant attachment to the opposites of good and evil, purity 
and impurity, life and death, and so on.14   Hence, he will not necessarily do what duty 
requires of him.  Instead, Abhinavagupta explains, his actions will be guided by 
compassion for the ignorant who he recognizes as “troubled . . . and deserving of 
help.”15  The advanced practitioner’s “identity with the Supreme . . . precludes the 
possibility of any other motive in him than the good of others, because he has attained 
perfection.”16  He has cast off ignorance and with it the guṇa-s and conventional 
morality. 
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 140 
Aurobindo’s position on this issue resembles that of Rāmānuja more so than 
that of Abhinavagupta, his fellow Tantric.  Aurobindo holds that all actions are 
determined by Brahman’s will.  At earlier stages of evolution, this determination is 
mediated by the guṇa-s, material constituents that are created by Brahman and obey 
strict deterministic laws.  Intelligence and apparent will in man are due to sattva.  “In 
man sattva is awake and acts not only as intelligence and intelligent will, but as a 
seeking for light, for right knowledge and right action according to that knowledge.”17  
Hence, the will is not free but is determined by what Brahman has established as right 
action.  “When the ego thinks ‘I choose and will this virtuous and not that evil action’, 
it is simply associating itself, somewhat . . . as might a cog or other part of a 
mechanism if it were conscious, with a predominant wave . . . of the sattvic principle 
by which Natures chooses . . . one type of action in preference to another.”18  At later 
stages of evolution, a faculty called the psychic being empowers an agent to resist the 
guṇa-s and perform action that promotes truth, right, and beauty.19  In this, as before, 
the agent participates in divine work, obeying the will of Brahman.20   
To gain genuine freedom, Aurobindo explains, one must realize and identify 
with Brahman, “the one will that is really free.”21  “For that we must rise above the 
three guṇa-s . . . for that self is beyond even the sattvic principle.”22  The practitioner’s 
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goals is to recognize “all action as not his own but Nature’s, as the play of her guṇa-
s.”23  For Aurobindo, transcendence of the guṇa-s is disidentification with them and it 
leads to identifying instead with Brahman.24  This shift does not bring about 
omnipotence as Abhinavagupta holds.  Aurobindo explains that “nature is the doer and 
carries out her action after this machinery is dispensed with,”25 or, that is, after one has 
disidentified with the guṇa-s.  The practitioner is never free to act according to his 
own individual will.   
Several claims Aurobindo makes seem to entail that one who has gone beyond 
the guṇa-s will do only what is sattvic.  He sees tamas predominating, and 
determining behavior, at the lowest evolutionary stages.  At higher stages rajas 
predominates, then later sattva.  “We have to climb to [guṇa-transcendence] through 
the sattva.”26  Preponderance of sattva is a necessary precedent to the transcendence of 
the guṇa-s.  Once that latter stage has been reached, it seems unlikely sattva will cease 
to dominate the composition of the practitioner’s body and mind.  Aurobindo depicts 
evolution as proceeding in a constantly upward fashion.  It would be inconsistent with 
this to allow that progress in one’s self-understanding could be attended by devolution 
in one’s mental and physical make-up.   
Robert Minor is one of the few modern Western scholars to address the idea of 
transcendence of the guṇa-s.  He takes the guṇa-s to be the elements of material nature 
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responsible for all qualities.27  He writes: “The guṇa-s are the elements of things that 
cause them to be and act in a certain manner.”28  He explains that action is an attribute 
of objects and is produced by the guṇa-s.  Like others, Minor sees transcendence of 
the guṇa-s as disidentification.  But for him the realization that one is not really in 
control of one’s deeds does not have the effect that Rāmānuja thinks it does.  He holds 
that it destroys desire for pleasure but not the desire to do one’s duty.  Minor writes 
that in one who has transcended the guṇa-s “there is . . . no desire to achieve ends, but 
only to do one’s duty.”29  Desire for duty remains and with this righteous motivation 
one does sattvic action.  As Minor sees it, the practitioner cannot abandon desire 
altogether and still act. 
The views of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Aurobindo, and Minor are all grounded in 
determinism.  As I argued in Chapter 2, the Gītā, as a yogic text, implies voluntarism.  
Of the views entertained so far, only Abhinavagupta’s  interpretation of surrender to 
God and transcendence of the guṇa-s is adequate in this regard. 
Furthermore, as a yogic text the Gītā is not only concerned to teach a way to 
immortality but also to promote appropriate action for the embodied.  To the latter 
end, it teaches a way out of moral dilemmas.  Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Aurobindo, and 
Minor fail to recognize the difficulty of this project.  They seem to think that Arjuna 
can escape his by disidentifying with his body and mind thus freeing them to perform 
required duties.  But his duties conflict, and a change in attitude does not change this. 
Krishna resolves Arjuna’s dilemma.  This shows that recourse to Krishna is the 
right response to moral dilemma, and that relationship with Krishna is necessary for 
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yoga.  If the practitioner who has transcended the guṇa-s simply does what is sattvic, 
as Rāmānuja and others think, then devotion to Krishna need play no role in his action.  
And then relationship with Krishna is not a practical necessity of yoga practice.  I 
disagree. 
In what follows I develop my own view in contrast to Minor’s 
disidentificationism.  Minor’s view is well-articulated and the weakest of the above 
forms of disidentificationism (in that he takes disidentification to have the weakest 
effect on the practitioner’s psychological make-up), so I let him represent the camp. 
 
 
Libertarian interpretation of transcendence of the guṇa-s 
 
I argued in Chapter 2 that the guṇa-s are sets of psychological features where 
psychology is broadly construed as including the mental, moral, affective, and 
behavioral.  I argued in Chapter 3 that faculties and states that belong to the guṇa-s 
such as knowledge and desire produce incitement, a necessary condition of action that 
consists in a subject’s recognition of an end and a reason to pursue that end.  When 
more than one incitement are present an agent is free to choose from among them.  
When only one is present his choice is forced but still necessary for action.  I bring 
this view of the guṇa-s and action to the following discussion. 
I also employ, in what follows, a notion of the ideal yogin, or practitioner.  He 
is one who obeys all Krishna’s yoga instructions, maintains ongoing practice with 
flawless discipline, and by virtue of his efforts has achieved all yogic goals possible 
for one still embodied.   
The text makes few explicit statements about the transcendence of the guṇa-s.  
First, the three guṇa-s are impediments to the ultimate goal of yoga.  One must 
transcend them to attain immortality (BG 2.45, 14.20).  Second, one transcends the 
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guṇa-s while still embodied.  According to BG 14.20, it is the embodied self (dehin) 
which transcends the guṇa-s and attains immortality.  
It seems clear that the embodied one who has transcended the guṇa-s still 
engages in action.  The maintenance of the body requires action (BG 3.8) as does the 
maintenance of the world (BG 3.14, 22-24). Krishna promotes both of these.  
Furthermore, BG 14.26 states that the practitioner who transcends the guṇa-s serves 
(sev) God with bhakti yoga or devotion.   
And he who serves me 
with unfailing bhakti yoga,  
transcending the three guṇa-s, 
is ready for absorption in brahman. (BG 14.26) 
The verb sev means ‘to dwell in’ and ‘worship’, but it also means ‘to obey’ which 
implies action.30  
In BG 7.13 Krishna describes his relationship the guṇa-s. 
This whole world is confused 
by the three [types of] conditions the guṇa-s establish. 
Because of these they do not recognize me 
who am beyond these and imperishable. (BG 7.13) 
This verse requires interpretation. ‘Whole world’ cannot be meant literally for ideal 
yogin-s live in the world and do recognize God (BG 14.19).  BG 7.13 should be read in 
light of BG 7.3 in which Krishna states that “hardly anyone truly knows me” since 
ordinary people and most yogin-s do not recognize him.   Recognizing God requires 
seeing through the confusion generated by the guṇa-s.  The ideal yogin is not confused 
but the ordinary person is.  Most practitioners find themselves somewhere between 
these two poles. 
                         
30 Arthur Anthony Macdonell, A Practical Sanskrit Dictionary (Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidass, 2004) 359. 
 
 145 
Instead of ‘confused’, some translators have rendered mohita as ‘deluded’.31  
But the states and faculties associated with the guṇa-s do not necessarily involve non-
veridical perception or false beliefs.   Sattva, for example, includes knowledge.  Moha 
(confusion) can be understood merely as the effect the guṇa-s have of obscuring the 
true nature of the self, God, and reality.  The states they include can so capture a 
person’s attention that he spends his days fully absorbed in them.  Most of us think 
only of what we know, what we imagine, what we ought to do, and what we want to 
do.  We are caught up in the life of the mind and do not look beyond it.  
When one is able to turn attention away from states like desire one may come 
to know the ultimate truth.  “When he . . . knows that which is beyond the guṇa-s, he 
reaches my being” (BG 14.19).  This knowledge is gained by sustained contemplation 
of God and his nature. 
Knowing that which is beyond the guṇa-s brings about the transcendence of 
them.  BG 14.19 states that when one knows that which is beyond the guṇa-s one 
“reaches Krishna,” or liberation.  Since God is beyond the guṇa-s, reaching this state 
would require transcending the guṇa-s.  
BG 14.19 also states that the ideal yogin “perceives no doer (kartṛ) other than 
the guṇa-s.”  Minor takes this to mean that the ideal yogin knows that the guṇa-s cause 
all human action.  He explains that the one who has transcended the guṇa-s sees this 
but knows better than to take the actions of the guṇa-s as his own.  
However, BG 14.19 cannot mean that the ideal yogin recognizes no agent at all 
other than the guṇa-s.  The ideal yogin knows that God is an agent.  Even if, as 
Rāmānuja holds, God controls the guṇa-s and acts through them he is still the agent 
and the guṇa-s can be nothing more than his instruments.  Minor’s strict reading of 
                         
31 Minor say they cause “confusion and delusion.” Minor, Bhagavad-Gītā 244; 
Rāmānuja, Gītā Bhāṣya 251; Śaṅkarācarya, Bhagavad Gita 213; Winthrop Sargeant, 
The Bhagavad Gītā, ed. Christopher Chapple Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1984) 331. 
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this verse is not acceptable.  It entails either that God is inactive or that his actions are 
determined by the guṇa-s and he is therefore not free.  
‘Doer’ in BG 14.19 must be taken in a limited sense.  It cannot refer to God 
and I will show below that it does not refer to the ideal yogin either.  It can refer only 
to ordinary people.  BG 7.13, as I take it, states that ordinary people do not see 
anything not mediated by the guṇa-s.  The reasons for which they act, then, are always 
either sattvic, rajasic, or tamasic and their agency is never exercised independently of 
the guṇa-s.  In my view what the ideal yogin knows, according to BG 14.19, is that for 
ordinary people agency is not exercised apart from the guṇa-s. 
The ideal yogin, on the other hand, is free from the influence of the guṇa-s.  In 
BG 14.23 Krishna explains that the yogin “is not stirred (vicālyate) by the guṇa-s, 
thinking only ‘the guṇa-s go on (vartante)’.”  Unlike ordinary people, the ideal yogin 
does not respond to his sense of duty, desires, and delusions.  He watches as feelings 
of obligation to do certain things and desires for certain objects arise, but he does not 
act from them.   
In Chapter 3, I described how restraint of desire is to be understood.  It can be, 
alternately, to reign in desire so tightly as to immobilize it, or to stand firm and 
immobile oneself as desires well up and generate turbulence in the inner landscape.  In 
practicing nirguṇa karman, the latter form of restraint is applied to desire and all other 
features that belong to the guṇa-s.  While they might be reigned in, they cannot be 
completely immobilized.  According to BG 14.23, psychological elements associated 
with the guṇa-s are present even in the ideal yogin.  The verse also tells the 
practitioner what to do.  He should be unmoved by the sattvic, rajasic, and tamasic. 
BG 14.19-23 give the most substantive discussion of the transcendence of the 
guṇa-s to be found in the text.  BG 14.19 indicates how it is achieved, while BG 14.23 
describes negatively how one with this achievements acts.  He does neither sattvic, 





Two senses of ‘action’ and ‘agent’ 
 
My interpretation of BG 14.19-23 hinges on taking ‘agent’ in BG 14.19 to refer 
only to a limited group of agents: ordinary individuals.  This is not ad hoc. There are a 
number of verses in the Gītā in which ‘action’ and ‘agent’ must be taken as employed 
in not one general but two limited senses: to refer to ordinary action and agency on the 
one hand and divine or ideal yogic action and agency on the other. 
I showed that a move like this is necessary in reading BG 7.13, where ‘this 
whole world’ cannot refer to all people but just to ordinary people.  Three more 
examples are BG 4.13-14, 4.20, and18.17.  In BG 4.13-14, Krishna states that although 
he as God creates, Arjuna should know him as a non-agent.   
The four types were created by me  
according to their shares of guṇa-s and actions. 
Though I am the doer of that,  
know me as the imperishable non-doer. (BG 4.13) 
Actions do not stain me. 
Nor do I take pleasure in their results. 
Who recognizes me thus 
is not bound by his actions. (BG 4.14) 
BG 4.20 explains that even when the ideal yogin acts he does nothing at all.   
Renouncing attachment to the results of his actions,  
ever-satisfied and free, 
though he be occupied with action 
he really does nothing at all. (BG 4.20) 
BG 18.17 states that the yogin without self-conceit does not kill, even while killing.   
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He who has no self-conceit 
and whose intelligence is unstained,  
even killing these people, he does not kill 
and is not bound.  (BG 18.17) 
The contradictions apparent in these passages suggest they must read in a 
nuanced manner.  I will argue that they employ two senses of ‘agent’ and ‘action’.  In 
one sense, God or the ideal yogin can be identified as agents, but in another sense of 
the term they cannot be.  Similarly, in one sense of the term, action may be attributed 
of God or the ideal yogin, but in another sense it may not be.  
These passages have two more significant commonalities beyond the 
contradictions they contain.  First, the subject of each passage is an agent who is 
described as lacking a feature characteristic of ordinary agents.  In BG 4.13-14, 
Krishna explains that he as God is not bound by his actions.  Normal agents are, and 
this bondage results in rebirth.  The ideal yogin in BG 4.20 has no desire regarding the 
results of his actions, but ordinary agents act out of desire (BG 3.39).  The agent in BG 
18.17 has no self-conceit (ahaṃkāra), though elsewhere this is listed as an element of 
human nature (BG 13.5).  The subject of each verse is established as non-ordinary. 
Second, these three passages all use the subordinate conjunction api, which can 
be translated ‘even’ or ‘though’ and indicates a relationship of concession between the 
subordinate and main clauses.  BG 4.13-14 concedes that God does act, though there is 
a sense in which he is a non-agent.  In BG 4.20 and BG 18.17 it is conceded that the 
ideal yogin does act and does kill, though there is a sense in which he does not, 
namely, he does not generate karmic bondage.   
When BG 4.13-14 calls God a non-agent, I suggest, it means he is not an agent 
in the ordinary sense.  Ordinary agents generate karmic bondage.  While he is a divine 
agent his is not an ordinary agent since, for one thing, he does not accrue karmic 
bondage.  Similarly, when BG 4.20 and BG 18.17 say the ideal yogin does not act, 
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they mean that he does not engage in ordinary action because he is not bound by 
action.  They affirm that he does ideal yogic action and not ordinary action.  
The following argument can be made.  Since bondage is generated by the 
guṇa-s and neither God nor the ideal yogin are bound by their actions, their actions 
must be nirguṇa karman, or free of the involvement of the guṇa-s. 
In my view, these passages implicitly recognize two senses of ‘agent’ and 
‘action’: the divine or ideal yogic and the ordinary.  This suggestion is not novel in 
light of the fact that Krishna frequently contrasts the yogin and the non-yogin (BG 
2.19-21, 2.42-45, 3.31-32, 4.40-41, 6.36).  






BG 14.26 indicates that the practitioner who has transcended the guṇa-s acts, 
but according to BG 14.19-23 he does not act for the sake of duty, desire, or delusion.  
BG 3.22-29 calls such action nonattached and likens it to God’s own action.   
In BG 3.22, Krishna explains that nothing is obligatory for him, yet he as God 
still engages in action.   
For me, O Son of Pṛthā, there is nothing  
in the three worlds which ought to be done. 
There is nothing to be obtained that has not been obtained.  
Still, I engage in action. (BG 3.22) 
He has no duty, nor does he have desire since there is nothing he does not already 
possess.  He acts neither from duty nor desire but in order to keep the world from 
destruction.  He instructs the practitioner: “Let the wise one work, nonattached, for the 
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sake of world maintenance (lokasaṃgraha)” (BG 3.25).  A parallelism seems implied: 
the practitioner should act like God does.  But while God has neither duty nor desire, 
all practitioners have duty and some still have desire.  It is with regard to both duty 
and desire, I think, that the practitioner is told to be nonattached.  Nonattachment is 
often interpreted to mean desirelessness, but if that is all Krishna means here then 
pointing out that he has no duty is superfluous.  The practitioner should abandon 
desire and his interest in duty for duty’s sake.  He works for the sake of world 
maintenance, doing his duty because it contributes to world maintenance.  
Verses BG 3.28-29 define nonattachment in terms of the guṇa-s.   
But he who knows  
the guṇa-s and action as two separate things (guṇakarmavibhāga), 
thinking “the guṇa-s move among the guṇa-s,” 
is not attached. (BG 3.28) 
Those who are confused by the guṇa-s of their nature 
are attached to guṇa-related action (guṇa karman). 
The one who knows the whole truth should not disturb 
the weak-minded whose knowledge is incomplete. (BG 3.29) 
Minor takes this passage to teach disidentification with guṇa karman, which he 
understands as the action of material guṇa-s.  As he reads the passage, the practitioner 
should know guṇakarmavibhāga or ‘separation from both the guṇa-s and [action]’.32  
In Minor’s view, the guṇa-s and action are effectively inseparable.  He takes 
guṇakarmavibhāga to refer to one distinction: that between the practitioner’s inner 
self, on the one hand, and the his guṇa-made actions on the other.   
However, the compound guṇakarmavibhāga is grammatically dual in BG 3.28.  
Two vibhāga or distinctions are meant.  Winthrop Sargeant recognizes this and 
                         




renders guṇakarmavibhāga ‘the two roles of guṇa and action’.33  Minor, holding as he 
does the necessity of the guṇa-s for action, must ignore the number of the compound     
I take BG 3.28, like BG 14.23, to describe the ideal yogin’s recognition that the 
states and so on that belong to the guṇa-s go through their own processes and need not 
involve him.  They arise and cease for certain reasons, pull on him harder under 
certain conditions, lay dormant then later reappear, and so on.  He knows from 
experience that the guṇa-s and action are two separate things (guṇakarmavibhāga).   
He knows what it is to act free of the influence of his sense of duty, desires, and 
delusions.  He is nonattached; his action is neither sattvic, rajasic, or tamasic.   
On the other hand, ordinary people can only act for reasons like duty, desire, or 
delusion.  BG 3.29 calls them attached.  Specifically, they are “attached to guṇa-
related action (guṇa karman)” (BG 3.29).34  Attachment to guṇa karman means doing 
guṇa karman – doing sattvic, rajasic, and/or tamasic action. 
To do guṇa karman is to act for one’s own reasons.  It is to act from concern 
with one’s own duty or svadharma, selfish interest in obtaining the objects of one’s 
desires, or foolish clinging to one’s peculiar delusions.  It is to act as an individual, 
according to one’s own lights.   
 The practitioner who transcends the guṇa-s is free from the limitations of 
individuality.  He is “established in oneness” (BG 6.31).  Recognizing that what is 
essential or inherent in all beings is the same (BG 6.29), he “sees [God] everywhere 
                         
33 Sargeant, Bhagavad Gītā 185. 
 
34 BG 3.28 explains that “the guṇa-s move (vartante) among guṇa-s.”  As I have 
argued, this verse only makes a claim about ordinary people.  It may mean that when 
one acts on sattvic incitement (with knowledge that something is obligatory) it is 
because one possesses virtue, which is also sattvic (18.6, 30).  And when one acts 
from rajasic incitement (perception of a desired object) it may be because one is 
selfish, which is a rajasic trait (14.17, 18.24).  Sattvic, rajasic, and tamasic incitement 
may have a pull on a person by appealing to sattvic, rajasic, and tamasic qualities the 
person possesses.  
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and all things in [God]” (BG 6.30).  This recognition engenders equanimity, the joyous 
embrace of all beings, and the concern that they all should thrive.  The practitioner 
adopts Krishna’s universal aim of world maintenance. 
 
 
Surrendering action to Krishna 
 
Surrendering action to Krishna, I will argue, is just the positive aspect of 
nirguṇa karman, which has been identified already.  It is the adoption by the 
practitioner of God’s ends as his own, or doing one’s duty for the sake of world 
maintenance.   
In BG 3.30, Krishna implores Arjuna to fight, “surrendering all actions to me” 
(mayi sanyasya).  He promises Arjuna that if he does this he will be free from the 
bondage of rebirth (BG 3.31).  This promise is made again in BG 12.6-7. 
But those who hold me as supreme, 
surrendering all actions to me,  
meditating on me, 
worship me with undistracted yoga. (BG 12.6) 
I soon deliver 
from the sea of death and transmigration 
those who enter into me 
in contemplation. (BG 12.7) 
Sargeant takes surrendering one’s actions to Krishna, or ‘deferring actions to Krishna’ 
as he translates it, to be allowing Krishna to initiate one’s actions.35  I reject this 
                         




suggestion as it amounts to Arjuna’s giving up his very agency when all that is asked 
of him is to surrender his actions. 
 B. K. Matilal sees Arjuna as simply letting Krishna tell him what to do.  He 
sees this as Arjuna’s only alternative given his moral dilemma.  Matilal argues that the 
choice between two “irreconcilable alternatives” can only be based on irrational or 
non-moral grounds.36  He takes Arjuna’s acceptance of Krishna’s directions as non-
rational, which entails that Arjuna acts from simple obedience.  I reject this view.  It 
sees Arjuna as sacrificing too much intellectually.  If Krishna means for the 
practitioner to simply obey, he would not take so much time and care to explain the 
role of sacrifice in world maintenance, the unity of all beings in God, and other things 
which help make Arjuna understand why he should do what he should do. 
 Furthermore, Krishna never asks Arjuna to allow God to initiate all his 
actions, nor does he insist on Arjuna’s simple obedience.  Meanwhile, he does ask 
Arjuna to make world maintenance his aim.  In doing so, I think he indicates what 
form he would like Arjuna’s sacrifice to him to take.   
Arjuna’s moral dilemma amounts to not knowing what to do to most 
effectively contribute to world maintenance.   He is worried that fighting against his 
cousins will lead to the downfall of the family and consequently of society at large.  
This is a worry about world maintenance and how to secure it.  Future practitioners 
will face this general problem too.  
While Krishna tells Arjuna what to do in the current situation, he also tells him 
how in general he is to decide such questions.  This counts against Sargeant’s and 
Matilal’s suggestions.  Krishna says scripture should be the guide for determining 
one’s obligations. 
                         
36 B. K. Matilal “Moral Dilemmas: Insights from the Indian Epics,” Moral Dilemmas 
in the Mahābhārata, ed. Bimal Krishna Matilal (Delhi: Indian Association of 




Therefore, scripture as your measure, 
determining what should and what should not be done, 
knowing the prescribed scriptural injunction, 
should you perform action here. (BG 16.24) 
Of course, scripture is not always adequate.  BG 16.24 does not indicate how 
one is to know what to do when the duties prescribed by scripture conflict, as in 
Arjuna’s case at the outset of the Gītā.  Arjuna’s problem is not uncommon, but his 
solution to it is.  He knows Krishna by acquaintance and in this relationship receives 
instruction from him directly.  Scripture is normative, but God overrides it as the 
ultimate source of normativity. 
The greatest promise, perhaps, of the Gītā is that anyone may attain a personal 
relationship with God.  The devotee must “think solely of [God]” (BG 4.10), intent on 
him alone (BG 12.6).   When he is able to transcend the guṇa-s he will know God by 
acquaintance.  This is assured.  In return for devotion, God brings the devotee near to 
him (BG 4.11, 7.23, 8.10, 9.25, 9.28, 9.34, 10.10, 11.55, 18.65-68).  Along with 
immortality, nearness to God is the ultimate goal of yoga. 
The text strongly suggests that this nearness yields direct perception of God as 
is granted to Arjuna in Chapter 11.  This is arguably the dramatic high point of the 
text.   
After Krishna gives Arjuna a vision of his true form, he asks Arjuna to “be 
[his] instrument” (BG 11.33).  The Gītā suggests that when one knows God by 
acquaintance he will guide one in times of moral conflict as he does Arjuna.  The 
fraternal tenor of their exchange seems to convey that God is easily accessible to his 
devotees and generous in giving direction, wisdom, and encouragement.   
Even when he does not take human form, God, as the inner self, is with one at 
all times.  He may speak, perhaps, through the voice of conscience.  Krishna’s 
emphasis on the yogic importance of knowing one’s true self may have implications 
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for action beyond freeing one from desire and the fear of death.  The inner self may 
possess innate moral wisdom.  Krishna identifies God as the inner self, and calls God 
“the goodness of the good” (BG 10.36).  Self-knowledge may be the route to accessing 
ultimate knowledge of good and bad.   
Still, whether God provides the devotee with practical guidance, and if so how, 
is not made clear.  It is left, perhaps, for the devotee to learn through experience.  
   
 
Succinct definition of karma yoga 
 
The preceding work allows me to make my definition of karma yoga more 
succinct.  Karma yoga is the practice of doing one’s duty for the sake of world 
maintenance as a sacrifice to God.  This requires transcending the guṇa-s, or turning 
away from all reasons for action that are generated by sattvic, rajasic, or tamasic 
psychological features, and instead adopting God’s ends as one’s own, or surrendering 




Karma yoga, choice, and creativity 
 
Karma yoga is voluntary.  Turning away from the promptings of the guṇa-s 
such as desire and one’s sense of duty is done by choice and application of self-
control.  The ideal yogin does not surrender his will but chooses to make God’s ends 
his own.   
Furthermore, as these ends are broadly construed there is room for choice in 
how to achieve them.  Krishna tells Arjuna to fight, for example, but Krishna does not 
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spell out each move Arjuna should make.  Arjuna is free to, and will doubtless have to, 
exercise choice on the battlefield in many split-second decisions and more deliberate 
strategic maneuvers.  
World maintenance in an ever-changing world implies creativity.  With time 
comes new knowledge and new technologies.  These create new opportunities for 
action and give rise to new moral questions.  For example, what duties, if any, does a 
sperm donor have to children conceived using his sperm?  Over time the social 
landscape changes, bringing new problems that require solutions and new 
opportunities that must be explored with discernment.  For example, is it permissible 
for earnest Westerners to study yogic teachings which were supposed to be kept secret 
to all but those with commitment to a guru and formal initiation?  For society to 
flourish, which is a goal of world maintenance, such questions need to be answered 
with compassion and good judgment.  And that judgment is necessarily creative, for 
what it must produce is the right answer to a new question.   
The Gītā leaves open the practitioner’s relationship to such creativity.  Arjuna 
was unable to resolve his moral dilemma.  He was incapable of the creativity required.  
Yet this need not mean that all practitioners will be so incapable.  As I argued in 
Chapter 1, it is best to take Arjuna to represent the new practitioner.  The ideal yogin 
may be capable of more.   
Krishna declares that he is the inner self of all living beings.  This permits of a 
variety of interpretations as a survey of the classical commentators’ works shows.  
Among those I discussed,  Abhinavagupta takes the identity of God and individual 
selves to entail the heaviest correlation of qualities between God and man.  
Abhinavagupta argues that since God is free to create, and individual selves are 
identical with God, then the individual selves have God’s power of creation.  He goes 
so far as to affirm the practitioner’s ability to create cities, for example, without 
building materials, tools, or manpower but by pure will.   
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There is nothing in the Gītā to block a view like Abhinavagupta’s, though 
admittedly there is nothing to recommend such a view either.  Yet such creativity may 
be possible for us.  The very possibility is inspiring, tantalizing, and worrisome.  With 
such power, would not the imperative to restrain desire be all the more important?  
Perhaps Krishna intends to leave the question of our creativity to be explored by those 
willing to ask it.  He performs a miracle in revealing his true form to Arjuna so that he 
might know God’s nature.  But note that while Krishna also wishes Arjuna to know 
the nature of his own inner self, he does not attempt to reveal Arjuna’s true form to 
Arjuna.  He leaves that, rather, for  him to discover on his own.  So does he leave it to 








Summary of the main conclusions 
 
The main questions of this dissertation are: 
1. Is effort considered, in the Gītā, in principle possible?  
2. Is action in karma yoga to be free of desire?  If so, how can action be 
performed without desire?  
3. How is action in karma yoga to be specifically characterized? 
4. What does it mean to transcend the guṇa-s and surrender action to God?  
 The answer to the first question is yes.  Krishna indicates voluntarism in a 
number of ways: implicitly recognizing that Arjuna can choose to fight or not, naming 
volitional opposites as his obstacles on the battlefield, seeking to convince Arjuna to 
fight, explicitly stating effort and self-control as required for yoga, and offering 
Arjuna alternative practices that he may choose from based on his ability.  At the same 
time, Krishna’s metaphysics contains no element that entails determinism.  His 
metaphysics is not materialist and he makes no statements indicating any general view 
of causation.  Interpreters who attribute to the Gītā elements of classical Sāṃkhya 
which entail determinism commit a fallacy of anachronism, reading the later 
philosophy into the text.  There is no substantial theoretical indication of determinism 
in the Gītā.  The few verses that do prima facie suggest determinism can be 
reinterpreted in line with the overall voluntarist tenor of the text. 
 On the second question, yes, action in karma yoga is to be free from desire.  
Niṣkāma karman, or desireless action, is without any form of desire, contrary to those 
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who argue that only a certain subset of desires are disallowed.  The Gītā describes 
several forms of action as utterly desireless.  Sattvic action is duty for duty’s sake, 
done without desire for the results.  Action done from pure compulsion is also 
desireless.  (Compulsion and desire are distinct.)  God acts without desire and for the 
sake of world maintenance.  Many forms of action count as desireless.  Karma yoga is 
one of them.  
 The Gītā does not include a theory of motivation.  In answer to the question of 
how action can be performed without desire, I develop a theory that is consistent with 
the Gītā’s teachings.  Krishna mentions briefly that he supports beings’ movement by 
endowing them with ojas, or energy.  I interpret this energy as serving as a 
motivational push that is always present but which must be coordinated with the pull 
of a reason to generate motivation.  Krishna provides a detailed theory of reasons, or 
incitement.  Reasons may be derivative from one’s concern for duty (sattvic), one’s 
desire (rajasic), one’s delusion (tamasic), or perhaps a combination of these.  To act 
for the sake of duty, desire, or delusion is to act on reasons generated by psychological 
faculties and states which belong to the guṇa-s, certain sets of psychological features.  
I argue that, contrary to many commentators and interpreters, the guṇa-s are not 
constituents of material nature which obey strict causal laws.   
 In answer to the third and fourth questions, I define karma yoga as doing one’s 
duty as an offering to God, free from the influence of the guṇa-s.  To transcend the 
guṇa-s is to look past one’s personality and discount one’s sense of duty, desires, and 
delusions as reasons to act.  The practitioner instead adopts God’s end of world 
maintenance.  Thus he makes his actions an adequate and appropriate sacrifice to God.  
To do so is to surrender his actions to God.  Yet, karma yoga is undertaken willingly.   





Closing remarks on freedom 
 
 The Gītā recognizes human freedom in the senses commonly recognized in 
Western discussions of freedom, such as having open alternatives, having been able to 
do otherwise, having the sources of one’s actions be in oneself, and so on, as discussed 
in Chapter 2.   
 Karma yoga promises far greater freedom than this.  Liberation is the ultimate 
freedom as the state of permanent release from all suffering.  But even before this goal 
is reached, the practitioner experiences freedom unfamiliar to ordinary people.   
 Through the restraint of desire, he is less and less troubled by dissatisfaction.  
He learns how to be content.  Failure stings less, and the ego’s demand for success is 
relaxed.  He thus feels more free to exercise creativity in his undertakings.  New ways 
of doing things necessarily involve risk, as they have not been tried before and might 
not work.  He more and more finds the fortitude to take such risks.  He is better able to 
rise to occasions that require new solutions.  The world stands to benefit from his 
innovativeness, and he may experience joy in being creative. 
 As he deepens in his level of self-understanding, his fear of death abates.  He 
worries less about disease, old age, accidental harm, or being the victim of violence.  
He stops letting worries like these limit his behavior and his enjoyment of family, 
friends, and other fellow beings.   
 As he learns to identify with all beings through mutual identity with God, he 
grows in compassion and his loneliness diminishes. 
 Finally, even before liberation, the practitioner experiences freedom from his 
own finitude.  As his sphere of concern grows to include the whole of creation, so 
does the significance of his actions.  He grows in confidence that his efforts contribute 
to the flourishing of all living things, and even, beyond that, to God’s work.  He does 
not worry that his life is without meaning.       
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 Through his practice the yogin finds freedom from the most crushing woes of 
the modern era: dissatisfaction, blocked creativity, loneliness, and meaninglessness.  
He is freed from the problems the ancients recognized as intrinsic to human life: fear, 
suffering, sickness, and death.  His agency increases, in a sense, as desire and fear 
diminish and he finds himself willing to engage in a wider range of activities.  Further, 
as his creativity grows and he comes to realize the vastness of what is possible for 
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